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The Kantian Thing-in-Itself
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The Creative Mind

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

By
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DEDICATED

TO

Dr. G. A. Tawney, Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio.

AND TO

My wife, Elizabeth Gold Miller, who, along with the author, labored long and patiently to perfect this Manuscript for publication.

If man's mental reveries were wings,
he would never know the human hurt
of earthly pebbles in his shoes.

— — — — —

The mind of man is like a captive
eagle which forever frets at its
hateful tether.

— — — — —

The Looms of Time and Mind
eternal Weave
the Golden Fancies
of Man's Waking Dream.

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INTRODUCTION

To SUGGEST a solution for the "Thing-in-itself," is, at the same time, to suggest a solution for the problem of value; which problem is the point about which moves a great deal of the philosophical discussion of modern and especially recent times.

Previous to modern times, it was generally taken for granted that things of the highest value must have a supranatural origin. But this traditional view may well be questioned. The feeling that values are not fixed and unchangeably *determinate,* but that they have a certain *indeterminateness,* leads to the feeling that they may be quite natural and quite human. The genetic method of dealing with values tends to show that valuation may be conceived as a systematic, progressive, and continuous determination of the stream of conation and feeling in the individual mind. Presuppositions become actual in feeling and desire; and actual feelings, desires, and dispositions, when formed, become presuppositions of new feelings and desires, and of further modifications of quality and degree.

Therefore, we have a psychological basis for the study of the laws of valuation. The concrete laws of the tendency to evaluate are not reducible to general laws of feeling, but rather of affective-volitional processes conceived as a whole. If we let the term "interest" designate the "conative" process, then we may say that the acquirement of affective-volitional meaning is based on a law of "interest." Thus, upon the basis of these findings, we may safely conclude that value is a "worth-experience"; a feeling with certain presuppositions, based on the law of "interest."

If the above statements, founded on the findings of W. M.

Urban, are true, then we have not only to deal with ultimate "norms," or so-called supra-natural "abstractions," but also with the facts of psychology, as they become factors in the process of evaluation. If we hold that the act of evaluating has two aspects, the "normative" and the "psychological," we should be able to reconcile the two and combine them into one intelligible conception. In other words, we should learn how to interpret the "norm" of Kant's so-called *Intelligible will* in terms of the laws of the *Empirical will.*

These two tendencies seem to combine or to reconcile themselves, if we say that we first "feel" the value of things, and then "evaluate" them. This takes in the "function" with its "feelings" and "norms." Again, what appears on one level as "habit," may, on another level, take the place of "meaning." "Selective thinking is the systematic or progressive and continuous determination of the stream of thought in the individual's mind." When the acquired meaning of one attitude becomes dispositional, it then functions as an assumption or presupposition of new feelings and modes of valuation. The subjective feeling forms a "norm"; but when this is projected it becomes a demand, the acknowledgment of which is the condition of further appreciation or "subjective" feeling. For instance, we first conceive God (a norm); then we project the "norm." The projection, being then "objective," demands appreciation. So, God *conceived* is the *first* "norm"; and God *objectified* is the *second* "norm."

Consequently, as Thomas Reid suggests, "could we but obtain a distinct and full history of all that hath past in the mind of a child, from the beginning of life and sensation, till it grows up to the use of reason—how its infant facilities began to work and how they brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions, and sentiments which we find in ourselves when we come to be capable of reflection—this would be a treasure of natural history, which would probably give more light into the human faculties than all the systems

of the philosophers about them since the beginning of the world."

Having touched on the *origin* of value, let us now go on to consider its *nature* and *significance*. If values are relative to human development and to reflective processes, it is reasonable to suppose that they may be of the *nature* of means or ends. The development of an organism is dependent upon its adjustment to, and its control of, the environment. No organism would for long continue to deem valuable those things which did not in some way serve its purposes. Some things thought to be of merely *intrinsic* worth, may yet be, in some subtle sense, of *instrumental* worth. Even an heirloom in the form of an old spinning wheel, no longer used for spinning, serves a purpose: It is associated with the ideals of thrift and industry; which may, in turn, become the very stuff of manhood. This is just one little example of how so-called *intrinsic* values or "ends-in-themselves" may be, in reality, *instrumental* in nature. On this basis, all of John Dewey's *intrinsic* values are at bottom *instrumental* in character. They are, to be sure, the "unquestioned" values; but he himself goes on to say that they are "unquestioned" as to some particular situation. Thus, they are *instrumental* in character. Especially emotional values, such as those which pertain to art, are thought of as *intrinsic*. Indeed, they may be thought of in this way; but we ought, nevertheless, to remember that in this case *intrinsic* is an abstraction, made for the moment, on the basis of some particular interest which, in fact, when looked at from a different angle, comes to be not purely *intrinsic*, but rather one aspect of a more comprehensive whole of *instrumental* value. If a painting did not serve in the promotion of emotional experience, it would not for long be considered great.

Even the "family" possesses no purely *intrinsic* value. It is a means to a further and indefinite end, rather than an end in itself. To be an end in itself, the offspring would have to be

born minus the reproductive urge. The family would then be a *determinate* entity; an absolute within itself. This, however, is not the case. Children, as a rule, are born with the urge to mate and reproduce the species. Any given family, or the family as a social organization, is always the potentiality of future families. The family is a natural order, set up in keeping with certain reproductive tendencies which become the means of further racial development. And even after offspring appear, the family does not cease to be *instrumental* in character. For, as a family, it is the means to a fuller and richer life, which is never static, but always progressive in nature. In other words, the whole "family regime" comes to be one big *instrumental* process of caring for, educating, and training children. And this program of rearing children to have families; to have families to rear children; to rear children to have families becomes one "largely unconscious instrumental process" of promoting the interests of human life, considered as a social whole. Anything that does not serve in this plan is soon consciously or unconsciously dropped by the way.

It is, however, sometimes held that *personality* is an "intrinsic" value. But how could this be? For every true personality is an example of continual "growth" or "change." And this growth or change involves "causes" or "instrumentalities." And these are instrumental values. Therefore, no personality is at any given time "complete," or "absolute," or "intrinsic" in itself. The social group is always contributing to it, and it is also always contributing to the social group of which it is a part. And no process of this kind could be absolutely "intrinsic." It is "intrinsic-instrumental."

In short, if we hold that there are *intrinsic* values, should we not say that they are after all but the reflective "abstractions" out of a larger whole? For, treated genetically, instrumental and intrinsic values are very closely related. If we hold for any sort of development or evolution of values, we

get, as has been said, a sort of "value-movement" or "Werthbewegung"; in which process, so-called *intrinsic* values are always passing over into *instrumental* values, and *instrumental* into *intrinsic*. Therefore, in a psychological analysis the sharp distinction between *instrumental* and *intrinsic* is broken down; and yet the *instrumental* argument has, in some sense, the greater weight, especially if we hold that all evaluation has a psychological basis and is founded on the feeling of need (*Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,* Baldwin, p. 824).

Concerning the above discussion, it is possible that there are at least *five* Thought-Moods: (1) The Practical; (2) The Scientific; (3) The Metaphysical; (4) The Logical; and (5) The Emotional. Relative to the last three moods, and for example, God may be thought of as a *Universal* and *Metaphysical Ground,* as *Logical Non-Being,* or as *the final goal toward which the world moves*. But in no one of these five moods is God conceived as an "efficient cause." For instance, in mood *three,* the manifestations and activities of God are within and of the series; in mood *four* the concept is a purely logical one; and in mood *five* God is the ideal goal toward which all cosmic forces move. In the Metaphysical and Logical moods, God will be more or less *impersonal.* But in the Emotional mood, he will be *personal,* in that he is the formulation, projection, and personification of a sort of emotional reflection, which demands a power greater than itself, to which one may feel obligated and call upon for guidance and protection. Such a power, born out of the Emotional mood, will naturally take on the attribute of *personality*. Consequently, all of these ways are, in a sense, legitimate ways of thinking about God. Only, we should remember that each mood has its own peculiar demands, and that it makes use of the concepts which best serve to satisfy those demands. Even the *Practical* and the *Scientific* moods make their demands, as will later be shown.

That "thing" or "concept" is *instrumental,* in the larger

sense of this term, when it tends to produce or promote satisfaction in terms of the Practical, the Scientific, the Metaphysical, the Logical, or the Emotional, or any two or more of these moods combined.

But neither reference to the Emotional mood, nor any other reference found in this work, is to be understood as implying belief in any kind of *transcendent* existence, except when the term *transcendent* is capable of being interpreted in a logical sense. *For it is possible that thought, in its highest form, is simply a higher level of a natural evolution.* Reflection or the power to evaluate is, in some sense, analogous to the rose which is a product of a thorny bush. It is *like,* yet it is *unlike,* that from which it comes. The rosebush, with its roots, leaves, and thorns, is natural. Is not also the rose? The ovum, the embryo, and the child, are natural. Is not the power of man to reflect and to evaluate also natural? Where have we any right to draw the line? Where can we say that the biological ends and the psychological begins?

In the light of such reflection, the implication of which is evident, the "Thing-in-itself," ideals, and concepts of all kinds, including God himself, are just moments in the natural evolutionary process. That is, all these things are products of the evolution or unfolding of the natural "world-stuff." Richard Swann Lull, and others, are inclined to believe, not that man came directly from the monkey; but that the anthropoid apes and man came from a common ancestor; and that man, in turn, came from some primitive reptilian form. Others, that he came from the amphibians; which, in turn, evolved from a fish-form; the latter from an invertebrate; and so on down to the protozoa. Still further, there seems to be evidence that earlier living forms evolved from the inorganic world. That is, that they were the products of some kind of primordial "stuff."

Upon this basis, then, the power to evaluate; to form hypotheses; to formulate concepts; and to believe in God are

the natural functions of complex organisms, just as eating and sleeping are the natural functions of both lower and higher organisms.

In a diffuse nervous system, like that of the sea-anemone, the external surfaces of the animal serve as receptors, and communicate directly with the subjacent musculature. The nerve-net serves to spread the impulses throughout the body, but without involving a central organ. That is, the sea-anemone has "receptors" and "effectors," but no "adjustor" or central nervous system properly so called. This central organ is a feature of the higher animals, and a recent evolutionary acquisition. The sense organs did not develop because we had a central nervous system; but the central nervous system developed because our very early ancestors had already acquired receptors and muscles. In highly differentiated types, the sense organs, that is, the eye, the ear, the organs of touch, of taste, and of smell, to some extent, supply the central apparatus with those elements out of which the intellectual life is constructed. With the adjustor, there came the power to modify responses in relation to past activity. Thus, there was built up a storehouse of experience which became the seat of the intellectual life. As C. Lloyd Morgan would say, the cortex played back upon the sub-cortical or lower brain centers; the two synthesized; and experience and intelligence was the result; intelligence consisting in the ability to act in the light of the past, and so to evaluate.

Thus, the adjustor, a later development, becomes the central region of evaluation. The cerebral cortex, about one cubic centimeter of protoplasm, containing about twelve billion brain cells, is the center of all human mental states, that is, sensations, memories, volitions, emotions, affections, the highest flights of poetry, the most profound thoughts of philosophy, the most far-reaching theories of science, and the concept of a God as creating a world out of "nothing."

But this is not to say that the human mechanism is all there

is to life. It is the purpose of this little book to show that just the opposite is the case. It is true that all life *involves* "mechanization"; but it is not true that life is *only* a "mechanism." A machine may produce something very much unlike itself, that is, in form and function. Likewise, this human mechanism, this little lump of protoplasmic stuff, may go beyond its apparent self, and create a world.

William Brown, in *Psychology and the Sciences,* says that the so-called real world is a wild abstraction. Biology, physics, mathematics, astronomy, and so forth, are all abstract sciences. In short, any true reality involves the experience or possible experience of sentient beings.

In fact, the whole of *philosophy or metaphysics reduces itself to a process of evaluation; to discovering a method of interpreting mental phenomena in terms of meaning, purpose, and value.* But how did this ever come to be the case? Why did man learn to make hatchets, axes, knives, weapons, and instruments of all kinds? On the other hand, why have men come to have so many kinds of intellectual tools?

It may be that to ask such questions is to answer them. However, we do not mean to kill the fox and spoil the chase. But one begins to feel that these are vital questions. A simple Southern farmer cuts a hole in a gourd and hangs it on a snag over a spring. A child can tell you why the farmer does so, and what the gourd-dipper is good for. But when a simple primitive creates a spirit, in order to explain the existence of a spring, men begin to look for a supernatural world in which such spirits dwell. Does not man give shape to both gourd-dippers and water-spirits? And that because each of them is necessary to the business of living? Are not spirits shaped by *nature* and the *mind* of man, just as gourd-dippers are shaped by *nature* and the *hand* of man? Are not both attempts to complete an imperfect world? The *spirit* is the means of the spring, and the *gourd-dipper* is the means of getting the water to the mouth.

Someone may say that there is a deeper reason why the primitive man created a water-spirit. We may also say that there is a deeper reason why the farmer made his gourd-dipper. As we have said, both proceed on the basis of need. But is this all? Is there not back of the felt need that unique function called "reflection?" In its first stages, reflection may be something like awe or wonder. The human race in its slow development has passed through periods of childhood and youth. Just as the individual begins his intellectual life in wonder, questionings, and curiosity; so has the race advanced from a condition of childish wonder, questionings, and interpretations of mankind and the external world. In some sense, *spirits* and *concrete tools* are the *products* of this *reflective wondering,* along with an instinctive consciousness of the necessity of adjusting oneself to the world by supplying, here and there, out of the "creative mind," that which is lacking in the realistic situation. Just as to the child the happenings about him seem to be caused by real beings; so the primitive man saw in the wind some hidden spirit which bent the tree, or turned things over, or moved them along the earth. A little more reflective wondering, and men saw the sun, the moon, and the stars, as Gods marching around the world! They must be Gods or beings of some kind; for only beings can move themselves or other beings. Where there is motion, there is being; Spirit only is "active." This is not such bad reasoning; it is the doctrine of the good Bishop Berkeley.

We may say that these findings of primitive man are not correct; but, nevertheless, they were the stepping stones to what we now call scientific knowledge. Aristotle says, "It is owing to their wonder, that men both now begin, and at first began, to philosophize." There may be people too low in intelligence to have curiosity or wonder; but most human beings, however primitive, have explanations for the common things or events of Nature, such as day and night, life and death, sickness, health, sleep, moon, stars, sun, seasons, and the

like. One of the commonest and most natural is the personal interpretation of Nature, which assumes that all things are alive and possessed of something like human personality. It is only a step from here to the ideas of Cause, Soul, Immortality, and God, in which all men more or less believe. For, as Hobbes says, it is the peculiar nature of man to be inquisitive as to the cause of events, especially as to the causes of his own good and evil fortune. It is natural to think of anything that had a beginning as having had a cause. Unlike the beast, man observes how one event follows, or is followed by, another, and remembers antecedents and consequents. And when he cannot be certain, he supposes causes, such as are suggested by his own fancy. As Alfred Weber says, in his *History of Philosophy,* "Animated by an all-powerful instinct to discern the causes of things, and to comprehend them within the unity of a first cause, the human mind no sooner reaches certain elementary truths in physics, mathematics, and morals, than it hastens to synthesize them; to form them into universal theories; into ontological systems, i.e., to philosophize or to make metaphysics."

Looking forward to a more detailed explanation of the process of evaluation, of the rise of concepts, and of the origin and function of hypotheses, let us say here that all evaluation is in some sense based on need, whether spoken of as being Practical, Emotional, Scientific, Metaphysical, or Logical.

In the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,* p. 106, David Hume says, "whatever is valuable in any kind, so naturally classes itself under the division of useful or agreeable, the *utile* or the *dulce,* that it is not easy to imagine why we should ever seek further, or consider the question as a matter of nice research or inquiry." No one may ever quite know the whole of Reality. The world is never quite perfect or complete. But the process of curiosity and wonder; of reflection and evaluation leads in the direction of a perfect world,

rational, logical, and good. Man's essence is "thinking"; ordering his life according to his practical needs and in keeping with his logical demands. It may be that a process something like this is a vital constituent of ultimate Reality. Even for Plato, the "Good" is that which has utility. It is an instrument for dealing with a certain set of facts. *The valuable is that which is good for something. A vision of the "Good" is desirable, in that such a vision may transmute common men into uncommon men.* Even for Socrates and Plato, concepts are relative to man's purposes. We consciously or unconsciously create concepts to be used as tools. In short, *valuation is the process of selecting the stimulus needed, and is a higher and more recent activity of the organism.* Therefore, the ability to evaluate accompanies the development of the *will.* May this not suggest their relation? May it not be that *value or the "Thing-in-itself" is, in essence, like, or similar to, the Moral Will?*

Proceeding now to a fuller treatment of these matters, let us say, that, though we have referred to "value-things," this discussion will be mainly concerned, not with *Phenomenal,* but with *Conceptual* values.

I

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF

In keeping with man's natural wonder and curiosity, it is possible that the concept of the "Thing-in-itself" was one of the earliest abstractions of reflective man, due to a natural tendency to search for a cause of the world; for the unity to which all manifoldness might be reduced; or for the ground for each particular thing or species.

1. *The Early Greek Philosophers:* In the so-called beginning of Greek philosophy, certain cosmologists repudiated the idea of God or Spirit as being the cause of Phenomena, and turned their attention toward some single element visible to the naked eye or evidencing itself in accordance with physical causation.

In the first place, the primal original ground was thought by Thales to be "water." From water everything arises, and to water everything returns. Moisture is essential to the generation and nourishment of plants and animals, and even to the formation of rock or stone. Also, warmth is developed from moisture; so moisture or water is the plastic, universal, life-giving principle. From the condensation and expansion of this fundamental matter, all Phenomena arise.

For Anaximander, some more immaterial, universal, eternal something must be the undetermined ground or "ἀρχή" from which everything proceeds, and into which all things, in order of time, return. This "ἀρχή" may, it is true, be material in some sense; but it is not material in the sense that any one of the four elements is material. It was rather the material

matter before it had separated into material elements. It was the "chemical indifference" of elementary opposites. In that it is a chemical indifference, it lies at the basis of all *determinateness* of the finite and changeable; it itself being infinite and *indeterminate*.

In short, Anaximander manifests an unwillingness to qualify the boundless mass; all of which shows a tendency toward a more abstract mode of thought than we find in his predecessor's concrete sense-perceived substance.

Anaximenes attempts to compromise the situation by stating that the universal ground is the unlimited, all-embracing, ever-moving air; from which, by expansion and condensation, everything is formed, as "fire," "water," "earth," and "stone." Air is a sort of semi-material substance, embracing physical characteristics; but at the same time containing an aspect of mystery; for air is physical in that it seems to be a part of the world; but it is full of mystery when it is thought of in terms of "breath," which is the condition of vital action.

These men sought for the universal essence of concrete being. They found this essence in a material or semi-material substance or substratum, the fundamental forms of Nature or Phenomena being derived from this original matter or half-matter.

For still another one of these early Greek thinkers, all cosmic bodies or spheres revolve in fixed orbits about a common middle point, or central fire; from which light and warmth stream forth into the whole universe. Either this "inner" fire or "number," or both, are the forms to which all things may be reduced. If we emphasize "number" instead of "fire," it lies at the base of all things. Numbers are the true realities, the substances and the grounds of things; and all else is an expression of number. Number is placed behind Phenomena as their basal principle and ground.

In this case we have either an actual material substance, or a purely ideal principle, of all things; the archetype in ac-

cordance with which all things are formed and controlled. To say the least, there is here, in the philosophy of Pythagoras, a more abstract concept than is found in "water" or "moisture." Men were gradually discovering that no purely material or concrete substance satisfied the demands of reflection.

Xenophanes, turning his attention toward the problem, found the solution in the idea of God. True, this God may have been thought of either in material or in intellectual terms; but he was not an element; he was God. And the probability is, that Xenophanes was struggling toward a spiritual cause of the world. At least his causal ground is highly abstract when compared with the earlier concepts of Greek philosophy.

Another group of thinkers differs from the earlier philosophers; from Empedocles, for instance, when they say that not "earth," "air," and "water" are the primal substances; but rather certain minute indivisible particles of matter, which are more elementary than the four elements.

These elements of the atomists are neither *spiritual* nor *material* in the true sense of the term, but rather "conceptual"; that is, they are not personified as God, nor are they comparable to any one or all of the four elements. They are not *perceived,* but *conceived.*

Over against Parmenides, the Eleatic, the atomists say that "Non-Being," though not corporeal, is a species of reality.

For the atomist, the sensible qualities, as color, sound, taste, smell, which we attribute to the different bodies, are not in the things themselves as objects, but merely the effects of combinations of atoms in our sense organs. Atoms, as such, have no qualities except impenetrability, shape, and size. So, sense perception does not yield a true knowledge of things; it merely tells us how these original basic qualities affect us.

Frank Thilly thinks that we have in the concepts of the atomists a distinction between *primary* and *secondary* quali-

ties. Sense perception is obscure knowledge; thought, which transcends our sense perceptions and phenomenal appearances, gives us true knowledge, or knowledge of the true realities. Here is expressed the same feeling that Kant later expressed, though not in the same terms: *The "Thing-in-itself" cannot be known in the sense of knowing sense-qualities; but it can be thought.*

2. *Plato:* Plato sensed the problem, and undertook to solve it. The previous thinkers had confused *Phenomena* with *primal substance; primal substance* with *True Being;* and, again, *True Being* with *Non-Being.*

Plato points out that we have: (1) The world of Ideas or True Being; (2) The world of Non-Being: Matter and Becoming; (3) And, in the third place, and as a middle term between Being and Non-Being, sensible Phenomena.

Now, things are the "copies," in some sense, of the Ideas, or True Being; or, things "participate" in the Ideas, deriving the Being which they possess from the world of True Being; or, finally, the Ideas may be the "final end" of phenomenal things. But Ideas are not the only cause of Phenomena. We must look elsewhere for the cause of the world of appearance.

The word "ὕλη" in Plato is thought to have the same significance as in ordinary speech; that is, it is thought to mean "wood," "timber," and sometimes just "material"; indefinite, undefined material; the "stuff" out of which things may become formed. "ὕλη" is not "matter in general," but rather a sort of "raw material" out of which things are made.

However, it is thought that Plato was not consciously seeking for the basis of the corporeal in a positive substratum. But matter is at least anterior to the elementary bodies; and is of course not perceptible to the senses; for he would urge us not to call fire, air, or water the universal "ὕλη." Gold successively transformed into different figures, would still be called gold. So, there is a nature which in itself permits of

manifold individuation. After all, then, even though Plato may not have consciously sought it, he at least arrived at the concept of a "primordial substratum" other than the simple elements.

At times in Plato, it seems that matter is either Non-Being or partakes of Non-Being; for he says that the only Being which Phenomena has is derived from the world of True Being, the world of Ideas; and, again, that matter and the things of matter are not created. Therefore, "Non-Being" is in some way closely tied up with Phenomena. Now, Phenomena are not caused by the Ideas in any true sense; therefore, they (Phenomena) may be thought of as Non-Being. The *Timaeus* distinguishes the foundation of the corporeal from all Becoming. So, there is a substratum or cause other than Becoming; a substratum which remains the same in spite of the multiplicity and changes of its form. This could easily be Non-Being.

In the *Timaeus* Plato does not use the expression "ὕλη," but he describes the basis of the sensual in such a way that Aristotle ascribes that denotation to him. Matter in both the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus* is the substratum of the sensible Phenomena, and is described as "unlimited." We may ascribe to it all that is capable of "more and less," "stronger and weaker," and so forth. The "unlimited," or "matter," is that within which no fixed and exact determination is possible; the element of "conceptless existence," or of change, which never arrives at *Being* and *Permanence*.

So, in Plato, we find three orders of Reality: (1) The archetype: "Self-identical essence": The Ideas; (2) The sensible Phenomena; (3) The groundwork and receptacle of all Becoming.

This third order of reality is the common element which in some way passively underlies Phenomena; is the active cause of them; or else is identical with them, constituting a world of Non-Being and Becoming. But we are justified in supposing

that there is an underlying substratum, be it Non-Being or not Non-Being; be it material or mental in nature, which supports, or at least is the logical or metaphysical cause of, all determinate matter. In the ceaseless flux of forms in the process of Becoming, this common element or cause runs through them as a permanent and unifying substratum. All Becoming is in and about this substratum, and to it all returns.

But this "ὕλη" has no specific quality or definite form. Yet it *is* and *must be*. For the constant passing of elements, one into another, would be impossible if the determinate parts of matter were real, and not merely modifications of one common, and therefore necessarily indeterminate, third something. For Plato, this "third something" is an invisible and shapeless Nature, capable of taking on any form. Non-Being may take on specific shape in the world of perceptible Phenomena; but the perceptual Phenomena, in turn, are dependent upon the Ideas for their Being; for Non-Being cannot impart Being or true Reality to the world of Phenomena, but can only individuate itself in the world of appearance, still remaining "Non-Being," and not of the world of Ideas.

Therefore, the groundwork of sensuous existence is not *spiritual* in the sense indicated in the pre-philosophical period before Thales; it is not of the nature of any one of the four elements; neither is it *spiritual* or *intellectual* in the Xenophian sense. It is rather that out of which all particular forms of matter arise, and into which they resolve themselves. It is like the unhewn mass out of which the sculptor fashions his figures. No man knows what it is, or what it may become. But when it has "Become" "something other" than the unhewn, undefinable mass, it is too late to define it in its indefiniteness. Neither could one ever catch it in the transformation; for, to the extent that it has "Become," it is definable; and to the extent that it has not "Become," it is still only an undefinable mass; the unknown, the unlimited, Non-Being. In some sense, then, "matter" or Non-Being is the irrational remainder

which is always left over when we abstract from things that which in them is the copy of the Idea. For matter cannot have Being; neither can the world of Phenomena have Being or true Reality, except from the Ideas. Even though the phenomenal world may in some way emerge out of the realm of Non-Being or indefinite matter, this Non-Being is only the passive, metaphysical, or logical cause of such emergence; the active, positive process is the participation in, the copying of, or the struggle toward, the world of Ideas or True Being.

We might say that here lies the logical reason why Kant hesitated to identify the "Thing-in-itself" with the category of "Causality" in any legal sense of the term. For if the "primordial substratum" is thought of as unlimited matter or Non-Being, it cannot well be the active, legal cause of Phenomena. In fact, Plato sometimes represents it as a passive principle. It is not a "material something," but "space," or the "empty," which receives into itself the form of the corporeal. The *Timaeus* never speaks of the groundwork of the sensibly-perceptible, as that out of which things are "made," but as that in which things have "Become."

We may conclude, then, that there is some other principle which is everything that Idea is not, and to which sensuous existence owes its imperfections. This principle, be it material or of the nature of mind, in some way forms the basis of the phenomenal world. As such, it may be thought of as the raw material out of which Phenomena are made. It is in some sense perishable and unreal, imperfect, Non-Being. It is at least evident that Plato sought for something other than the Ideas as the cause of the world of sense. This substratum or logical cause, untouched by ideal principles, must be conceived as being devoid of all qualities. That is, it is formless, indefinite, imperceptible, Non-Being. But this "Non-Being" is not "non-existence"; it is merely a "lower order of existence." It is a sort of substratum for the diversity of the many different objects.

3. *Aristotle:* As for Aristotle, everything in the world is moved by an inner urge to become something greater than it is. *Matter* and *Form* are only relative terms. The man is the Form of which the child was the Matter; the child is the Form and its embryo the Matter; the embryo the Form, the ovum the Matter. This regression may be carried on until we reach the conception of "formless matter," that is, "materia prima." But such formless matter would be "no-thing," for everything that is a real thing has Form. Matter, then, is the possibility of Form; and Form is the actuality, the finished product of formless matter. Form is not only the Form, but it is "shaping force" or "inner necessity and impulse." Form is the realization of the potentialities of Matter. But as Alfred Weber says, it must be remembered that the Matter of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, is not the Matter of the materialists, but what Schelling and Schopenhauer would call "Will," or the "Will to Be"; it is not body, but the transcendental substratum, the principle of corporeality; that which makes the body a body; but it itself is an incorporeal thing, in nature mental or mathematical.

But "motion," according to Aristotle, has a source. How did the vast process of motion and formation begin? This motion must have had a beginning or a source. Aristotle could have resorted to the idea of an Infinite Regression, but the idea of a Prime Mover was more pleasing to him. So, he posited an Unmoved Mover; a being incorporeal, indivisible, spaceless, sexless, passionless, changeless, perfect, and eternal. This God does not *create* the world, but he *moves* it. However, he does not move it as a mechanical force. God is not the "legal cause" of the world. He is a "total motive for all the operations in the world." God moves the world not as modern theologians have imagined, *but as the beloved object moves the lover. He moves the world as the ideal of the "Good" moves him who wishes to be good.* God is the final cause of Nature; the drive and purpose of things; the

Form of the world; the principle of its life; the energizing entelechy or Soul of the world. *God is not a person, but a sort of magnetic power which moves all else by its mystic influence.*

Therefore, in reality, God, and God as a postulate, is the "Thing-in-itself" for Aristotle. Another step, and Aristotle would have saved philosophy much confusion as to the real nature of the "Noumenal Realm."

4. *Erigena:* The founder or precursor of Scholasticism, John Scotus Erigena, influenced by Plato and Aristotle, proceeds to make some further distinctions as to Nature. There is that which creates and is not created, that is, the cause of all that is existent, or non-existent; that which is created and creates; that which is created and does not create; and, finally, that which neither creates nor is created, the end of all things.

The third of these divisions corresponds to the problem of "things-in-themselves," in that they are created but do not create. The problem is that of Non-Being, the passive, metaphysical, or logical cause of both Phenomena and Being, in that there could be no "Being" without "Non-Being," and that "Non-Being" is in some sense the cause of Phenomena.

But by "non-existent" Erigena does not mean that which has absolutely no Being. He means that which is above and beyond both sense and reason.

There is no doubt but that Erigena is here catching up the thread dropped by Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, though he may not have added much to the solution of the problem, he at least helped to hand it on to those who were more vitally interested in it from a purely philosophical point of view.

5. *Galileo:* In the writings of Galileo, we find a recognition of the problem after its having been for some time obscured by theological and semi-theological concepts. For, even Erigena, after stating the problem, lapses into mere theological speculations, consoling himself by the supposition that God

is the *beginning, middle,* and *end* of all things: From him they come; in him, and through him, they exist; and to him they return.

But Galileo, independent of theological speculations, stated the problem in a scientific way. A material or corporeal substance has boundaries, and is of some shape or other, relative to other corporeal substances. It is great or small; it is in this place or in that place; it is at this or that time; it is in motion or at rest; it touches, or does not touch, another body; it is unique, rare, or common. But on the other hand, one is not absolutely compelled to apprehend an object as *white* or *red, bitter* or *sweet, sonorous* or *silent, smelling sweetly* or *disagreeably*. If the senses did not point out these qualities, it is possible that language alone could never have arrived at them. So, one has reason to conclude that these tastes, smells, colors, and the like, in regard to the subject in which they appear to reside, are nothing more than mere names, and exist only in the sensitive body. There is nothing in external bodies for exciting tastes, smells, and sounds, except shape, quantity, and motion; and if ears, tongues, and noses should be removed, it is likely that there would be no sounds, tastes, or smells; which, apart from living creatures, are nothing but words.

We have spoken of the atomists as having given expression to the doctrine of the "Thing-in-itself." It is said that Galileo was well acquainted with the theories of Democritus; and Democritus was one of the atomists. Therefore, Galileo, like Democritus, whom he considered greater than Aristotle, came to feel that all change is nothing but change in the relation of the parts of objects. All is the result of the movement of atoms. Sensible qualities are subjective, and are based on quantitive relations; all "qualities" are explained by "quantities." There is little doubt, then, that Galileo received from the atomists his belief in *primary* and *secondary* qualities.

6. *Locke:* We might say, therefore, with Henri Bergson, that there is no such thing as "individuality"; and that, consequently, John Locke did not, magic-like, draw from out his own ingenious brain the concept of *primary* and *secondary* qualities; but that he was rather the heir and steward of a great inheritance, investing the same with good returns, that he might, like a good steward, hand on more than he had received.

It is, then, safe to say that Locke was the first of the great modern philosophers to recognize the profound significance of our problem, to face it squarely, and to make an honest effort to solve it. The pre-cosmologists were too theological; it was too new for the cosmologists; the atomists, to some extent, saw the problem, but became too obsessed with the idea of indestructible atoms; Erigena is thought to have stated the matter in his four divisions of Nature, but his division is really the basis upon which the absoluteness of God is to be proved; Galileo, like Erigena, saw the difficulty and stated it, but offered no adequate solution in anything like an extended treatment; due, no doubt, to the fact that he was mainly interested in the astronomical aspect of nature; Plato and Aristotle, more than any other men before Locke, saw the problem and set the philosophers on the right track; but until Locke, the most of them shunted off into abstract philosophical or theological speculations, and so missed the real issue.

But Locke manifested his pluck by setting for himself a hard task; which he proceeded to perform in a philosophical fashion, freed from all religious and semi-religious prejudices.

In the first place, there is for Locke an outer, material substance, which is the unknown support and cause of the union of several distinct, simple ideas.

But we are led to believe that there are *two kinds of qualities of material substance,* that is, *primary* and *secondary.* The primary qualities are constant and unchangeable, and al-

ways present when matter is present. These qualities are called *primary* because they are inseparable from matter. They are such as *extension, solidity, motion, rest, duration,* and *position* in time. The objects, being made up of certain *primary* qualities, produce in us, through our senses, certain *secondary* qualities, as sound, color, odor, and the like.

Beneath the primary qualities, however, is "Substance"; which is the normal support of the primal qualities. The *primary* qualities, in turn, are the cause of the *secondary* qualities. Secondary qualities do not resemble the things by which the ideas of them were excited; but they correspond to the things, because they are their constant effects. As to "Substance," Hobbes, before Locke, had tried to cast off the idea of such a thing. Locke himself speaks of it with a certain irony, calling it "I know not what," and comparing a belief in it with the Indians' belief in the necessity of an elephant to support the earth. *But he does not reject it.* He declares it, however, to be a "self-produced" concept, just as is the concept of mathematics. Notwithstanding that it is self-produced, he attributes to it an "external archetype" and an "external ground." This observation is very significant, and one of which we shall have more to say.

Locke's problem, then, is first an epistemological one; and knowledge, in the sense that he speaks of it, can be experienced only by man. "To know" is as characteristic of man as "weight" is characteristic of material bodies; and just so is it, like the latter, an object of empirical observation. The point of departure for his research is the individual subject. In order to consider the nature of the understanding, I can only look into my own understanding, never into that of another. Yet, I believe that the intellectual capacities of most people are created in a peculiar way, and are in a peculiar way effective. Locke's method is regulated by the notion that the questions as to the guarantee or certainty and range of human knowledge are to be answered only through insight into the

nature of the *representations* which are the *elements of knowledge*. By the results of these representations, he seeks to explain his problem in a simple, historical way; and to give, through psychological analysis of the representations, a descriptive statement of the development of the knowledge of an individual subject. He accepts, willingly or unwillingly, the existence of metaphysical realities. On one side, there are a number of material things; on the other, a number of knowing subjects, who are provided with different psychological possibilities. It is supposed that there is a mechanical influence through which sensations generally arise. Bodies produce sensations in us, probably by means of "shocks," just as bodies affect each other. The experience out of which all knowledge arises is a product, which comes through the reaction of the Understanding to the influence of outer things as conditions.

The elements which constitute the corner-stones of the knowledge-structure are *representations* or *ideas*. These spring from two sources: (1) From the senses; and (2) From reflection (the outer and inner senses). The ideas are divided into (1) *simple;* and (2) *complex*. Both of these classes are again divided into sub-classes. There are four kinds of simple ideas: (1) The ideas which are produced by means of a simple outer sense; (2) The ideas which are produced by means of several outer senses; (3) The ideas which are produced by the inner sense; (4) The ideas which are produced by means of both the inner and outer sense. The complex ideas fall, likewise, into four classes: (1) Mode, which can be either simple or mixed; (2) Substances; (3) Relation; (4) Abstract ideas.

For Locke, there seems to be no specific difference between the "Thing-in-itself" and a Phenomenon. But Locke, as to this point, can best be understood in the light of Kant. The *primary* qualities, according to Locke, seem to be the mathematical definition of *size, form, position,* and *movement*. Yet

perhaps Locke should have spoken here rather of "quantities" than "qualities," which are the characteristics of outer things. For Locke, our "ideas" are exact copies of every quality in the object; and these qualities would come to be actual realities in the world whether or not there were beings to perceive them. In the case of the *secondary* qualities, however, one cannot maintain that our "ideas" are like them, or correspond to them. Secondary qualities are nothing but energies which are aroused in us, and which we distinguish as colors, sounds, and the like. Thus, one sensation comes to be different from another. But in another place, Locke hesitates to resort to this method of explanation, believing that there should be another means of solution. The simple ideas, which correspond to the nature of the atom, carry with them, in their own nature, no visible necessary connection or inconsistency with any other simple idea. Therefore, for Locke, the *secondary* qualities are dependent either upon the motion of atoms, or else upon a yet "less conceivable" cause.

At times, Locke identifies "ideas" with "sensation." In this sense, ideas are impressions which outer objects produce in the mind. The Understanding must take up the impressions, whether it will or not. When these impressions are given by outer objects, the mind can change or destroy them just as little as a mirror can change or destroy the form of an object which is placed before it. On the contrary, he speaks in another place of an idea of sensation, as if an idea and a sensation were different from each other; and appears to say that perception must arise in order to change our impression into an idea. Again, perception is identified with sensation in apposition to impressions. Yet again, the "idea" is the object of the Understanding, as was suggested in the beginning of this section. Only in this sense is it possible for Locke to speak of ideas of yellow, white; heat, cold; soft, hard; and all those which we call sensible qualities. Only when the

"idea" is so considered is it conceivable how Locke can so often identify the idea with the quality of the thing.

Therefore, we may conclude that a psychological research into the nature of the "idea" as a psychological occurrence, cannot in the least explain the theoretical-epistemological meaning of the "idea." In fact, Locke admits this to be the case: "We know so little what figure, size, green color, or sweet smell produce, that we cannot once conceive how size, figure or motion, can ever produce in us an idea of color, taste, or tone; there is no conceivable relation between the two."

7. *Kant:* According to Locke, the real element of knowledge, as we have seen, is generally that which is supplied from without. Bodies produce representations through some kind of impulse. To say that the given ideas are added to by the Understanding is idealistic; so Locke denies that the Understanding can contribute to the reality of the ideas or representations.

However, there are implications to the contrary. For Locke's idea of "Substance," that is, the idea of "something or other," is very similar to Kant's Transcendental Object, or the thought of "something in general." Both are products of abstraction; and therefore constitute a real advance over most of the early Greek speculations on the subject. Locke's admission that there is a "Substance" upon which the primary qualities depend, if thought of as a logical dependence, is similar to Plato's Non-Being before it becomes individuated. It is also similar to Kant's "Thing-in-itself," if we discover that the "Thing-in-itself," like Non-Being, is the metaphysical or logical cause or condition of Phenomena. There is, at least, a thread that binds the thoughts of these two thinkers together.

But both Plato and Locke fail to give any adequate solution of the relation of the "Thing-in-itself" or Non-Being to Phenomena. With Plato, Non-Being is sometimes different

from, and sometimes identical or almost identical with, Phenomena; while with Locke, "Substance," the "Thing-in-itself," or "Non-Being" is at least not related to Phenomena as is Kant's "Thing-in-itself." For, for Locke, Substance is only the ground of the primary qualities; while the *primary* qualities, in turn, become the ground of the *secondary* qualities.

Schopenhauer is, therefore, probably correct when he says that Kant's greatest service is the differentiation of Phenomena from the "Thing-in-itself." We may say that Kant to some extent failed in his effort to completely differentiate between Noumena and Phenomena; but certainly, logically speaking, he intended to do so. It may be that the confusion as to whether or not he did differentiate these two existences, is due to the impossibility of always being able to tell when he is speaking of them in a "logical" sense, and when he is speaking of them in a "pragmatic" sense. For certainly the "Regulative Ideas" belong, logically, to the realm of Reason; but they are as certainly not intended to be divorced from the realm of experience. Rather, just the opposite.

Therefore, to say that for Kant the concept of Phenomena in the experience of knowledge is of great significance, is not to say that he did not also concern himself with the realm of the Noumenal, and that he did not cause the problem of the "Thing-in-itself" to stand out as never before. He makes the characteristics of Phenomena to depend upon the nature of Noumena; and yet shows that they are logically different existences. He objects to the doctrines of both Locke and Leibnitz, saying that Leibnitz intellectualized Phenomena; while Locke sensitized the concepts of the Understanding.

(1) *Things-in-themselves:* Let us first consider Kant's "things-in-themselves" in their relation to each other:

In three places in the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant seems to deny that the Transcendental Object is to be identified with the "Thing-in-itself." The Transcendental Object is

not an object of knowledge in itself, but only the representation of a Phenomenon. He says that "the whole indefinite thought of 'something in general' cannot be called Noumenon, for I know not from it what it is in itself, except merely from the object by means of a sensuous intuition." Again, Kant says that the concept of Noumena is not the concept of an object. But it may be that Kant here means that the "Thing-in-itself" cannot be thought of as an "empirical object," and likewise of the Transcendental Object. *So, the Transcendental Object may be the same as the "Thing-in-itself," both being different from empirical objects. For Kant actually identifies the Transcendental Object with the Noumena or the "Thing-in-itself." "The Understanding thinks an 'object-in-itself,' but only as a Transcendental Object." We call these objects transcendental because the representation of them is not sensuous.*

But Kant hesitates to found Nature on the Noumena. He at times leans toward another "Thing-in-itself" as the cause of sensations. Yet he points out that the Transcendental Object is the cause of sensations. Again, he seems to clearly distinguish between the "Thing-in-itself" and Phenomena.

There must be, therefore, two distinct meanings of the word "object." In one case, the given object is the intuitive content, the empirical object. Elsewhere, the word "object" means the *transcendental* "Thing-in-itself." He also says that "objects," as "things-in-themselves," provide the stuff of Empirical Intuition. Again, matter is that aspect of appearance to which sensations correspond. In still another place, matter is immediately identified with sensations. Thus, it appears that Kant insists on the distinction, that sensations are occurrences in consciousness, and that matter is a part of the content of the Empirical Intuition.

In the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant seems to be in line with Locke, when he says that colors are only modifications of the forms of sense which are affected in

a certain manner by light. Light, however, is a "moving matter." In other words, the sense qualities are, as with Locke, pushed back into materiality. But for Kant, this "matter" is only appearance in the objective sense. We *first* have the unknown "Thing-in-itself," which affects our sensibilities; through it arises, in the *second* place, the apparent object, which affects our senses yet more; we then receive, in the *third* place, the representation of the Phenomenal object once again, plus the sense qualities.

In Kant's *Aesthetics* there is a definition of "appearance" and its correlative the "Thing-in-itself." That which is sensuously apprehended is "appearance"; and its nature, as it appears, is determined through its relation to the sensuous intuition and to the *a priori* forms of Sensibility. On the other hand, "things-in-themselves" are the objects of Reason.

Therefore, for Kant, there must be an objective ground. But what is this objective ground? It is not "Nature," as such. For Nature is not a world of "things-in-themselves," but just the classification of appearances or Phenomena. Kant had no intention of transforming the world and man into mere representation. He makes use of the weapons of Bishop Berkeley in order to destroy Cartesian idealism. Berkeley's dogmatic idealism denied the existence of matter or a spacial outer world in addition to ideas. So does Kant. For him the whole outer world in space arises from our ceaseless representation. Again, in another sense, Kant does not deny the existence of the outer world. The same may be said of Berkeley. *Berkeley bases the transcendental ground of such modifications in God; while Kant, on the other hand, uses the concept of the "Thing-in-itself" as a support for the realistic world.*

It is thought by at least one authority that Kant, in the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* attaches a double affection to the subject: *First,* through the "Thing-in-itself"; and, *second,* through outer appearance. However, the subject who is affected may be the same in both cases. True, the

"Thing-in-itself" affects the Transcendental Subject; through which affection, arises the whole world of experience, of which the empirical "I" is a part. The outer Phenomena affect the empirical subject, upon which arises sensation and representation as events in the individual consciousness. Vaihinger thinks that Kant here approaches the concepts of Beck and Fichte.

Perceptions, says Kant, are empirical representations from the influence of moving energies of matter which affect the subject. These energies affect the subject because he is a physical being. The inner changes wrought in him by the activity of consciousness are perceptions. The moving energies of matter are, in the mind of the subject, the cause of his perception. However, for physics they are causes in themselves which affect the senses; while the objects of sense, metaphysically speaking, are appearances. But Kant has no faith in physics, for it deals not only with "appearances" but with the "appearances of appearances."

Nevertheless, it sometimes seems that Kant retains some kind of mechanical causal relation between the "Thing-in-itself" and the knowing subject. Erick Adickes, in *Kant und das Ding-an-sich,* states that it would be a great mistake for one to consider the "Thing-in-itself" and "appearance" as two absolutely different realities, both alike real, standing over against each other, as archetype, copy, or image. However, there is a "something" which is given to our experience only as "appearance"; while on the other hand, there is given to us an existence which seems to be entirely independent of appearance.

But we must not identify the "Thing-in-itself" with either the purely subjective, or with the objects of appearance. For only by making oneself free from all forms of human conception and ornamentation could one approach the "Thing-in-itself." But even that would not prove satisfactory to knowledge, for it would have to enter into the structure of "Intellec-

tual Intuition" in order to provide the stuff of knowledge. In fact, one and the same object is at one and the same time the "Thing-in-itself" and the heart of appearance. However, the "Thing-in-itself" in the appearance is not knowable. Yet it appears in the appearance, that is, manifests itself in it.

We can have knowledge of "things-in-themselves" only in so far as they are objects of sensuous intuition. So, all rational knowledge is limited to the experience of objects. Yet, we must be able to "think" the same objects as "things-in-themselves"; for Kant makes a distinction between "knowing" and "thinking." The "Thing-in-itself" cannot be "known," but it can be "thought." God, for instance, cannot be "known," in the sense in which Kant speaks of knowledge; but of course he can be "thought."

Thus, as was suggested, the object has two kinds of meaning: It is at once "appearance" and the "Thing-in-itself." *But may these not be one and the same object? May not the distinction be only a logical one?*

(2) *The "I-in-itself"*: "Things-in-themselves" cannot be known or defined. In man, there is no possibility of the intuition of the Self. He can know that he exists, only as he knows himself through the condition of Time; which makes impossible any adequate definition of the "Thing-in-itself" as it applies to the subject. But that an "I-in-itself" lies at the bottom of our consciousness of Phenomena is just as self-evident to Kant, or, if possible, more evident, than that every outer appearance corresponds to a "Thing-in-itself." Yet, Kant says that the "I" as a "thinking being" is hardly like the "I" as a "sense-being." A man is not quite one and the same subject. As object of the inner empirical intuition, that is, so far as I become affected by sensations in Time, which take place at the same time or in succession of each other, I know myself only as I appear to myself, and not as a "Thing-in-itself." This seems to be what Kant means to say; but, as

we shall see, the implications of his system as a whole seem to point in a somewhat different direction.

It is at least evident, then, that one and the same being is "I-in-itself" or "Thing-in-itself" and "appearance." So, what is said of the Self must also be said of other things. In each and every thing, then, there is manifested a "Thing-in-itself," an unknowable "something" that runs through each individual thing, binding its manifoldness together. We must either accept this statement or say that the "Thing-in-itself" is nothing but a Phenomenon, freed from all subjective conceptions and ornamentations.

(3) *The Things-in-themselves as Affecting Causes:* At one point we are told that the "Thing-in-itself" is not a "Substance," and that it does not work as a cause, except as part of a real whole. We can easily see how this may be true; for even though the "Thing-in-itself" be the cause of our sensations, it need not be the cause of our knowledge; for knowledge involves not only sensations but the Categories of the Understanding, and the Pure Intuition of Time as a "schema." Kant says that the possibility of the "Thing-in-itself" as a cause of knowledge is to him inconceivable; for the whole idea of cause is relative to things in a world of phenomenal experience. However, it is pointed out in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* that the "Thing-in-itself" is the definite cause of appearance or representation. The "Thing-in-itself" lies at the bottom of the appearance of matter. But Kant also denies that the "Thing-in-itself" is a cause of our sensations in any "mechanical" sense. He believes that such a notion is unthinkable.

We have to do only with appearance, or our representations. How "things-in-themselves" are possible is outside of the sphere of our knowledge. Kant sometimes leads us to think that the physical object is not in itself actual, but mere appearance; that the object in itself is unknown. But stimulus is not the result of these unknown causes; it is merely the

appearance of their influence on our senses. The non-sensuous cause of these representations is entirely unknown, and, therefore, could not be intuited as an object; for, like an object, this non-sensuous cause would again have to be placed in Time and Space, without which condition we could not possibly have an intuition of it. We might at least call the Transcendental Object the merely intellectual cause of appearances. To do so, gives us that to which the sensuous, as receptivity, corresponds. We can think of this Transcendental Object as extending to, and as being in relation with, our possible perceptions, and say that it is given in itself before all experience.

Every appearance is a proof of a fundamental underlying "Thing-in-itself." So, "things-in-themselves" must, in some way, be causes of appearances, as those appearances affect us. "Things-in-themselves" must be, in some sense, objects-in-themselves. At the same time, they may be unknown.

Therefore, the "Thing-in-itself" may not, in any direct way, be the cause of our sensation; yet it, as a Transcendental Object, may be the conceivable cause of appearance. This does not mean that it is the cause in any "legal" sense of the term. For the "Thing-in-itself," conceived as Space, the Empty, the Nothing, or Non-Being, could not possibly be an active, or legal cause of anything. For the "Thing-in-itself" is not an active force in the world of Phenomena; which it would have to be in order to be a cause in the ordinary sense of that term.

But this is not to say that the "Thing-in-itself" may not be, in some way, the passive, metaphysical, or logical cause of all Phenomena, and so of all sensation. Certainly, "Not-A" is in some way necessary to "A," and so the metaphysical and logical cause of "A." For there could be no "A" without "Not-A," for "A" is produced by limitation; and it is "Not-A" that produces the limitation and enables one to apprehend "A" as "A." Take "Not-A" away, and certainly there is no "A."

Likewise, the "Thing-in-itself" is, in some such way, the cause of Phenomena; the "something," the "nothing," or the *indeterminateness* upon which all *determinateness* is dependent, but which never enters as a real member into the world of objects; just as "Not-A" never enters into "A," but yet determines "A."

So, the "Thing-in-itself" possesses reality of a vital sort, but not "perceptual reality," as does appearance. In other words, our thoughts in some measure constitute the concept of the "Thing-in-itself," as a theoretical, epistemological, or limiting concept.

(4) *Things-in-themselves and the Categories:* Can Categories not be thought of as "things-in-themselves"? As to the answer to this question, Kant has left us in some uncertainty. At times he explains the concepts of the Understanding as not applying to our sensuous space-time concepts, but as being bound up in sensuous intuition. Again, we get the impression that "pure thought" is not so entirely different from "Noumena" or "things-in-themselves," if we only assign to ourselves a non-sensuous intuition. Noumena signify or imply the problematical concept of an object for an entirely different Understanding than ours. However, this Understanding, which must be known, not through the Categories but intuitively, is yet a problem. Only an Archetypal Intellect; an Intellectual Intuition; or an absolute Creative Understanding could have a knowledge of the "Thing-in-itself," that is, an absolute knowledge. Because only in an Archetypal Intellect could *thought* and *thing, representation* and *existence* be united. In other words, our thinking, under present conditions, does not produce the real thing, but only appearance.

Erick Adickes, in *Kant und das Ding-an-sich,* points out the fact that when Kant speaks of the "Thing-in-itself" as the cause of sensations, he has in mind not the Category of Causality, but the idea of Freedom, which is the *transcen-*

dental correlate of Causality. That is, Causality as applied to Freedom is in apposition to Causality as it exists in the phenomenal realm. But both of these types of Causality, the Empirical and the Intelligible, are methods of Causality, and so fall under the Category of "Causality." But of this matter we shall have more to say hereafter.

If the Category of pure Causality is thought without sensuous "schema," then it may be combined, through Freedom, with Intelligible Causality. And Kant really speaks, in the *Critique of Practical Reason,* of an application of this kind; and even uses, in a like manner, the "Category of Causality" and the "Thing-in-itself." That is, every cause involved in Freedom falls under the form of the Category of Causality. It is here that the "Thing-in-itself" is made use of, that is, when Intelligible Causality is spoken of.

Therefore, to the question, "How is the agreement between the pure concepts of the Understanding (the Categories) and the "Thing-in-itself," to be explained?" Kant could have answered that, "One needs the 'Thing-in-itself,' to which the objects of Nature correspond; but the mind also turns toward an inner existence, establishing upon the basis thereof the same organization for all masses that it maintains for itself." Thus, in thought there comes to be set up a universal organization upon the basis of reflective consciousness, a kingdom of "things-in-themselves."

However, Kant did not dare to carry out the above idea to its ultimate conclusion, for he had a realistic tendency; of which the necessary consequence was, that he labored under a strong conviction that there are *actual* or *realistic* "things-in-themselves," possessing a real and substantial existence. Without some sort of "objective realities," thought could know nothing; it could only play with "representations." True, the Intelligible can never be immediately known, because we cannot perceive it, except in so far as it appears in the object; but it must yet be "thought of" as com-

formable to the empirical character. *Therefore, we must generally place a Transcendental Object at the ground of our thought of appearance, though we may not know what it in itself may be.* That is, by thought, through the pure Categories of the Understanding, we cannot give any definite character to this possible existence.

There are, we conclude, a number of statements which lead us to believe that the Categories are involved in, or that they may actually be reduced to, "things-in-themselves." For the word "Category" is used in two different senses: It is the expression for the synthetical function of one's unity of Transcendental Apperception; and it is also used to distinguish the pure *a priori* concepts. The Categories are not reduced to Phenomena, but to *objects in general;* and so can be reduced to, or made use of, as "things-in-themselves." "Things-in-themselves" are, in some sense, the ground of appearances. But we cannot think such a relation except through the Categories and their "schemata." So, analogous to these relations, we have admissibly built into the world of appearances the *a priori* forms of the Understanding. Therefore, "things-in-themselves" and Categories cannot be of a wholly different nature.

(5) *The Thing-in-itself as a Limiting Concept:* We cannot transcend our experience or have *a priori* knowledge of the Supersensible or of "things-in-themselves." Knowledge implies perception, and "things-in-themselves" cannot be perceived by the senses. Neither, as Hegel has pointed out, can the "Thing-in-itself" be arrived at by the process of physical analysis. As the intellect is *discursive* and not *intuitive,* we could never, even by analysis, see the whole of a thing face to face. If we apply Categories to this "Thing-in-itself," we cannot justify them. We cannot prove, for example, that everything that exists, exists as a "substance" in an Intelligible world. *We can, however, think such a "Thing-in-itself" as existing just beyond the point to which our knowl-*

edge reaches; we can speak of it as that to which none of the predicates of sense-perception apply; we can say that it is neither in Time nor in Space (Space and Time used in the Kantian sense); that it does not change, and so forth. But no Category can be applied to it, for we have no way of knowing whether anything corresponding to it exists.

The "Thing-in-itself" is not, however, a contradictory concept; for we cannot hold that the phenomenal order is the only possible form of perception. True, we can have sensible knowledge only of sensible things, not of "things-in-themselves." *But the senses cannot presume to "know" all that the intellect can "think." "Things-in-themselves" may be realities in a form other than that of Phenomena, and yet have no constitutive existence,* except in the *Critique of Practical Reason* sense of that term.

Therefore, "things-in-themselves" are just "guide-posts," as one authority holds, which tell us that the realm of sense is not the only one; that the world of sense is not actually a *world* but an *island.* But it is an island because of the "Thing-in-itself"; otherwise, no one knows what it might be. For the *indeterminate* is necessary to the existence of the *determinate.* It is "Non-Being" which makes possible "Being," for "Being" must be limited in order to be "Being." So, in both *thought* and *thing,* an "unlimited," as a boundary, is necessary in order that a *thought* or a *thing* may have shape or definiteness. For either "Being" or "Non-Being" stretched out to infinity, ends in "Non-Being."

However, in spite of the apparent demand for the "Thing-in-itself," some philosophers have attempted to dispense with the concept.

David Hume insists that because we observe a relation between perceptions and objects, we cannot conclude that the perceptions are caused by the objects. If we abstract both primary and secondary qualities from matter, we leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of

our impressions; a notion so imperfect that no skeptic will think it worth while to contend against it. We do not know whether there are "things-in-themselves" or not. The objects of our knowledge are ideas of our own impressions. We cannot prove that the impressions are caused by outer objects, by "things-in-themselves," by Substance, by ourselves, or by God. Knowledge is a relation of ideas, and reasoning by means of such ideas.

But the "Thing-in-itself" takes on many forms, and it may be that Hume did not escape from it after all; for he at least believed in the existence of a God.

G. E. Schulze, in his *Enesidemus,* also attacks the new critical philosophy as presented by Kant and Reinhold. He thinks that this philosophy restores skepticism instead of doing away with it, leaving philosophy where Hume left it. It denies the possibility of knowing the "Thing-in-itself," and yet assumes its existence, and applies the Categories to it, after saying that they are valid only in the world of experience. The only way to overcome the skepticism and the contradictions implied in the notion of the "Thing-in-itself," according to S. Maimon, in *Versuch uber die Transcendental-philosophies,* is to abolish the "Thing-in-itself" as inconceivable and impossible.

William James says the whole of our experience, if such there be, leans on "nothing." Nothing outside the flux of experience secures or makes possible these experiences. Behind the bare phenomenal fact there is "nothing"; no "Thing-in-itself," no absolute, no unknowable. *It is absurd to attempt to explain the given concrete reality by an assumed reality of which we can form no idea, except through symbols drawn from our own experience.* But, by and large, that is precisely what man is always doing. However, as to why he does so, we shall hereafter have more to say; for to understand this fact is to possess the key to the understanding of the philosophy of "things-in-themselves."

But just here let us go on to say that William James' "nothing" may be the very thing of which he would affirm the existence; for it is well known that he believed in an extra-mental or supra-natural world. And it may be that the realities of which we can form no idea, except through symbols drawn from our experience, will prove to be the true "things-in-themselves." Therefore, it might have been just as easy and even more logical for him to have confessed a belief in the "Thing-in-itself," that is, in the Kantian Noumena.

F. H. Jacobi, however, says that we are immediately certain of the "Thing-in-itself." It is directly revealed. It springs from our direct perception of the object; we come face to face with the real, not merely with ideas. *He puts the "Thing-in-itself" in the same category with Spirit, Freedom, and Divine Being.* He may be correct, for God, Freedom, Immortality, and the "Thing-in-itself," or Noumena, are all alike, in that they are "limiting concepts." Therefore, Erigena was really discussing the problem, even though he did emphasize the theological aspects of it. For, as we have suggested, Erigena thinks of God as the beginning and end of all things. He, God, is the "nothing" out of which the world was made; his incomprehensible essence is, for Erigena, the substance of all definite things. God is the "Thing-in-itself." Logically, he may have been correct. For apparently the "Thing-in-itself" may be conceived under many different forms. That God is for Erigena the "Thing-in-itself" seems to be evident from the fact that the nature which "neither creates nor is created" is not a fourth nature, distinct from the three first, but is identical with the "creating and uncreated nature"; that is, God is the ultimate; the Divine "Substance" in which all things are grounded. In a word, the "Thing-in-itself," so far as Erigena has the idea in mind, is God himself.

But Erdmann says that this fourth class, that which "neither creates nor is created," is, logically speaking, the "nothing." So, even though the "Thing-in-itself" is thought

of as God, it is still a Limiting Concept; that beyond which, or into which, knowledge cannot penetrate, but which can be "thought" and "valued."

Jacob Fries seeks to combine the teachings of Kant and Jacobi. *The principles of Reason, which Kant seeks to prove a priori, are immediately known in consciousness.* We are directly aware of their certainty. True, only that which is sense-perceived can be known, in the Kantian sense of the term; but these principles are objects of faith, which satisfy the demands of the heart. He might have said that they also satisfy the demands of reflection. That is, that "things-in-themselves" are logical demands, of which the concepts of God, Freedom, and Immortality are outstanding illustrations.

As for Kant himself, it is shown in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the "Thing-in-itself" *cannot be known.* But the concept evolves throughout the *Critiques. It is at first a mere abstraction, a "Gedankending"; but it finally becomes a necessary Idea of Reason; a regulative principle, expressing the rational demands of reflection, and is not fundamentally different from the demand made for the Soul, the World, and God.* The "Thing-in-itself," which was at first an abstraction, comes to be thought of as Freedom, Practical Reason, or Will, and is made to be the ground of Theoretical Reason. For instance, *the Moral Law within us is a sure guarantee of the existence of a Supersensible World.* Of course we do not possess the power of intellectual intuition which would enable us to meet the "Thing-in-itself" face to face. The same may be said of God, Freedom, and Immortality. But shall we deny the existence of the latter? Then why deny the existence of the former? For after all, we can say that we *know* if we firmly *believe* in the Moral Law. For the Moral Law is for the Reason what sensation is for the Understanding. *If sensation proves the existence of Phenomena; then the feeling or conviction of the Moral Law will prove the existence of God, the*

Soul, Freedom, Immortality, and the "Thing-in-itself" or Noumenon.

In line with this argument, F. A. Lange states that such religious and metaphysical speculations are the products of a kind of "constructive instinct" in man. They may have no theoretical value, since *the existence of an ideal world cannot be proved.* But they do have for man a certain amount of *practical value. All of which is to say that the "Thing-in-itself," like other kindred concepts, may be a judgment of value. It may be, in its different forms and phases, the expression of the "constructive genius" of man, as he, more or less unconsciously, attempts to lay for his world a thought-foundation; or to rear a suitable superstructure upon the world that is;* the analysis and demonstration of which process is the task of this discussion.

But before we make any definite attempt relative to reconstruction, let us proceed to give some critical consideration to the previous attempts to solve the problem in hand, hoping thereby to gain some insight as to the possibilities of the philosophy as a whole.

II

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF SOME OF THE PREVIOUS SOLUTIONS

1. *The Early Greek Philosophers:* Beginning with Thales, the early Greek philosophers repudiated the mythical interpretation of the world, and turned their attention toward discovering a more realistic world-essence. *But not being aware of the "subject-object" problem, they did not realize the part played by the mind in the building of the world.* Therefore, they naturally supposed that the "Thing-in-itself" was some fixed and realistic material essence or "Substance."

This changed attitude upon the part of the Greeks was, and was not, an advance. Of the two, the "mythical" interpretation is possibly the better one. But the "realistic" interpretation, within certain limits, promises a more satisfactory understanding of the world as a whole, and enables man to study Phenomena as he might not otherwise be able to do. So, if the Greek had retained his "myths," and added to them a world of "stuff," then mixed them properly, he might have arrived at a more perfect solution. But, as we know, a reaction against any philosophy always carries the reactionist too far in the opposite direction; which was the case with Thales and many of his successors. However, there is advancement even among these early philosophers. The first of them asked only: "What is the 'material' cause of things?" That is, What is the primitive and indestructible body of which all sensible things are the perishable transformations? But their successors, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the atomists, saw that from such a point of view it was more plausible to regard sensible bodies

as complexes of many different and equally primary constituents. And thus, relative to the question of the material cause, "materialistic monism" gave way to "pluralism." Now they began to ask, half unconsciously, a third question: "What provides the motive impulse by which these constituents have been brought into just these specific combinations?" This resolved itself into the question: "What is the 'efficient' cause?" But, as order, arrangement, and organization are naturally recognized as good, and their opposites as evil, there arises the idea of a "final" cause, as present in Nature. Then follows the idea of *end* or *purpose*. What, then, is the explanation of the presence of Order, Beauty, Goodness, and their opposites? What is the nature of the final cause? The first specific attempt to define this final cause was made by Anaxagoras, of whom Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics,* has said, that he seemed, by contrast with his predecessors, like a sober man compared with idle babblers, in that he spoke of this "final" cause in terms of "mind." For Anaxagoras, "*mind*" *is, formally at least, the source of all cosmic order.* The other question: "What is the source of Mind?" these Greeks did not ask.

2. *Plato:* It is well known that Plato also thought of the "Thing-in-itself" in abstract terms; but was not in a position, historically, to deal adequately with the problem. He confuses the problem, in that both "ὕλη" and "εἶδος" contribute to the reality of an object. *For the "ὕλη" is the "timber" out of which the object is made, and the "εἶδος" gives it its chief reality. But ought we not let "ὕλη" be the realistic stuff, and the "εἶδος" the concept of reflection which synthesizes the two?* This is what Plato did not quite wish to do. However, we ought to bear in mind that the "matter" of Plato is not "matter" in the sense in which it was spoken of by the early Greek philosophers, nor as it is now sometimes made use of in the science of physics; but that it was in reality of the nature of "potential mind."

3. *Aristotle:* Either purposively or accidentally, Aristotle came near to the solution, when he made "matter" or the *indeterminate* the stuff of the "form" or the *determinate,* and left them both, as some interpret, shot through with energy, or God, or the efficient cause. If he had only reflected that *he* was, in some sense, the projector of this "energy" or "efficient" cause, he would have been taking the last step.

4. *Erigena:* This philosopher touched the matter at a vital point. But, being mainly interested in it from a theological angle, he did not deal with the whole question as he might have done. In him, speculative reason was beginning to be hampered by the spirit of Scholasticism. However, he makes an advance, in that the "Thing-in-itself," for him, is God, and not some material substratum.

5. *Locke:* Being an empiricist, in the common sense use of that term, Locke generally hesitated to characterize "Substance" as spiritual, mental, or semi-mental. Though he made a contribution by his analysis of the problem, he made no real advance over Plato or Aristotle, except that for him, rationally interpreted, *space, time, simple ideas, and complex ideas, are all, in reality, constructs of the mind; for he says that the secondary qualities are not like the qualities which excite them; and that the complex ideas become complex by means of a mental operation in which simple ideas are arranged and combined. But if complex ideas have a mental constituent; and secondary qualities are unlike the powers, qualities, or quantities which excite them; then one might be led to suspicion that even primary qualities are not independent of the contribution which is made by the agent in the act of knowing; and that the world of knowledge is a world of meaning partly evolved out of rational beings, who have, as Locke himself says, at least the "faculty" of knowing. But to have even the "faculty" is to make it impossible for the mind to comprehend without at the same time making a contribution to that which is comprehended.* Again, Locke

really wavers as to the nature of "Substance": It is sometimes a substratum, sometimes a combination of qualities, *and sometimes an idea of the mind.*

6. *Kant:* In general, Kant holds that the "Thing-in-itself" is a *realistic something.* But if such were the case, then the "Thing-in-itself" would be infinitely divisible, and so not different from Phenomena. At points, he almost, or quite, identifies it with Phenomena. But of what use could a "Thing-in-itself" be if it were in essence like a Phenomenon? Again, if the "Thing-in-itself" is unlike Phenomena, it could not then be the cause of Phenomena, in any legal sense of that term; for cause must be able to pass over into effect. Therefore, a realistic "Thing-in-itself" could, in one sense, be neither like nor unlike Phenomena. *If it is not a realistic something like Phenomena in essence; and if it cannot be a realistic something unlike Phenomena in essence; then it may be conceptual in essence.*

In the formal sense, at least, Kant himself established the principle that *thought is spontaneous and self-determining. He failed, however, to deal with the implications of this admission.* It was Fichte who first noticed the failure; and who, after he had called attention to the want of a deduction for the Categories, endeavored to supply something of the kind. Aristotle set down ten Categories, that is, Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Space, Time, Situation, State, Activity, Passivity; Substance being the logical source of all those that follow. Now it may be that "Substance" is the "I," and that Aristotle's and Kant's Categories proceed from this "I"; the "I" being, in some sense, *the pivot of Reality. At least, for Fichte, the Ego is the starting point.* Though, in reality, the germ of Fichte's "Ego" is evident in the Categories; for the Categories must have an intelligent or rational source.

However, Fichte's Ego, if we ascribe to the human Ego those characteristics which belong to the cosmic Ego, *is not*

really free and spontaneous thought. It is supposed to receive its first excitation by a shock or impulse from without. Against this shock, the Ego will react, and so become conscious of itself. In the meantime, the nature of the impulse remains beyond our knowledge. So, the Ego, after all, is conditioned. Therefore, Fichte did not, for our purposes, advance very far beyond Kant. For what Kant called the "Thing-in-itself," Fichte sometimes called the "impulse from without"; an indefinite, non-Ego in general. *Thus, neither Kant nor Fichte really carried out to its ultimate conclusion the suggestion of free and spontaneous thought.*

Nevertheless, *Kant will admit that the Categories are features of both mind and things. The mind enjoys itself categorically in contemplating the corresponding categorical features of the object which it contemplates. However, we enjoy the Categories in things mainly because we first discover them in ourselves, or because that it is in us that they first become determinate.* But if there were no "objective Categories," *man would have no way of cognizing things. But when he does cognize, he sees out there that which he has in some sense thrown into and around the object; otherwise, he could never have taken in the object. In fact, it is so natural for man to objectify and to imagine that the qualities which are in him are also in the object,* that it might be possible to say that they are *only in him.* For, for them to seem to be in the object does not mean that they are actually there. It may mean that they are not in the object except by the process of his experience, during which he projects them into the thing which is being known or experienced.

If, as Kant says, Time is a "schema" of sensations and the Categories, then it must be a fundamental aspect of mind. Kant says, however, that Time is a "pure intuition"; that is, a "form." But is not a "form" an abstraction upon the basis of which Phenomena may be explained? "Mind," as S. Alexander says, is a form of Time, and of the nature of deity;

both being concepts upon the basis of which Phenomena may be explained, whether that Phenomena be of the subject or of the object. That is, "mind" is a counterpart, correspondent, or synonym for Time. For "mind," being that comprehensive term by which all mental Phenomena may be explained, is like Time, in that were there no succession of moments, then there would be nothing to comprehend in the term "mind." Both are principles of unity. Now, these may be, and are, extended into the phenomenal and objective world, because they are first evident in man when he comes to cognize that world. They are postulates which tend to explain the behavior of man and things. Then Time, in that it is necessarily bound up with Space, is in some sense the "mind" of Space. They telescope, as it were. For as we cannot imagine the behavior of "body" without "mind"; just so we cannot imagine Space without a succession of the moments of Time, which constitute that continuum which accomplishes the Space, and then logically holds it together; that is, grounds its existence. For if moments of Time had not followed each other, the Space would never have been accomplished. So, Time may be the "Thing-in-itself" of Space, as "mind" is the "Thing-in-itself" of body.

This is not wholly out of line with Kant. For he says that Time is the condition of *inner* sensation, as Space is the condition of *outer* sensation. *There is here a recognition of Time as being more subjective than Space; having more of the character of mind than has Space, even though both are in a sense pure intuitions, and so of the nature of mind.* However, if Time has a "mind-aspect," so must Space, since Time and Space are not separable. It may be, then, that Time is really akin to Space, as mind is akin to the body; without the one, the other could not be; yet the one is not the other; but the "Thing-in-itself" that belongs to the one is the logical cause of, and the means of explaining, the other. This is in keeping

with Bergson, who finds Time to be the animating, spontaneous principle of the universe, calling the same "duree."

Now, if Categories are features of both *mind* and *things;* and if Time and Space are aspects of both mind and objects, with Time as "schematic" and especially subjective; and if Time creates Space by the *process of succession,* then Time or mind is in some sense the source of the cognized world; its own succession of moments being the ground of Space or an extended existence. If Time is the "schema" of the Categories and sensations, and so the condition of experience; then Time must be of the essence of mind. But if Time is of the essence of mind, and Time is necessary to experience; then mind is fundamental to an experienced world, and possibly necessary to the construction of that world; just as, according to Kant, Time is necessary to the construction of knowledge. In short, Time is of the nature of mind; mind is of the nature of Deity; and Deity is of the nature of spirit; which spirit may be finite or infinite. In either case, it is the center of experience. In *Selections from Kant,* Watson, p. 87, Kant, in speaking of Time as a "schema" says, "This 'schematism' of our Understanding, in its application to Phenomena and to their pure form, is *an art hidden away in the depths of the human soul,* the secret of which we need not hope to drag forth to the light of day." But may it not be that this "*art hidden away in the depths of the human soul*" is, in a sense, the source of Kant's whole world? May it not be that the whole synthetic process involved in the Understanding, together with the Categories, and the pure intuitions of Space and Time, are similar to the "I-in-itself"? Out of this "I," in its *indeterminateness,* is evolved the *determinates* of Time, Space, Categories, God, Freedom, and Immortality; all of which are of the nature of Noumena. But of the nature of Noumena because they are out of "*the depths of the human soul*"; out of the depths of the "I-in-itself."

In other words, for Kant, Time and Space are of a *subjec-*

tive nature. Time and Space are not properties of things; nor are they separate things of Nature; they are, to some extent, conditions of our sense-knowledge of things. *Therefore, they are real only as facts of our consciousness.* Time and Space are just forms of human perception. Our world seems to be in Time and Space simply because it is our nature to view it as "temporal" and "spacial." Time and Space appear to us as belonging outside of us, merely because they are the conditions within us of our seeing and feeling things. It is like wearing green goggles. We always perceive under these forms of sense; and therefore Time and Space cannot but seem to us to be objective and realistically or empirically real.

But if Time and Space thus govern our knowledge process, then may it not be true that Time and Space are the fundamentals of the Self? May it not be true that the Self is in some sense constructed out of Time and Space? Consciousness may be said to be made up of a succession of events. And this succession demands Time; and Time demands Space. But whatever is for the Self will be for the objective world. Therefore, Time and Space, as realities of consciousness, become, by the process of projection, realities of the so-called objective world. The fact that so-called objective Time and Space are governed by that Time and Space which inhere in the Self, can be made plain to oneself by a little experiment: Start toward some given point, say five miles away. If you are in haste to cover the distance, you will think of it as being far and as taking considerable Time. On the other hand, if you have plenty of leisure, the distance will seem less than in the first case, and the Time consumed will seem comparatively short. Now, why so? In the *first* case, when you are rushed, the Space which begins in the Self is projected so rapidly that your legs cannot keep pace with the "projection." The result is that you feel that you are behind in Time, and so behind in Space. In short, you project more Space, which in turn, demands more Time than might otherwise be the case.

But what about the *second* case? Well, you have five miles to go. You have plenty of Time. Therefore, you project the distance slowly. Projecting the distance slowly, you are able to keep up with your own projection. Keeping up with your own projection, you of course have plenty of Time. So the five miles is a short distance, and is covered by you in a short space of time. That is, all distance is stateable in terms of "projection." And the rate of "projection" can be stated in terms of one's state of mind. If the "projection" is above normal, the distance is long; if the "projection" is normal, or below normal, then the distance is short. For, if distance is projected too rapidly, one must be always running to catch up with it; but if it is projected slowly, then one has time enough to keep up with it. So, Time and Space are the *products* and the *projections* of human consciousness. If one could always go as fast as one wished, that is, if one only needed to *wish* in order to be at any point, then, there would never be *long distances* and *short distances*. It would be the same distance, or, rather, no distance, to all points. Kant, in the *Selections from Kant,* Watson, p. 127, says, "Even in the case of inner changes, we have to figure Time, the form of inner sense, as a line; and the inner changes themselves as the generation of that line, that is, as motion." If, however, the inner changes generate Time, they must also generate Space. Therefore, both Time and Space are forms of inner changes, Time being the succession of little "projections," and Space the length of the line generated and projected by the succession of the changes in consciousness.

If Time and Space are thus created out of the Self, as conditions of knowing, or, as forms of experience, may not many other supposed "realistic conditions" be projections of those things which have their origin in a psychic unit? If Time and Space thus come to be the conditions, grounds, or "things-in-themselves" of mind or Self, may not the Self be a "Thing-in-itself" that, because of its very nature, proceeds to construct

a whole world, just as we have seen it constructing so-called objective Time and Space? That is, consciousness, being made up of Time and Space elements, projects these elements as objective Time and Space. But if Time and Space are created in the Self and then projected, other things may be created or become *determinate* in the Self, and be projected by it; and then be thought of as *constitutive* or *realistic* in nature.

According to Aristotle, *Time is just a condition of Motion; the measure and number of motion.* But if Time is the measure of Motion, it is then of the nature of Number. However, Number presupposes a person who can count. So, it follows that Time presupposes a Soul, and that it cannot exist without a person who has within him the *power to number.* Therefore, if Time, which is generally thought to be independent of the mind, is actually created by the mind, then many other supposed objective and thought-to-be "constitutive realities" may be traceable to "numbering" or "reflective" Souls.

This would make unnecessary an objective and realistic "Thing-in-itself." For the mind now becomes the creator. Kant says that the postulates of God, Freedom, and Immortality are demanded by man as a moral agent. Then, if these are demanded by man as a *moral agent,* all other postulates, together with these, may be demanded by man as a *rational agent,* in his attempt to fashion the world to his individual liking. It is not natural for a being of reflection to dwell in a "matter-of-fact" world. Still more, *it is not possible for reflection to exist in such a world; for, for reflection, there can be no such world. As soon as man begins to know, he has already made impossible a factual existence.* Man has no distinctive *moral faculty* that can posit God, Freedom, and Immortality, and then stop short. These are not pure "moral concepts." They are "intellectual concepts," or rational demands. But if man as a *rational being* can postulate God, Freedom, and Immortality, the same being necessary to satis-

fy certain "demands of his reason"; then he may continue the process indefinitely. He would not be likely to come to a sudden halt. The "I" could not be thus limited.

If God, Freedom, and Immortality are postulates; contents of the noumenal realm, or "things-in-themselves," then all other concept-values may be of the same nature. That is, like those above, all concepts may be created by Reason and used as instruments relative to certain specific problems to be solved; just as God is postulated because he promises to fulfill our rational demand for happiness; and as Immortality is postulated because it promises an endless continuation of that which we now value.

Thus, does man lay the foundations of his world. Thus, does he build his temple and ornament it with a tower. In other words, the building of an ideal, Intelligible, or logical world, is just a continuation of man's instinct, desire, and need to build houses, cities, and institutions. No rational or reflective being can be conceived as living in a world to which he makes no mental contribution. Kant himself admits that the mind in some sense constitutes the so-called natural world-order. But the world that *is,* is a combination of the subject and the object, in a synthesis which we must call "experience"; there being no clear line of demarcation between *things* and *concepts.* What, then, is the chief factor in the knowledge-situation?

Every attempt to account for the world by means of a realistic "Thing-in-itself" has thus far failed. The realistic "things-in-themselves" of the early Greeks are now known not to be "things-in-themselves" in any true meaning of that term. Just so can no realistic "Thing-in-itself" ever satisfy the demands of reflection. These notions were, as Aristotle said, simply the crude beginnings of what may come to be a real solution of the problem. *They at least represent the demand of reflection for a more and more abstract explanation of the ground of Phenomena or the world of experience.* At

the same time, the dissatisfaction with such realistic conclusions testifies to the evident inadequacy of such conclusions. Man seeks to attain to a larger control of the world than is afforded by "water," "air," "earth," or "fire," or any other independent and realistic element or substance. *His means of control must not be something right before his eyes in the realistic data, but something developed or invented by himself.* The animal is largely satisfied with a natural lair, and is contented to use the simple tools with which it first finds itself provided: Claws, teeth, and so forth, as a means of sustaining itself in its world. But man builds houses and ornaments them; makes tools; and makes tools to make tools. Also, reflection, which is itself a tool, creates other tools, in the conceptual sense, for the ordering of the world and for the satisfactory manipulation of Phenomena.

No doubt we have all taken note of the fact that our sense of harmony with the world of Nature at any one time is in proportion to our degree of normality. And this is to say that we project our "enjoyed harmony" into the so-called "objective world." *When the individual is out of harmony with himself as an individual, so is all the world out of harmony.* When the heart skips a beat in its rhythmical progression, just so does the world seem to proceed irregularly and in jerks. Philosophy, reality, and value are matters of temperament. The world of data *is,* and *is progressively knowable.* And value or reality is the valuation of the situation by a reflective mind. The reflective mind is a variable, but also a big factor in the process. Reality or value will vary in keeping with the fluctuations of the individual Ego, taking on many different forms and assuming many different phases, according to the particular tendency and need of the particular mind so evaluating.

In fact, *Kant himself wanted to say that the mind is the chief factor in the knowing situation; but he did not wish to be called a follower of Bishop Berkeley. The Categorical Im-*

perative is the only real Noumenal in the Kantian world. But this is out of the "I." Then the "I" must in some sense be the source of all lesser "things-in-themselves."

Therefore, in his idealistic moments, Kant bordered on saying that the "I-in-itself" is the chief or first "Thing-in-itself." *The first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason would make the "Thing-in-itself" a concept, not a realistic something.* In the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Book II, Ch. I, in speaking of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, Kant says, "It is easy to see that 'I think' is the common vehicle of all conceptions, and therefore of *transcendental* as well as *empirical* conceptions." In the same chapter Kant speaks of the "I" as a "Thing-in-itself." Again, Kant says, "The conception of a thing that can exist by itself as a subject, but cannot exist as a mere predicate, does not carry with it objective reality." *In this discussion, therefore, the "Thing-in-itself" is a concept, without any constitutive reality.* There is, as Kant says, "no knowledge of the *subject* as an *object.*" So, the Noumenon, in this case at least, is *not a realistic entity, but a concept.* In the same edition, Book II, Ch. II, Kant refers to the world as a whole as only an *idea.* In the same chapter he says, We assume that the world, or the whole series of Phenomena, is a "Thing-in-itself." Later, Kant was driven from this position because he could not bear to be called a *psychological* or *subjective* Idealist. But, properly worked out, his own view would not have committed him to that of Berkeley, but would have resulted in a philosophy something like that at which Fichte aimed, only the mind would have been the free source of the "Thing-in-itself," and itself the chief "Thing-in-itself." It would not have been dependent upon a conceptual or realistic stimulus in its initial activity, *but rather the creator of a conceptual stimulus in order to explain the realistic data of experience. For in the Metaphysics of Ethics, the Noumenal or "Thing-in-itself" is the Moral Will.* Then what may be their ultimate relation?

If they should turn out to be one and the same, then the Noumenal or "Thing-in-itself" might prove to be the "I-in-itself." And if out of this "I-in-itself" should come "Freedom," then other "things-in-themselves" would follow in its wake. Or, Freedom, the Noumenal, and the "I-in-itself," may prove to be almost one and the same thing. For Kant himself says in his "Prolegomena": "Thus we are able, in a rational being, or in beings generally, so far as their causality is determined in them as 'things-in-themselves,' to imagine a faculty of beginning from itself a series of states." According to Abbott, in Kant's *Theory of Ethics,* Freedom is the keystone to the whole system of Pure Reason; all other concepts, God and Immortality, for instance, remaining in Freedom unsupported. These, attaching themselves to the concept of Freedom, obtain "consistency and objective reality." That is to say, *the possibility of the ideas of God and Immortality are proved by the fact that Freedom actually exists.* So, by this, Freedom may be the first "Thing-in-itself," or, rather, the first act or feeling of the "Thing-in-itself," and a basis for the other kindred concepts. This is another way of saying that the first "Thing-in-itself" may be the "I-in-itself." Again, *the law of the pure will, which is free, brings the will into a sphere quite different from the empirical. It may be, then, that the will, plus the feeling of freedom, is the source of the "I-in-itself," and so, ultimately, the source of all "things-in-themselves," including, of course, the concepts of God and Immortality.*

In conclusion, there is for Kant a logical boundary between Sensibility and the Intellect; Sensibility receiving the impressions, co-ordinating them, and making intuitions of them; and the Intellect synthesizing the intuitions, that is, judging and reasoning. In Sensibility, there are the *a posteriori* intuitions of Space and Time. In the Understanding are a number of *a priori* concepts, which are like the many compartments in which Reason stores up and elaborates the products of ex-

perience. However, with all these seeming divisions, the faculty of knowledge is, nevertheless, a *unity;* and this essential unity of Reason, in the diversity of its operations, is the "Ego." Reason, or the Noumenal aspect of the Self, is a sort of mistress who rules over these realms: The realm of *Theoretical Reason, Practical Reason,* and *Aesthetics.* She is respectively, Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. But she unifies and harmonizes the activities of the "Ego."

Also, there is a logical boundary between *Pure* Reason and *Practical* Reason. Pure Reason declares that every occurrence in the phenomenal order is a necessary effect. Then, what about moral liberty? Kant does not admit an absolute incompatibility between them. The conflict of Reason and Conscience can only be a seeming one. It is possible to resolve the antinomy without violating the rights of intelligence or will. However, the solution would be impossible if the *Critique of Pure Reason* absolutely denied liberty. *But in fact, this work only excludes Freedom from the phenomenal world, and not from the Intelligible and Transcendent, or Transcendental world. Freedom, impossible in the phenomenal order, is possible in the absolute order.* Therefore, Freedom is conceived by Kant himself as a "Noumenon." *It is Intelligible;* and Practical Reason adds: *It is certain.* So, there is no real contradiction between the *faculty of knowledge* and the *act of will. Our acts may be determined in Time and Space; and not determined but free as to our Intelligible character, in so far as our Intelligible character is independent of these two forms of Sensibility.*

This would not be a reconciliation, if Time and Space were objective realities. But if Time and Space are modes of seeing things, and do not affect the things themselves, then *determinism* is reduced to a mere theory or general conception of things; and the "Ego" is still the Hub of Reality, and the point at which all roads meet.

Therefore, as Weber says, if the "Thing-in-itself" does

not exist as a "quantity," as a "cause," or as a "reality," then it exists only in the thinking subject. Like Time and Space and the Categories, it is identical with the subject which conceives it. Hence, it is an inconsistency of the Kantian philosophy to conceive the "Thing-in-itself" as being outside of Reason. *The true consequence of the Critique of Pure Reason is the monism of the "Ego," together with the conclusion or implication that it is the creator of the logical world-order.* In the end, *Theoretical Reason* is subordinate to *Practical Reason,* and to the *Moral Conscience. There is, for Kant, a connecting link between Theoretical Reason and Practical Reason; and this connecting link is the "Thing-in-itself," the Noumenon, the Intelligible order, supposed by Theoretical Reason, and postulated and openly affirmed by the Moral Conscience. The "two Reasons" would contradict each other, if the one denied what the other affirmed. But the Theoretical Reason does not reject the absolute; it simply recognizes its inability to know it, and to demonstrate its existence.* But what Theoretical Reason *cannot do,* Practical Reason *must do;* and so there is no contradiction, but just a division of labor; one phase of the "Ego" *supposing,* but not *knowing;* it *being reserved for another aspect of the "Ego" to both know and be that which is only thought by Theoretical Reason.* The *Critique of Pure Reason* denies liberty in the phenomenal world; but it conceives liberty as a prerogative of the "Thing-in-itself," while maintaining the impossibility of theoretical demonstration. The "Thing-in-itself" is free. Now, Practical Reason categorically affirms the liberty of the acting subject, the freedom of the "Ego." Hence the *Critique of Practical Reason,* instead of contradicting the idealistic conclusions, confirms them. The "Ego" itself is the "Thing-in-itself." *The object which seems to determine us from without is merely the subject acting within ourselves. Object* and *subject, being* and *thought, nature* and *mind* are unified in the "Thing-in-itself"; which is, by implication, the "I-in-itself." If the "I"

were *determined* by an "object-in-itself," the "two Reasons" would absolutely contradict each other; the "Ego" would henceforth be a slave in theory and in practice, and moral freedom would be an illusion. This, however, is no contradiction, but rather a reconciliation. *The Moral Will becomes the mediating bond between Theoretical and Practical Reason.* (*Metaphysic of Morality* and *Critique of Practical Reason,* especially the latter).

After all, Kant is, then, *monistic.* It is true that he postulates Immortality and God apart from the "Ego." But this double affirmation is just an accident in the system, essential to which is the affirmation of the absolute freedom of the "Ego." The "Ego" which Kant holds to be free is not the Empirical Ego, but the Noumenal Ego. However, to speak of the immortality of an Ego that does not exist in Time, and for which there can be no "before" or "after," is an inconsistency, similar to that other inconsistency that the "Thing-in-itself" is distinct from the personal subject. But neither of these inconsistencies has any organic connection with Kant's system as a whole. In reality, the chief "Thing-in-itself" is the "I-in-itself," native to which are the ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality, together with the disposition to project the same. In the *Metaphysic of Morality,* Watson, p. 251, Kant states that Freedom is a property of the will to be a law to itself. He further states that "Freedom . . . is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no way be presented in accordance with the laws of nature, and, therefore, not in any possible experience." In short, Freedom, like other Intelligible Objects, is just a presupposition of Reason or the "I-in-itself." God, Freedom, and Immortality, and all other transcendent, or transcendental, ideas, are the rungs of the ladder whereby man climbs up into the *Intelligible World.*

III

A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE IDEA OF THE THING-IN-ITSELF

1. *The I-in-itself:* Reality is elusive. Like a flash of light, truth rushes in, but quickly the darkness falls! Throughout the ages men have sought to pluck the golden thread. For a moment men of genius have touched it; but, alas, magic-like, it slipped through their anxious fingers and was gone. Anaxagoras, in some dim way, knew that the world is full of meaning. Socrates communed with a "voice," but knew not from whence it came. Plato sensed the truth, but doubted his own genius. While Aristotle, full of the spirit of the "Nous," came near to falling over the brink of the common world into the very stream of eternal reality. Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, however, like other men, did not for long hold the golden thread. Nevertheless, they knew, in their best moments, that the world might be explained by the "Immaterial Hypothesis." They knew that Nous, or Reason, or God was the secret to the mysteries of the world. Like the Hebrew prophets, they might never have seen God at any time; yet they had an intuitive sense of his being. Why he was, they did not know. But that he did in some sense exist, and that he was in some sense the ground of the rational world, they were immediately sure; and they were mainly correct. They, like Immanuel Kant, at the moment when his unconscious genius possessed him, together with F. H. Jacobi, Jacob Fries, and F. A. Lange, knew that the most signficant and eternal reality is not something *realistic,* but something *conceptual* in nature. Even men like Thomas Reid, who

held consistently that, for scientific procedure, causation is nothing more than invariable sequence or succession, yet thought that there was another and metaphysical meaning to causality.

Unfortunately, however, none of these men could or did hold the golden thread long enough to be able to trace it to the spool from which it was unwinding. But even though they were not able to trace it back step by step to the point at which it began, they at least caught a vision of it now and then, unwinding from the spool of human consciousness; and this thread, they thought, was like the one which they at moments touched with their fingers. Nevertheless, there were many obstacles in the way: Hills, rivers, forests, and philosophic debris of all kinds. So, they could not very well retrace the way of the unrolling of the thread. But, as we have said, visions of the truth flashed upon them: Aristotle at points thinks of God as representative of all Reality. He is the universal cause; the absolute Reality. He is the undivided "Thing-in-itself." And in some sense man partakes of, or is, immediately, this universal Soul. Maine de Biran, in general, contrary to Kant's conclusion, starts from the analysis of the first fact of consciousness; and upon the basis of that analysis he attempts to found a theory of Understanding and Reason. In opposition to the doctrine of the Categories, which is quite *a priori* in Kant, he maintains a psychological genesis of the general principles of thought. *The Ego perceives itself to be a cause; and so becomes the pattern and model of every idea of Cause, Force, or Power.* Unity, Simplicity, Existence, and so forth, are ideas which the Ego obtains by means of an abstraction wrought upon itself, and which, in a way, isolates its own attributes. If we find these attributes again in objects, it is because they have been projected by the Ego. *Reason is the spontaneous result of a kind of self-analysis of consciousness.* Victor Cousin holds that pure apperception does not entertain explicitly any idea of the *limited* or of the *unlimited;*

of the *relative* or the *absolute;* of the *finite* or the *infinite.* It contains all these things *implicitly; and reflection forthwith converts them into distinct and necessary truths. There are times, says Cousin, when the decision of the Soul is spontaneous and self-inspired; times when it attains to heroism and self-sacrifice from its own first impulse.* In both the domain of action and knowledge, the creative and original function belongs to free spontaneity. *The facts of consciousness are alone directly given to us. Out of these we build our world.* Even for George Santayana, consciousness is the only seat and source of "worth." The physical, as such, has no significance. Merely because a thing happens to exist, gives it no claim to our approval. It is in the recognition, not of existence or causality, but of *preferableness,* that value lies. One task of Reason is to constitute that ideal realm wherein Nature takes on form and value as viewed from the vantage-ground of human interest, and becomes rational in proportion as the life of impulse is brought into a harmonious whole. We have a right to, and we do, turn the facts of life into myths and symbols; but we should not go on and substantialize or reify these myths and symbols. We should not forget their poetic origin and function. We should not forget that they are pictures and statues from out our own intellectual studio. Fichte, though he did not remain consistent, said, Until self-consciousness acts, no one has any notion of "I." *The "I" is the first emergence of self-consciousness.* Then, self-consciousness is the "I." Therefore, a product of self-consciousness is a product of the "I" itself. *All valuation is an act of self-conscious reflection.* Then all valuation must be the act of the "I" itself. And the source of all value, or the first value, must be the "I" itself. Kant himself is committed, for he says that the idea of God is gotten by realizing, hypostatizing, and finally personifying a necessary postulate of Reason. But this is to make the "I" the source of the idea of God; the source of the idea of God, not as "Being," in the theological sense, but as

"Value." *And this would be to find the "I" to be the mystic spool from which unwinds the golden thread of all evaluation.* In *Kant and the Moral Life,* by Scott, there is really a recognition of the "I-in-itself" as the first and chief "Thing-in-itself." Professor Titchener says that, "We live in a world whose center is ourself." "We live in a universe which revolves about the 'Me.'" Professor Münsterberg points out the same truth when he says, "In our practical experience things have their meaning just through our attitude; their existence is bound up with our interest in them." In *Hegel's Logic,* by Harris, it is stated, that Hegel's real beginning is with the Principle of Self-Activity vs. Mind. Mind is the fundamental ground of all objective being and of all subjective consciousness. Even the Instrumentalists, who ordinarily will have nothing to do with metaphysics, define purely subjective experience as the *indeterminate.* But the *indeterminate* is one aspect of the "I-in-itself"; that is, the Non-Being or *negative* of the "I," which makes possible the *determinate* "I." The subjective *indeterminate* is, then, just a part of the cosmic ground for the "I-in-itself," or, a vital part of the "I-in-itself"; which is a sort of "Becoming," consisting at any one time, of both Being and Non-Being.

Upon this basis, we are now prepared to proceed to a somewhat new definition of the "I-in-itself." It is, tentatively at least, the dynamic, spontaneous, living, thinking being, with its needs and interests. It is the "I-think" "act of spontaneity," the "pure apperception," and the "original apperception," of Immanuel Kant (*Selections from Kant,* Watson, p. 65). That is, the "I-in-itself," and at least in point of significance, the first "Thing-in-itself," is the individual functioning organism. *Kant himself says that an "I-in-itself" lies at the bottom of our consciousness of Phenomena. He also says that the "I," as a "thinking being," is not quite like the "I" as a "sense-being." But this sense-being of Kant's is, in fact, the dynamic, spontaneous, living being, with its interests and*

needs; that is, it is the original "Thing-in-itself." And the "I," as a thinking being, is in reality identical with this sense-being; for sensing and thinking are not wholly disparate exercises. Sensing, and thinking, and doing are, in a measure, one process; that is, the process within a being which is striving to create a situation which will be conducive to all its needs, and to the satisfaction of all its interests.

This "I-in-itself" or ultimate "Thing-in-itself" may be compared with a rapidly flowing stream, while the "things-in-themselves" of the "I-in-itself" are the banks and bends of the land that control the on-going of the stream. *In this sense, "things-in-themselves" may be thought of as means, negatives, or limits. That is, the "things-in-themselves," in this connection, are the governing forces just outside its activity; the means by which the "I-in-itself" guides or directs itself; or, the limit of the reach of the "I-in-itself"; the "I-in-itself" positing the so-called unknown to explain the known. This so-called unknown is not, however, unknown; for it is created by the "I-in-itself"; and every "I-in-itself" must know its own offspring. The Soul, for instance, is that which it means to explain, not an unknown entity within itself. It is the postulate which best accounts for the complex of human behavior; and, as such, it is known to be just what it is known to do. Of course, the Soul cannot be known as "postulated," but it can be, and is, known as a "postulate." The "Thing-in-itself" cannot be known when we insist that it is "unknowable"; but when we admit that it is a postulate for a specific purpose, then it is known to be what it really is. The difficulty has been that men postulate the "unknowable," then play hide-and-seek with it. Like children, they hide it away, then look everywhere where it is not, in order to prove that it cannot be found. Philosophers are this much like children; they like to keep fooling themselves.* As Bishop Berkeley says, "We first raise a dust and then complain that we cannot see." *In reality, none of these so-called "Unknowables"*

transcend the world of "experience." The mind just deceives itself into trying to believe that they do. The other worlds are not beyond. They are the worlds we live in here and now. There is no fundamental difference between knowledge and faith. What we think, we project; then imagine that it is beyond. But in one sense, at least, it is not beyond. It is here. We are living in the midst of what we deem is beyond us. The Nazarene knew this when he said, "The Kingdom of Heaven is within you."

From what has been said in the preceding paragraph, it is evident that the "I-in-itself" differs from other "things-in-themselves," in that it is primarily an *Existential Reality;* while "things-in-themselves" are primarily *Subsistent Realities*. Nevertheless, there is no sharp line of demarcation here; just as there is no sharp line of demarcation between any two types of Reality. Neither Existential Realities nor Subsistent Realities are metaphysically *transcendent*. But both of them are metaphysically *transcendental*. The difference, therefore, between the "I-in-itself" and ordinary "things-in-themselves," is mainly one of "function."

Now, this "I-in-itself," being set up, begins its activity by positing many things that are necessary to its activity; just as a man, when he enters a profession, provides himself with the tools necessary to the prosecution of that profession. In the *first* place, this "I," consciously or unconsciously, creates those concepts which are necessary to its own immediate activity, that is, God, Soul, Freedom, Immortality, and others; the same being those instruments which, working all together, will tend to make harmonious the many and varied aspects of existence or being. In the *second* place, the "I-in-itself" creates many other supernatural objects or beings. And, in the *third* place, the "I" creates those "things-in-themselves" which are necessary to the explanation and manipulation of many less important systems of facts. In each case, however, the "things-in-themselves," so created by the "I," are *sec-*

ondary to it, being only means to its satisfactory on-going. They are postulated because needed as instruments to explain Phenomena in general, or in order to unify and systematize the behavior of active and thinking beings.

But in the immediately preceding remarks we have not intended to say that the "I" "posits" itself in the sense that Fichte speaks of "positing." For, the "I-in-itself" does not posit itself. It simply *is*. It is not primarily *subsistent,* but primarily *existent*. In a way, however, Fichte is correct, in that the "I-in-itself" posits its *negative,* its *limit,* or *some hypothesis* by means of which it may direct itself; the "I-in-itself" still being the stream of reflective conscious need.

However, the problem is not quite so simple as the above statements might suggest. The "I-in-itself" is not *simple,* but *complex*. It both *is,* and *is not;* it is both *determinate* and *indeterminate;* it is both *positive* and *negative*.

As we have said above, the "I-in-itself" posits "things-in-themselves" as guides, limits, or negatives; but these are not of the same nature as the *negative* that inheres in, and is, a part of the "I-in-itself." This *negative* of which we now speak is necessary to the very existence of the "I-in-itself"; whereas the guides, limits, and negatives spoken of above are not, logically, necessary to the "I-in-itself," only in the sense that the "I-in-itself," out of its very nature, posits them.

Then, what is the nature of this "I-in-itself-negative"? It is not purely conceptual, as are the minor "things-in-themselves." It may be defined as *potential,* rather than merely *conceptual*. It may be conceptual, in that there is a dim intuition of it as potentiality which may in time become actualized. It is felt to be a real existent *indeterminate* which may evolve into a *determinate*. It may be called the Noumenal realm, or man's mental "lumber-yard," out of which he takes all sorts of raw "stuff" for the building of himself and his world. The Non-Being of this lumber-yard is always taking on concrete form in the Self. *A synthesis of the negative*

and the positive is forever taking place. As Aristotle says, "Becoming is always between that which is and that which is not." That is, Becoming is between Being and Non-Being. But it is Non-Being that makes possible Becoming; for without Non-Being, Being could not be; for Being itself is a process of "Becoming." Therefore, both "Being" and "Non-Being" are involved in the activity of the "I"; that is, both the *positive* and the *negative* are true parts of the "I-in-itself," the "I-in-itself" being represented by what we may call "Becoming"; for we have spoken of the "I" as being the active and thinking organism, with its needs and desires; such organism depending for its very existence upon the continuous interplay between the *positive* and the *negative* "I," or between Being and Non-Being.

But someone may object, by saying that the *negative* or Non-Being is "non-existent." But not so. Plato, Erigena, Hegel, and others of recent times have realized that "Non-Being" is not synonymous with "non-existence." With both Plato and Erigena, Non-Being is only a "lower form" of existence. It is that which has not yet become *determinate.* With Hegel, both Non-Being and Being are aspects of "actual Being." The lumber in the lumber-yard is not "non-existent," in the sense that it is "not." It is "non-existent" only in the sense that it is "not-house." That is, this lumber, like the *negative* Self, has a logical non-existence or Non-Being before it becomes "house." In a word, "*non-existence*" *simply means "a lower order of existence."*

Furthermore, the lumber-yard of any prosperous builder will not grow less and less as he draws upon it. Rather, it will remain equally as large; or, it may even grow larger. For as the business of building increases, and as the profits of business are good, the master-builder will be able to draw larger and larger amounts from his lumber-yard. *Therefore, he must, so to speak, posit the existence of increasing supplies out of which he may continue to build. He will figure on the possi-*

bilities of his business, and maintain his lumber-yard accordingly.

Again, and likewise, as one builds and prospers in things intellectual and spiritual, his intellectual and spiritual "lumber-yard" will naturally increase, because that which he has already built will awaken in him the consciousness of potentialities which might otherwise have continued to sleep.

In more abstract terms, we may say that the Noumenal realm is man's realm of *capacity,* over against his realm of *ability*. We cannot imagine one, all of whose *capacity* has been transformed into *ability*. But we know that as *ability increases,* the consciousness of *capacity increases*. Now, *capacity* is the "lumber-yard"; that is, it is the lower order of existence, over against *ability* or that which has already been formed or achieved.

In short, the lumber or capacity is the negative aspect of the Self; while the so-far-finished structure of the Self is the "relatively finished house," or the ability already acquired.

This view of the Self, or "I-in-itself," excludes that troublesome idea of two disparate worlds, the Noumenal and the Phenomenal. *For the negative and the positive are not two separate or disparate realms, but just the two aspects of one Self. The Noumenal Self is just as much a part of the real Self as the negative pole is a real part of the steel magnet.*

Still further, *to describe the Self or world as merely positive or actual, is to exclude all development.* If there is to be growth; if the Self and world have possibilities of development; that is, if there is to be a building-up of a larger and larger *positive* Self or *positive* world, then there must be, or be posited to be, material which can be drawn upon as such building or development progresses. As Plato might say, the *negative* Self or the *negative* world is the "timber" out of which the actual Self and the actual world are always being constructed.

This view of the "I-in-itself" will help us to solve an-

other aspect of the problem. Kant and others have had trouble in discovering the relation between Noumenon or the "Thing-in-itself" and Phenomenon. The idea of the "Thing-in-itself" as a cause has confused the whole issue. But we may clarify the matter by letting the lumber in the lumber-yard be rather the logical cause of the house, in that it is, previous to the "house," "not-house," and then becomes "house." Likewise, *capacity* is the logical cause of *ability,* for it is because of the existence of *capacity* that *ability* finally comes into existence. It is also because of the logical opposite of *ability* that we can speak of *ability;* just as the logical opposite *bad* is necessary to the concept *good.* In the same manner, there must be, logically speaking, a "Not-Self" before there can be a "Self."

This treatment will also aid in solving the problem of Being and Non-Being in the so-called objective world. If the "I-in-itself" is composed of *negative* and *positive* aspects, it will, in its attempt to interpret the world, do so in the light of its own nature. If so, the world as known, will also have its Being and its Non-Being aspects.

It follows, therefore, that Non-Being may be of several kinds: For instance, "no-chair" may mean (1) All other objects that are not chairs; (2) All material that is suitable "timber" for the chairs; (3) The logical Non-Being or *indeterminateness* which makes possible the existence of the chair as a *determinate* or *definite* object; and (4) Non-Being may also be defined in terms of limiting concepts; those concepts which represent the limits of the knowledge of Phenomena, but which are resorted to as means of explaining such Phenomena; as atoms and electrons are the *ground of the chair.* But in all of these cases Non-Being may be said to be a way of dealing with that which is given, concerning which more must later be said.

Proceeding to the second division of this section, it may be, as has been said, that the "Thing-in-itself" has two distinct

aspects: In one sense, the "Thing-in-itself" is the "I-in-itself"; while, in another sense, it may take the shape of "things-in-themselves." That is, "things-in-themselves" may be the postulates formulated by the "I-in-itself."

2. *The Offspring of the I-in-itself:* Now, as we have before suggested, *if the "I-in-itself" is of a given nature, it will interpret the world in keeping with that nature.* We have said that the world is possessed of Being and Non-Being aspects, because the "I-in-itself," which analyzes and evaluates the world, is possessed of such aspects.

In the treatment of the "I-in-itself" relative to "things-in-themselves," we also said that the "I-in-itself" posited "things-in-themselves" for its own immediate use; but that it also posited "things-in-themselves" relative to a Supernatural World, and to many less important systems of facts. If "things-in-themselves" are necessary for the rationalization of the Self, which they are, then the Self will also demand "things-in-themselves" for the rationalization of the world, and also for certain specific "Thought-Systems."

For instance, Reason is just the result of a conceptual analysis of the individual on logical grounds. That is, there is, in reality, no dualism of Self and Reason. The personality is, generally speaking, one, as psychology will bear us out. *The person is a whole;* but, for analytical and logical purposes, we introduce the notion of "Reason." It is here a value-judgment; a means of explaining human behavior. It is a "notional" cause of certain phases of activity. Reason is personified and becomes a directing force or power; the "Thing-in-itself" of certain types of action.

According to men like Wilhelm Wundt, Mind, Intellect, and Reason are purposive in nature, and so judgments-of-value. They may also be used as instruments for dealing with certain sets of facts. But this is to say that they are of the nature of "things-in-themselves," in that they may be thought of as the ground of certain "psychological phenomena." *They*

are of subjective origin. But they may be objectified, logically speaking, and so thought of as having actual and constitutive existence. In short, Mind, Intellect, and Reason are not only "metaphysical substances," but also "logical subjects."

Now, if it is so natural for man to postulate such concepts relative to his own intellectual constitution, when they have no existence as such; then it it easy to believe that he will, upon the basis of them, proceed to set in order the objective world, and certain specific realms thereof. If these concepts help to explain his own character, then it is unconsciously presumed that they are the key to the understanding of the world, or to any limited realm of Reality as a whole. As we know, this is the basis upon which Hegel proceeded; for his whole system is *an extension, amplification, and objectification of that which he finds to be true of the individual Self. In man, Reason is the essence and norm of thought; but in things it is the law of their evolution.*

Therefore, Consciousness, Mind, Intellect, Reason, and all like concepts are, as formulated, the children or offspring of the "I-in-itself"; the legitimate offspring of the universal and absolute "Thing-in-itself," which are made use of in the explanation of both the Self and the world. However, the Self must be interpreted in terms of the world, as well as the world in terms of the Self, concerning which more must later be set out.

In short, as Reinhold says, Reason, Sensibility, and Understanding, are "things-in-themselves." That is, they are the imperceptible grounds of the empirical activities of the kinds of cognitions in question, each one serving in its own way to explain a given set of observed Phenomena. True, from the viewpoint of *associational psychology,* these "things-in-themselves" may not explain anything. But they do serve as central ideas about which to group certain findings. They take the place of "genera" in science. Under them, as Immanuel

Kant would say, one may subsume the different types of behavior which are observed in actual experience.

But these "things-in-themselves" are, to begin with, not *outside* of consciousness, but *inside* of it. For, as Solomon Maimon says, the assumption of a Reality to be placed outside of consciousness involves a contradiction. *What is thought is in consciousness;* and in this case what is thought is thought of as being necessary in order to explain the *given in consciousness.*

However, whether "things-in-themselves" are created for the purpose of explaining the Phenomena of the Self or the Phenomena of the world, they are born out of the "I" under the stress of reflective need, mingled with a spirit of curiosity and wonder. Sigismund Beck is almost right when he thinks of Kant's "consciousness in general" as taking the place of the "things-in-themselves." In a sense, any consciousness is a "general consciousness"; only, for practical purposes, we must begin with consciousness in the biological sense, that is, the consciousness which we really experience as individuals. When we do so, we discover that even the "general consciousness," together with "things-in-themselves," may be largely the work of our own creation; which goes to show that the balance of power may lie in the individual "I-in-itself," as a conscious and reflective unit; remembering that it does not act independently of the "All." But it is better to say, not that the "All" acts for the "I," but that the "I," in a sense, acts for the "All"; in that the "I" is, so far as we know, *the highest type of conscious and reflective activity.* In fact, Fichte saw the reasonableness of a reconstruction of this kind; for, as Herbart says, Fichte's "I" is Kant's "consciousness in general" in a completely developed form. That is, the "I" is at the heart of the "consciousness in general" or the "Transcendental Apperception."

Again, Kant says that Reason dictates the Moral Law as a Categorical Imperative, because the world is found to be un-

satisfactory. But if Reason dictates the Moral Law, and the Moral Law is the basis for the creation of a new world, as it is in Kant; then, after all, Kant's system has an "Egocentric" phase; and the "I-in-itself" is *a* chief factor, if not *the* chief factor, in the building of the world. Therefore, Kant, as Josiah Royce suggests, *heroically created his world out of the fiber of his own Moral Manhood.*

We may conclude, then, with Hugo Münsterberg, and others, that the "I-in-itself" has a big part to perform in the creation of Reality; and that the potentialities that form the only possible metaphysical background of Reality are not the potentialities of so-called existing, objective, and constitutive objects, as such; but the potentialities of the "will," as it acts in behalf of the needs which are involved in its very existence. In the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant himself says, that, "while Reason can know nothing purely of itself, yet that which it has itself put into Nature must be its guide to the discovery of all that it can learn from Nature." In the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 127, Kant states that "Der Verstand ist Selbst der Quell der Gesetze der Natur."

IV

THE NATURE OF THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES

1. *Hypotheses:* Any provisional, tentative explanation of Phenomena; any suggested law which has not been completely verified, is called an hypothesis. These are of two kinds: (1) *The phenomenal hypothesis, as, air vibrations are the cause of sound. Here one phenomenal occurrence is used to explain another;* (2) *The conceptual hypothesis, as the supposition that ether is necessary to the transmission of light. In this case, "ether" is not a phenomenal occurrence; it is a pure postulation.*

Now, it is when the *phenomenal explanation* of any fact is either impossible or incomplete, that we resort to the second type of hypothesis, that is, to the *conceptual* type.

Every science is based upon a number of these conceptual hypotheses or postulates; that is, upon certain fundamental and essential presuppositions, without which science would be impossible. Science generally accepts such postulates as true, leaving to metaphysics the task of inquiring into the validity of such assumptions, and into the nature and reality of the thing assumed.

Consequently, this work, being a research in the field of metaphysics, must be confined more closely to what we have called the "conceptual hypothesis"; which is derived from the Greek words "ὑπό," "under," and "Θεσυς," "placing"; and so is synonymous with the Latin word "suppositio," meaning a "placing under." *It is the imagining of some "thing," "force," or "cause," which underlies the Phenomena with which one*

happens to be dealing; and which is thought of as the agent of their production, though it is not capable of direct observation. In this sense, an hypothesis is any concept or supposition which is used to explain or organize any given group of facts, as, for instance, the hypothesis of the theory of evolution.

Then, what about *induction* and *deduction?* Some have insisted that we do not begin with *deduction,* but with *induction.* True, the inductive methods are attempts to eliminate hypotheses. *But the term "induction" is usually employed in a sense sufficiently broad to include the method of hypotheses.* In reality, the inductive method of John Stuart Mill has the "hypothetical" element. *For there could be no reason for making a complete enumeration of the particulars of a group, if not for the purpose of corroborating the hypothesis which begins to form as soon as thinking begins relative to a given situation.* If no hypothesis began to form itself when thinking was initiated, it is not likely that the process of enumeration could, or would, continue; unless, perchance, the "enumerator" was a moron, an imbecile, or an idiot. But of course in that case, "thinking" might never be "initiated."

Consequently, there is a sense in which "deduction" precedes, or at least accompanies, "induction." For what leads men to circumscribe the area of investigation, if it is not that there is already in the mind some idea of the result which is likely to be reached? Now, the use of such a tentative idea involves "deduction" or a preliminary hypothesis of some sort. "Thought" could not proceed without this preliminary idea, which leads on to investigation. If it did proceed without it, it would overlook many facts which deserved to be taken into account. Therefore, a "preliminary hypothesis" of some kind is necessary to all "thinking."

Thus, it is evident that the existence of hypotheses is contemporaneous with knowledge, in the sense that we now speak of knowledge; which makes the reflective mind an inextricable factor in the knowledge process; which, in turn, is to

say, that the world is in some sense constructed by the mind and according to the needs of the knowing subject. Hypotheses may not be, and often are not, in the so-called facts, but are contributed to them by the mind, as a means of manipulating the facts. As J. A. Stewart says of the "Ideas" in *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas,* p. 27, "they are, in fact, ways in which the mind reacts, according to its own peculiar constitution, upon the influences which come to it from without; ways in which it, bit by bit, makes its world."

In short, postulates or hypotheses are not absolute. They are conceived for given purposes. The ultimate presuppositions of jurisprudence, ethics, and metaphysics are, at bottom, nothing but hypotheses; controls for rational procedure.

James Welton, in his *Manual of Logic,* Vol. 2, says that any supposition which we make in order to account for an event is an *hypothesis.*

Then, our suppositions as to the ground of the world; as to the ground for our being; or as to the ground for our future existence are *hypotheses.* That is, we are always asking the questions: "What is the logical basis for the world, for personality, and for the future life?" To the *first* question, "What is the logical basis for the world?" men have said, "Force," "Power," "Energy," or "God." To the *second* question, "What is the logical basis for personality?" men have postulated the Soul. As an answer to the *third* question, "What is the logical basis for the future life?" men have postulated Immortality.

That is, the "Thing-in-itself" for the world is Force, Power, Energy, or God. The "Thing-in-itself" for personality is the Soul. The "Thing-in-itself" as a hope for the continuation of life is the "principle of Immortality." "Thou hast set Eternity in my heart," was the Hebrewistic way of stating a belief in the "Thing-in-itself," as the same relates to human personality and to the continuation thereof.

In other words, men have always sought for the Source or

Cause of the world and of life. They have always supposed that there was some *metaphysical something* underlying the phenomenal processes, and directing the course of such processes. The Platonic "Ideas," Berkeley's "Eternal Spirit," Kant's "Transcendental Ego," Schopenhauer's "Will," Bergson's "Life," Driesch's "Entelechy," the Animist's "Soul," the "Subject" of many psychologists, and the "Force" of many physicists involve the *metaphysical concept* of Source; which refers to some often extra-mundane Power, the activity of which *process* is a manifestation; some metaphysical reality of which the world of science is the phenomenal expression. Thus, for T. H. Green, an "Eternal Consciousness" is necessary to the very existence of, and order of, Phenomena. This "Eternal Consciousness" is the *source* of the *relations* and *interrelations* which constitute the whole of the natural world; which relations and interrelations are the results of the activity of the "Eternal Consciousness," as it functions in terms of its combining and unifying capacity. *And the animal organism is its vehicle.* This "Eternal Consciousness" is operative throughout the succession of events which constitute the growth of the individual mind, acting on the sentient life of the Soul, and using it as its organ.

Therefore, any hypothesis of the purely conceptual type, runs into and becomes synonymous with the "Thing-in-itself."* As we have seen, the idea of God is synonymous with the idea of the "Thing-in-itself." But God is, for Kant, a "postulate." So, any postulate or hypothesis may be said to be of the nature of the "Thing-in-itself."

In connection with this thought, Mary Everest Boole, in her little book, *Philosophy and Fun of Algebra,* in the chapter entitled "The Great 'X' of the World," makes some very interesting statements, in which the Hebrews are represented

* Thenceforward when the term "Thing-in-itself" is used in any form other than in the form of "I-in-itself," it is to be understood as meaning an hypothesis made by the "I-in-itself."

as asking all sorts of questions about "Who" or "What" made things be. But nobody knew anything about it. So, Moses, seeing that this chaotic state of affairs would not be good for the people, said to them, No one of us has ever seen the "Maker" of things. We can all see things growing, but never the force that makes them grow. That is our "X," said he; our "Unknown." We are going to begin by stating that we do not know. We shall call the maker of things, "I Am," or, "That Which *Is,* Whatever It *Is*"; and we are going to make two hypotheses to start with: (1) We are going to try thinking of "I Am" as Unity; One, and not several, or a fraction; (2) We will also try thinking of "I Am" as "No-thing," that is, that "I Am" is not a "thing." When we find that any particular proceeding or behavior destroys men, or makes them too *sickly* or *weak* or *stupid* or *quarrelsome* to manage other creatures and keep the upper hand of the world, we will say, for short, that "I Am" does not like or does not intend the people of Israel to go on with that kind of behavior. Now, these two hypotheses are as much as we can deal with for the present. Anybody who wants to think out other hypotheses than these, will have to think to himself, or else get out of the country which I am going to manage.

Therefore, it turns out that when men are *up against real problems,* they begin to imagine ways of solving them. Now, these "imaginable ways or solutions" are "hypotheses" or the "things-in-themselves" of the given situations.

Thus, *presuppositions, conceptual hypotheses,* and "*things-in-themselves*" are all in reality "things-in-themselves"; for "things-in-themselves" may take on many forms; the situation, problem, or realm of discourse, largely determining the form. For instance, the chief "Thing-in-itself" of the world as a whole may be said to be God; while the chief "Thing-in-itself" of the individual personality is the Soul. But it is clear that both are *conceptual hypotheses,* in the sense that they have been resorted to in the absence of any possibility

of a phenomenal explanation, and in that they are not capable of any complete verification.

2. *Values:* As in the case of hypotheses, values are *Phenomenal* or *Conceptual.* That is, they are pure "thing-values" or pure "concept-values." This does not mean that the concept-value is out of relation to the thing-value; but, logically, at least, there is a distinction between the two phases of value.

Now, as in the case of hypotheses, it is with the *concept-values* that we must here deal. Also, it is with beliefs, as beliefs, that we are now concerned. That is, what is the nature of beliefs?

John Dewey, in his *Experience and Nature,* holds that reflection is not only an instrument for securing freer and more enduring values; but that it is, in itself, a unique good. Its instrumental efficiency determines it to be a candidate for a distinctive position as an immediate good; since, beyond other goods, it has the power of replenishment and fructification. That is, the subject-matter of intellect is not isolated with reference to the scope of value and valuation. There are not two realms, one of intellectual objects without value, and the other of value-objects without intellect.

This is to say, as we have already intimated, that values, hypotheses, and "things-in-themselves" must ultimately be referred to an individual Ego; not forgetting of course that this Ego is a miniature of the racial mind; that it is, in some sense, the representation of all that has been, or is, thought; a unit composed of all kinds of elements contributed by manifold interactions. But this does not destroy the fact that the evolution of knowledge begins with a reflective individual, as that individual begins to build a world to his own liking. *True, each individual is a ganglion within a boundless infinite, and may, in some sense, sacrifice himself for interests outside of himself. But his motives for procedure will be the common needs, wants, and ideals that inhere in the individual himself.*

Therefore, the individual or "I-in-itself" proceeds by form-

ing hypotheses and by creating values. But as we have said, values are beliefs which are immediate; that is, like hypotheses, they are not dependent upon verification. So, being of the nature of hypotheses, and being initiated by the individual himself in his reflective activities, they are of the nature of "things-in-themselves." Also, like reflection and hypotheses, values are in some sense always means of solving problems, or dealing with specific sets of facts. A belief in devils or demons, is, or was, for instance, one way of explaining many diseases. In reality, the hypothesis itself is a result of the evolutionary process. Postulating, evaluating, and conceiving of grounds or "things-in-themselves" are all one and the same process; the activity of the "I-in-itself," as it proceeds to create instruments and to construct a desirable world. An illustration of this process may be drawn from Kant's statements concerning the Transcendental Ego and the Rational Soul: The Transcendental Ego of Kant corresponds in general to what we have called the "I-in-itself"; while the Rational Soul corresponds to what we have called the "Thing-in-itself" as a postulate.

We may conclude, then, that "things-in-themselves," in their fundamental aspects, are like values and hypotheses; or, that values and hypotheses are just other methods of dealing with the problem of the "Thing-in-itself"; the "Thing-in-itself" being, in fact, a value-judgment. In other words, any one concept may be an hypothesis, value-judgment, or a "Thing-in-itself." For instance, for Kant, God is a *postulate;* for Josiah Royce, he is a *value-judgment;* but for Aristotle, Erigena, and men like Jacobi, he is the "Thing-in-itself."

V

THE COMPOSITION OF THE WORLD-ORDER

But is the world made up of nothing but concepts, hypotheses, conceptual values, or "things-in-themselves?" Are concepts and the data of thought of the same function? *They are, we believe, of the same fundamental nature; but this does not mean that they are of the same function.* The root of the plant and its flower are of the same essential nature, but they do not have the same function.

May it not be so in the world of knowledge? May it not be that there are *different functions,* but *one nature?* May it not be that a "thing" is its function? That all things are in some sense definable in terms of function? When a thing functions so and so, we call it "matter"; when it functions in some other way, we call it "mind"; and when it functions in still another way, we speak of it as "purpose" or "spirit."

In the first place, then, we may say that we have something which functions as data of knowledge, letting this data represent not only the so-called realistic world, but also the mechanism of the subject in whom the knowledge process takes place. Now, the mechanism of the world and the mechanism of the knower have one function, while the reality produced by these related functionings has another function, the function of what we call "consciousness." *Scott, in his Kant and the Moral Life, makes the world to consist of certain given realistic data, plus the universals furnished by the mind.* But may these universals not be a functioning result

of a relational functioning? That is, *alike* in *nature,* but *different* in *function?*

If this is the case, then, there may always be an interplay of so-called *subject* and *object,* the subject being one function and the object another function; the interplay being the relation of these functions, resulting in another function.

On this basis, we might say that the mind does not create Nature as a whole, but is a factor in making the world in which thinking and living actually proceed to take place. So-called *objects* and the *activity of consciousness* are both involved in what we call "experience."

According to Idealism, there is always something beyond: God, Nature, or Oversoul. Our senses perceive only the Phenomena of life; but behind the range of human senses lurk things not *phenomenal.* In a sense, these men are right; but, in another sense, they are wrong. In that *sense perceptions* are of a more concrete and more tangible nature, they may be called evidences of data or *Phenomena.* In that *concepts* are in some sense that which is in addition to or of a different function than data or the so-called sense-perceived, they may be said to be of the nature of *Noumena.* But, in that both *sense perceptions* and *concepts* are natural to man, both processes are evidently "natural"; and so only aspects of one human phenomena of thinking or reflecting, each having its function in the process as a whole. True, the so-called *non-phenomenal* does lurk behind, is set under, or is built upon, the so-called *phenomenal.* But this is so because man, the first and chief factor in the knowledge process, has in this way set his world in order.

In other words, it is reasonable to suppose that the relation between the *mind* and the *world* (so-called objective world) is analogous to that between the *mind* and the *body.* So far as experience goes, the mind cannot exist without a "body," and the body cannot exist without that peculiar function which we call "mind" or "spirit." This seems even more

likely when we remember that man is a part of the natural order. Being a part of such an order, his mind would have in some sense the same relation to the whole of the natural order that it has to his individual part of the natural order. In short, the world is both *stuff* and *mind*. But it is *stuff* and *mind* because man is also of the same substances. That is, man, being of these two functions, insists or demands that the world must conform to the same. And perhaps it does, and that in more ways than one.

Just as men have tried to set up a dualism between *mind* and *body,* so have they set up a dualism relative to the world. They have demanded that the world be *matter* and *mind*. But it is more likely that the world is "matter-mind," and that man is "body-mind." In a word, these distinctions are only mere conveniences for dealing with Phenomena. The world may be *logically many,* but *metaphysically one*. In *nature,* it may be *one,* but in *function* it may be *many*.

Then, may not both *data* and *concepts* be termed existences? May a universal, for instance, not be both existent and at the same time significant in meaning, reference, or use? At least, concepts and universals "exist" as "subsistents." *A value-judgment need not be divorced from Reality*. Reality and existence need not be thought of as two separate things. If ideals, concepts, hypotheses, values, or "things-in-themselves" are the products of a natural and existent world, then they are likewise natural and existent. But this does not mean that they may not be very much unlike in function. They are just different aspects of one and the same world. They may be called "subsistents." But, as we have just said, there is a sense in which "subsistents" "exist." However, they are of one and the same world; otherwise, how could they ever get together? John Dewey insists that *ideals* arise *out* of realistic situations, and that they should serve *in* realistic situations. This is making the point for which we are now

contending; that is, that the world is *metaphysically one,* but in *function many.*

F. C. S. Schiller, in his *Riddles of the Sphinx,* holds that the world is *one. Body* and *Soul, Matter* and *Spirit,* are only different aspects; the *outside* and the *inside* of the same fact: *The material is but the outward and visible sign of the inward and spiritual state.* For, if the phenomenal world is a stress between the Deity and the Ego, the Soul is but the reaction of the Ego upon the divine action which encases it as the body. But he goes on to say, that this very analysis of a stress, this very distinction between force and resistance, action and reaction, is a logical and not a real one. *They are distinguishable in thought, but inseparable in reality.*

Therefore, knowledge or experience is the interplay or interaction of different functions of existence, involving *a given data; mental projections of a reflective mind; and the purpose of an organism whose harmonious adjustment is demanded by its very existence.* All of these functions are the necessary aspects of one whole of Reality; evaluation being reserved for the self-conscious and reflective organism, which is the center of the knowledge process, as such.

VI

THE TENDENCY OF THE MIND TO CREATE, PROJECT, PERSONIFY, AND REIFY

But, we may ask, Why do we get a complex world as described in the previous section? The general answer is, that the mind's disposition is to create, project, and personify concepts and ideals. That is, that the "I" is a factor in the whole of Reality, and that any reality is relative to him who experiences it.

However, we may ask still further, Why does the mind thus project its concepts and ideals? Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* holds that the term "objective" indicates a "controlling and determining" function.

Concepts and purposes, functioning as controls, are naturally projected; and so become a part of the real and objective world. Man's own body is objective in that it largely controls his activity. His possibility of mobility is largely regulated by his physical organism. His ideals and concepts, likewise, being once conceived, tend to control his whole behavior; and so, in his thinking, come to be objective. All things, including concepts, are to be made use of or avoided. If they are to be avoided, one must go around them in his thinking; just as he would go around a hole in the ground in order to keep from falling into it. If concepts are to be used, one must approach them, examine, grasp, and wield them just as he would grasp and make use of a mechanical tool. So, in either case, there is an element of control, which results in

objectivity. As we have said, let a thing come to be a *control,* and it is as *objective* as one's own house, table, or bed. The insistence that God is *objective* lies in the fact that the concept of him has for so long influenced or controlled the human race. And, therefore, he has now come to be objective, and thought to exist independently of his "creator."

M. Fouellee, in the explanation of his *leading idea,* the hypothesis of the "ideas-forces," says that an idea is not a mere representation. *It is not a mental reproduction of a real or supposed object outside of itself.* An "idea" is at the same time a force working for its own realization. For instance, "liberty" is not a reality given objectively, of which we have an idea because we perceive it; but, on the contrary, it is because we have an idea of our own liberty; because we believe in it; because we adapt our conduct to this belief, that we are actually free, and that our freedom is effectual in the world of Phenomena. Our ideas and feelings are conditions of a real internal change; and are, therefore, factors in mental evaluation; not mere signs of an evaluation taking place independently of them, because of exclusively physical causes. Again, every *internal change,* being inseparable from an *external change or motion,* produces effects upon the external world. Ideas having acted inwardly, at the same time find outward expression, with all the resulting consequences. Thus, the *internal* and the *external* efficacy of mental states are inseparable, because of the fundamental unity between the *physical* and the *psychical.*

So, *there are not two worlds, but only one,* to the latter of which thought makes its natural contribution; the different aspects of which world, including *data, concepts,* and *purposes,* may be said to equally control us. *But if they equally control us, they will be equally objective.* However, men have not generally understood how that which is initiated by the individual can become objective; and so we have the problem of *subject* and *object, mind* and *matter,* the "*Thing-in-*

itself" and *Phenomena.* But when we have once discovered that *thoughts are as objective as things,* and learn what that contribution is that thought makes to the world of experience, then shall we have begun to solve the problem of the *subject* and the *object;* and also the problem of *Phenomena* and the "*Thing-in-itself.*" Just what proportion of the world is contributed by reflection, man may never know; but he may at least discover the *nature* of the contribution which he makes.

This does not destroy the fact that man's power of knowing and thinking is regulated by the potentialities belonging to the world, and so to a creature of a natural realm. Contrary to modern Realism, there is here more than an *external* relation, for the reason that there is certainly a fundamental *internal dependence* of the individual upon the whole of that which has had the power to make him to be the peculiar kind of being which he is. If the reader is in doubt at this point, he is hereby invited to examine carefully the works of A. N. Whitehead, and other relatively recent writers of Whitehead's philosophical temperament.

Again, man's physical and mental constitution will make demands in keeping with the tendency along which it has come into existence. But has not every organism in its evolution been forced, if it was to continue its existence, to seek and to avoid certain objects? In other words, the whole history of any organism is one of *seeking* or *avoiding* objects. In the primitive state, there are those things which are to be *sought,* and those which are to be *avoided.* Therefore, these *actual objects,* being controls, will later on serve as a background for the objectification of *abstract concepts.* In line with this idea, some authors take the attitude that the worship of actual objects preceded the worship of God or the Gods.

But there was always that disposition to project the Self, and to interpret the world in terms of the same. The Omahas, for instance, regarded all animate and inanimate forms as being pervaded by a common life; which was thought of as be-

ing continuous with, and similar to, the will power which they were conscious of in themselves. This "mysterious power in all things" was called "Wakonda." Through it all things were related to man and to each other. In the idea of the continuity of life a relation was maintained between the seen and the unseen, the dead and the living; and also between the fragment of anything and its entirety. Thus, an Omaha novice might at any time seek to attain "Wakonda" by what was called the "rite of the vision." He would go out alone, fast, chant incantations, and finally fall into a trance, resembling what in modern times has been called "Cosmic Consciousness"; in which state he would perceive the inner relations of all things and the solidarity or oneness of the least object with the rest of the cosmos.

These people may not have been as advanced as the modern Realist, but they knew that no one thing had a "prefixed measure and boundary." They were sufficiently wise to repudiate a world of *external relations,* and to confirm a cosmos of *relations* and *interrelations.*

In reality, man projects so much of himself into the world, and the world projects so much of itself into him, that the word "juxtaposition" in no sense describes the "knowledge-situation." The data of the world, the unique concepts of reflection, and the purposes that arise out of this combination so control men, that the whole "knowledge-world," including the creations of fancy and imagination, naturally becomes objective. God-concepts, laws of all kinds, universals in general, and the "Thing-in-itself" have been thought of as objective and constitutive existences. And this tendency has not been wholly bad or at all unnatural. It is safe to say that so long as these concepts actually control men in their activity and thought, they will be conceived as being either objective, or constitutive, or both. The scientist, for all practical purposes, thinks of the *law* relative to his particular science as being objectively true; as existing in the concrete. Why? Because,

in his investigations, he is always being controlled by it. And it is just so in the case of all the "things" and all the "thoughts" that control men. *They will unavoidably objectify themselves.* Man, being of a world which has, before his birth, in some sense controlled the possibilities of his very existence; and having been born and reared in the midst of objects and agents which controlled him, will, when he begins to think, conceive of the world which he creates as being like the world out of which he came, and in the midst of which he began his biological existence, and the building of his own particular world. If a nurse or mother makes the child go here or there; do this or that; and the nurse or mother is objective; then, when he has thoughts and ideas that make him go here or there, do this or that, they, too, will be objective. So, does the child "become a man," and build up his world. But he is no less the chief factor; for he provides the material that makes the world of experience what it is. Like a honeybee, he adds to the mixture the formic acid that makes the world to possess those things which seem good to his taste. But his contribution is in the world, and is thought of as being just as objective to him as the nectar and formic acid combination is objective to the honeybee.

However, as Socrates believed, and as many of the Stoics persisted, *ideas* or *universals* have *no constitutive existence.* They are neither *outside* of things, as Plato generally thought, or as he has been interpreted as thinking; nor *inside* of things, as Aristotle taught. *They are rather mere abstractions of thought, to which nothing in Reality corresponds; yet, when projected, must naturally be thought of as objective, or constitutive, in that that which controls becomes objective. And, having become objective, they come to be thought of as real in the sense that other objective things are real, that is, as constitutively real. For the nature of the mind is to attribute constitutive existence to all that which tends to control its activity, whether that which controls is concrete data, or the*

concepts of the mind. In a word, as James Mark Baldwin indicates, *the world, as it presents itself to our immediate perception, does not disclose the unity, the permanence, or the purpose which reflection and reason demand as an intelligible account of experience.* Therefore, the mind forms a conception of some *substance, activity,* or *principle* which it regards as self-existent and ultimate; and which is at the same time thought of as the cause or ground of the Phenomenal realm. *These projected concepts are in a sense a part of the world; but, as we are now thinking of them, they are that part of the world which is contributed by the reflection of man.*

But not to understand the movements of the mind, as indicated above, is to become involved in an infinite number of difficulties. Both the Realist and the Idealist fall into the *ditch of philosophic folly* because they do not remember the *subtleties of reflection.* The Realist imagines the object to have existed before he appeared upon the scene, just as it appears after he has appeared and begun to know it; the Idealist imagines that it did not at all exist until he appeared and began to know it. However, the fact of the matter is, that we must begin with something which is generally called data. But when we do so, there is immediately an evaluation of that data, which is quickly objectified by the mind. For, in the light of all previous discussion of the problem, *there is no way in which we can wholly separate the datum in a "knowledge-situation" from the contribution made by the mind.* But the Realist holds that the object is in no sense an objectification of the mind's content; and the Idealist holds that the object is wholly an objectification of the mind's content. Both are equally in error. At this point, the reader should either re-examine, or proceed to acquaint himself with, the philosophies of Representative Realism, New Realism, and Critical Realism.

It is this confusion of the Realistic and the Idealistic trends of thought that "darken the understanding" relative

to the Ideas of Plato. We ought not to imagine that Plato's mind was unlike the ordinary reflective mind. Plato, as suggested by J. A. Stewart, in *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas,* arrived at his Ideas in a perfectly natural way. From the psychological point of view, both his Ideas and our "things-in-themselves" may be understood. *The Idea is simply the mind's way of reacting to a given situation. The "Thing-in-itself" is the instrument hit upon by reflection in the presence of chaotic data.* But in the case of the "Thing-in-itself," just as in the case of Plato's Ideas, there is that tendency to project, which ends with an objective entity. Therefore, not only datum plus evaluation is objectified, but the evaluation-content itself may be abstracted, objectified, and reified as an independent entity. If Plato had known even as much about the inner workings of the mind as is now known, he would have been quick to see why his Ideas took on objective existence like "archetypal forms laid up in heaven." For, as J. A. Stewart says, "Mental Images, being products of imitation, and consciously designed, by which we adapt ourselves to a uniform environment suitable to our permanent nature, always tend to assume the character of archetypes over-against sensible particulars." As it was, *Plato knew that Ideas were, but he knew neither their origin nor their nature.* But in his failure, he was not less subtle than the most of the schools of modern philosophy. Socrates blazed the way for a real solution, but his successors did not follow his suggestions. *Yet, to know oneself; to know the subtle activities of the deceitful mind, is to have found the key to many of the world's mysteries.*

In a word, this process of "world-building" goes on in terms of the Self. Charles Darwin, in *The Descent of Man,* states "that as soon as the important faculties of the imagination, wonder and curiosity, together with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed, man would naturally crave to understand what was passing about him." In the same work it is stated that, relative to an "explanation of the

phenomena of life, a man must feign for himself; and to judge from the universality of it, the simplest hypothesis, and the first to occur to men, seems to have been that natural phenomena are ascribable to the presence in animals, plants, and things, and in the forces of nature, of such spirits, prompting to action as men are conscious they themselves possess."

But it may be objected that science is well on the way toward a complete analysis of the world, looking forward to the time when the world shall be directly and scientifically known. However, when we bear in mind that science is quite dependent upon hypotheses, we lose faith in the "positivistic ideal." In reality, no matter how completely we may come to control Nature, we will persist in making use of assumptions regarding the unknown or the not-yet experienced. In short, man will persist in projecting "things-for-him" into the realm of realistic or objective existence. For, regarding both sense and reason, we often find ourselves in error, and come to a point where we feel the need of making assumptions. Again, even though man should succeed in making a complete analysis of the world, he could not know that he had done so; and therefore would continue to make his assumptions; for he would not be able to compare his *ideas of reality* with that *ideal reality* which would always move on before him, objectifying itself, and continuing, as the changing goal of his desire, promising always to become a better and better means to the solution of his problems.

VII

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES

We have discovered that "things-in-themselves" may be of the nature of hypotheses or concept-values. Also, we have found that these, together with data, make up the world of experience; all of which is of course shot through with the purpose of the individual to create a world in which he can best attain the objects of his desire, or best realize his profoundest possibilities.

Furthermore, we have found that this world of experience, notwithstanding the so-called subjective contribution which is made by the individual, is, to all intents and purposes, an objective one, in that all that which controls becomes objective.

But if things and concepts control, they must do so for the reason that, for the time being, they are *present* and *objective*. But as to the *concept,* it must also be *practical*. If one chooses a tool for the purpose of accomplishing a given task, and the tool fails to be adequate, he will immediately cast it away and seek another. The tool so cast away may control his activity in his act of casting it away; but, in reality, this activity is a part of the movement made in the direction of choosing and putting into use another tool which promises to better serve the purpose. Likewise, if a concept is a controlling one, it is because that concept is making itself useful in the experience of the individual for whom it is a control. Therefore, concepts of all kinds, whether they be called *hypotheses, values, con-*

trols, or *"things-in-themselves,"* are instruments for the accomplishment of desired ends.

It is interesting, then, to note that the "Thing-in-itself," which has for long been thought of as a Noumenal product; as a Noumenal entity; as something different in essence from the world in which men live, is actually an instrument in the hands of him who has created it out of his own reflection for the specific purpose of manipulating the "stuff" of his data-world; just as a man will make a plow to till his field and a hoe with which to dig around the plants that grow therein.

The concepts which we have previously mentioned, as Mind, Soul, Reason, God, and so forth, come to be the instruments invented by reflection for the purpose of ordering the world to satisfy the logical demands of that reflection. Stewart, in *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas,* says "the εἶδος is not an impression of sense passively received; it is a product of the mind's activity, an instrument constructed by the mind, whereby it 'makes nature,' 'molds environment,' so as to serve the purposes of human life." The same may be said of all other concepts or "things-in-themselves." They are really the points of view which one takes in order to manipulate Phenomena; and therefore are common to *religion, philosophy,* and *science.*

This will be clear if we for a moment call up the idea of the "Thing-in-itself" as a *Negative concept.* As we have said, there is a distinction between "value-things" and "value-concepts." *Value-things* are not "things-in-themselves"; while *value-concepts* are of the nature of hypotheses; and so of the nature of "things-in-themselves." The statue of the sculptor is a *value-thing.* But necessary to it is the *value-concept.* This value-concept is like the mold in which certain articles are molded. That is, as the mold is the passive or logical cause of the molded article; so is the concept of a statue the passive or logical cause of the statue. As the inner form of the mold de-

termines the outline of the molded article; so the concept, when accomplished, determines the form and the features of the statue.

This concept is here also a limiting concept; for, using the analogy of the mold, the concept limits at each point the extension of the statue, and makes it impossible for the outlines thereof to extend farther than is in keeping with the demands of the concept.

But to say that such a concept is a "limiting concept," is to say that it is an instrument and a judgment of value; for things cannot be judged valuable unless they are good; and for a thing to be *good* is for it to be *good for something,* as Plato long ago said. In the case of a concept, as in that of the mold, it is chosen as the means by which a certain concrete piece of work may be accomplished. In other words, man creates the instrument which we call reflection, or rather it is created out of the evolutionary process. However, man having gotten an inkling of his creative capacity, in turn, by means of the first instrument, creates all sorts of other tools or instruments as means for realizing certain desired ends. He wishes to explain or to interpret himself, and so he creates the hypothesis called the Soul; he wishes to explain the world, and so he creates the hypothesis of God, by which he proceeds to explain all the Phenomena in the cosmos.

Now, if reflection, which is a tool, creates tools, these tools, so created, must be of like nature as reflection, both being the work of an "evolving knower." Therefore, both reflection and concept-values are of the nature of "things-in-themselves"; reflection being the activity of the "I-in-itself," as it creates lesser "things-in-themselves" as the specific tools or instruments necessary for the accomplishment of certain ends; the "I-in-itself" having first been created by a gradual evolution or unfolding within the *world,* the *race,* and the *individual.*

We have been thinking of "value-concepts" as "limiting

concepts"; *passive* or *logical* causes. But this is not the only way in which "things-in-themselves" may serve. Value-concepts may be thought of as *active* causes, when manipulated by reflection; that is, for instance, *patriotism* may become a very active instrument in time of war. Again, the *value-concept of God* may become a very active means of controlling society or organizations. But even in these cases, it is in some sense the ideas concerning patriotism and God that limit the activity of the individual. If one, especially in time of war, goes beyond the limit of the given definition of patriotism, he is called a traitor. If one passes beyond the limit of the activity which is allowed to him by the content read into the idea of God, he is immediately called a heretic. But in any case, the concepts are means of getting certain results.

Therefore, "things-in-themselves" are passive or logical causes, in the sense that God may be the logical cause of the world, in that he may, in some sense, represent Non-Being. But "things-in-themselves" may also be thought of as actual instruments for accomplishing purposes, as the theory of biological evolution is the hypothesis by means of which science attempts to explain the evident changes or developments that have taken place in plants and animals.

We have spoken of God as Non-Being, and also as an instrument for social adjustment. At first, these two ideas may not seem to be related to each other. But upon closer examination, it is evident that they are quite intimately related. In reality, the idea of God becomes an instrument for social adjustment and for the integration of human personality, just to the extent that it is represented as being a *negative:* It must be Not-man, Not-society, Not-organization if it is to be an *objective standard.* When it ceases to be objective, it ceases to control the thoughts and actions of men; and so ceases to function as an instrument for social control. God, in order to control, must be Not-man, in order that man may add to himself that which is not man, but God. Therefore, each concept

serves best its purpose when it retains that *negative* aspect, which we have described as being one of the characteristics of "things-in-themselves."

The negative aspect of "things-in-themselves" is a necessary one; and in a sense is the very "stuff" out of which the *positive* features of a situation reconstruct themselves.

This negative aspect of "things-in-themselves" may be due to the fact that the chief "Thing-in-itself," that is, the "I-in-itself," has both its *negative* and its *positive* aspects. Therefore, just as the "I-in-itself" is always creating itself out of its *negative* aspect; just so is each situation re-creating itself out of the particular "Thing-in-itself" which belongs to it; for instance, society may recreate itself by building into itself the characteristics or attributes of that Being which is the *negative* of a given social order. And a man may re-create himself by striving to take on the characteristics which are posited as belonging to God, or as inherent in his Soul or his ideal Self. It is just to the extent that man attributes the characteristics of good to his *negative* Self, that he is able to reconstruct himself into an ideal Self. For the *negative* Self is the "store-house," the "lumber-yard," as has been said, from which he must draw new materials; which, in turn, become the means to an end, that is, a more desirable personality.

But if "things-in-themselves" are such useful things, why have some men apparently gotten along so well without them? Perhaps, however, it was not because they actually got on without them, but because they were able to deceive both themselves and others.

Esther Crane, in *The Place of Hypotheses in Logic,* insists upon the necessity of the hypothesis. The hypothesis, or the "Thing-in-itself," whichever we may choose to call it, is necessary to all thought. It is the only adequate means of thinking about and dealing with Phenomena.

Sedgwick and Tyler, in *A Short History of Science,* claim that the hypothesis is natural to all reflection. It was even

the disposition of primitive man to create, and to proceed upon the basis of, certain postulations, more or less consciously formed. The whole of the science of mathematics is based upon the tendency of the mind to arrange and set in order certain systems of facts in keeping with certain axioms and postulates. The postulations of geometry and mathematics, generally, are only relatively true. In fact, they are of the nature of hypotheses, created solely for the manipulation of concrete Phenomena. A straight line is only a convenient hypothesis, which, according to Einstein and others, is in no sense true of the world, unless the actual world be thought of as the given, plus that which is contributed by reflection.

Consequently, it may be doubted if any man really proceeds independently of hypothetical concepts. The early Greek philosophers may have been somewhat materialistic; but they postulated a universal change or mutation of all things into all. There was not only one primary matter common to all things, out of which they were made; but there was some "moving principle" or "efficient cause" which manipulated the elements of natural substance. This "moving principle" they called the "*animi mundi.*" With Thales, as we have seen, this principle was described as "water." For Heraclitus, it was "fire." Anaximenes, seeking a less material substance, postulated "air." Empedocles held that "earth," "air," "fire," and "water," together, constituted the answer to the problem. While the Stoics postulated one infinite, eternal, almighty "Mind," which, being diffused through the whole universe of well-ordered and regularly disposed matter, actuated every part, and was, as it were, the Soul of the vast body called the world. Again, the Eros of Greek philosophy shot his arrow through the Earth!

For Cadwallader Colden, a materialist of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the world is a *dualistic dynamism, matter being extended, active,* and *unintelligent;* and *mind*

being extended, active, and *intelligent.* Substance is power and force, known not in itself, but in its effects.

Descartes, as is known, tried to get away from all hypotheses; but he is after all as dependent upon the hypotheses of the Soul and of God as any man could very well be.

Therefore, as Levy-Bruhl holds, in the *History of Modern Philosophy in France,* no philosophical doctrine can be anything more than a great hypothesis. Thus, any man who pretends not to use these hypotheses, *either deceives himself, or else is not a philosopher.*

Claude Bernard, a French physiologist, attempted to determine exactly the object of physiological science. In the beginning, he disencumbers physiology of the last remnants of metaphysics. Science, said he, must only concern itself with Phenomena and their laws. It has nothing to do with the so-called "vital principle" in order to explain those Phenomena; which, considered singly, are never other than physical and chemical Phenomena. But after all, he could not bring himself to the point of reducing physiology to physics and chemistry; for he goes on to show that life has something about it which cannot be reduced to a physical or chemical mechanism. He then emphasizes the part played by what he called the "Dominating Idea," which seems to preside over the evolution of the living being.

Auguste Comte says that there have been three stages of thought: (1) The *theological;* (2) The *philosophical;* and (3) The *scientific.* And he holds that the third stage is the highest. When men have reached this stage, they then know that there are no "things-in-themselves." But, peculiar to say, Comte then proceeds to postulate what he calls his "Great Being." He seeks to do away with the metaphysical idea of the immortality of the Soul, substituting the positive idea of incorporation into the "Great Being"; which may be defined as the ability of the social consciousness to bear along with it the consciousness of the individual who has, as a unit,

ceased to be. Is this escaping from hypotheses? Comte, also, inconsistently with his idea as to the stages of thought, makes much of *religion*. It is, for him, the agent and the essential sign of progress. In his *Politique Positive,* Comte undertook to prescribe in detail the dogmas, worship, and management of the new religion, taking pattern from the Catholic organization, which he looked upon as a masterpiece. In all this, Comte was forsaking the *positivistic attitude,* and becoming a *value-philosopher*. As a result of this tendency, many of his disciples refused to submit to the High Pontiff of the Religion of Humanity. They were right when they said that they had not left Comte, but that Comte had abandoned himself. But he was unfaithful to his own principles and to the positive spirit, only because he continued to "think." All of his later works have a strong sentimental and mystic coloring, which is absent in his first and positivistic works. We do not mean to say that his system, as a whole, is not positivistic; but we do mean to point out that neither Comte nor any other man can very well be always positivistic in his life and thought.

Locke, Hobbes, Hume, and William James, all tried to shake off the idea and use of the hypothesis as the same relates to the "Thing-in-itself." But all of them believed in God; and Hobbes' "Motion" is a warning to all, that the lot of having to have an hypothesis is likely to fall to all men.

In short, any philosopher or scientist who posits laws of any kind, whether called Gravitation, Relativity, Ether, Force, Energy, or Power, is falling into the use of hypotheses, and is getting into the realm of "things-in-themselves." He, like all men, is making use of that heretofore thought-to-be useless "Thing-in-itself," as a means for explaining or manipulating his Phenomena.

Again, both religion and metaphysics are, in some sense, based on the "Thing-in-itself"; and probably not until men have ceased to experience the religious impulse, will there be

no use for the concept. So long as men *feel, reflect, think, wonder,* and *aspire,* in the sense in which we now speak of these aspects of being, will the "Thing-in-itself" be with us. So long as man is related to the world as he now is, religion and metaphysics, and the concepts relative to the same, will be among his chief concerns. Even though the positivistic or scientific attitude may be a good trend, still it is true that no man can yet claim that he is free from the power of religion and metaphysics. *Theology* and *metaphysics* have not only afforded to man in past times a temporary explanation of certain natural phenomena; but they have also supplied, and are still supplying, him with a general view of the universe; with a worthy conception of mankind and its destiny; and with high thoughts relative to the use which humanity should make of its hidden and ideal forces; including rules for thought, conduct, and discipline. And this is the secret of man's belief in religion and metaphysics. *These religious and metaphysical postulates seem, after all, to serve best.* Men find in them answers to what they conceive to be vital questions. And they will never forsake these points of view unless better answers to these questions come to them from elsewhere. But so far, the "positive spirit" has given no better answers than men have been able to find in religion and metaphysics. "Things-in-themselves" still are, and promise for a long time to be, the chief instruments of man's satisfaction and progress. The positive spirit has represented the partial and special point of view; whereas, philosophic systems and religious beliefs represent the synthetical and general point of view. For them, *the spirit of God moves upon the face of the deep,* and *cosmos* develops out of *chaos.* Now, this latter point of view, the *synthetic,* is so far no less indispensable than the *positivistic.* It is so indispensable, that man will never abandon it so long as his reflection is directed either upon himself or upon the universe or cosmos as a whole; for so long as sensation follows sensation; and so

long as there are different objects in the world, men are going to postulate the unifying principles of the Cosmos, the Soul, and God, as Kant long ago proposed.

Therefore, in concluding the remarks of this section, allow the writer to warn all men to beware of those "Philosophical Monsters" who spurn a belief in "things-in-themselves"; for they are either deceivers, or else they are being deceived, or both. They call to mind the story of a member of a certain religious institution who wished, by eating a very little food, to prove to his fellows that he was a "holy man." But the milk soon began to be missing from the cellar of the dining hall. A watchman was stationed there. And soon the very "religious gentleman" was caught in the act of consuming great quantities of three and five-tenths percent butter-fat milk. Now, these philosophers who wish to appear as being purely scientific, as they say; who refuse to begin with, or to even proceed by, means of hypotheses; who refuse to partake openly at the "Philosophical Board," nevertheless, when no one is looking, drag up out of the cellars of half-forgotten philosophies all sorts of old "things-in-themselves" *incognito*. On the front doors of their "Philosophical Houses," they hang a sign, saying: "*Wenn Sie das Ding-an-sich sind, dann müssen Sie nicht herein commen. Wir brauchen Sie nicht.*" But on the back door they hang another sign which reads slightly different: "*Guten Tag, Herr Ding-an-sich! Bitte, wollen Sie nicht herein commen? Wir haben Sie im Hause sehr nötig; aber Sie müssen sehr ruhrig sein. Niemand muss wissen, das Sie hier sind.*"

VIII

THE DISAPPEARANCE OR TRANSFORMATION OF THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES

It has been stated that so long as man's present relation to the world continues, the idea of the "Thing-in-itself" is indispensable. But suppose that the scene should shift, and that man should find himself in perfect harmony with the "World of Nature" as a whole? Is it not the friction which arises between the so-called objective world and reflective self-consciousness, that makes it necessary for this self-consciousness to seek instruments of adjustment? In line with this question is the statement of Henri Bergson, in *Creative Evolution,* to the effect that the degree of self-consciousness is always in proportion to the friction between the state which is, and the state which is desired.

Therefore, if man should ever again come into harmony with the whole of Nature; if, as Josiah Royce would say, the whole universe should become one perfect and harmonious social order, then the race would enjoy its old oneness with Nature; only, of course, on a higher level.

It may be true, as Edward Carpenter, E. H. Hollands, and others have suggested, that the race has experienced a psychological evolution, the main stages of which may be described as that of (1) *Simple consciousness;* and (2) *Self-consciousness.* There has been a sort of gradual development or refinement of consciousness, which at a certain stage has

spontaneously given birth to the phenomena of religious and metaphysical beliefs.

If this is true, may not another stage follow these two? It is likely that for hundreds of centuries man possessed a degree of consciousness not very different from that of the higher lower animals, though probably more quick and varied. He saw, heard, felt, and noted. But he probably had no consciousness of himself as a being separate and apart from his impressions, as is now true of the lower lower animals. He was just an instinctive part of Nature. *Self-consciousness* was there, no doubt, but *embedded* in the general *world-consciousness*. For a long time the tribes of men, like the tribes of the higher lower animals, were well adapted to their surroundings and harmonious with the Earth and with each other. There must have been some period resembling a "Golden Age"; some condition which, compared with subsequent discord and misery, merited the name "golden." It was probably during this period of man's oneness with Nature that "totems" arose, representing man's consciousness of kinship to his winged and four-footed fellows. Pre-civilized man, as we know, worshipped the animals, and was glad to be called after their names. Out of the idea of the totem came the religion of the primitive; not religion in the sense that we generally speak of it, but in the sense that religion is the feeling of certain ties which bind man's inner Self to the powers of the universe about him. However, it was only in the second stage, that is, the stage of *Self-consciousness,* that man began to be at all keenly conscious of his religious emotions.

Consequently, the second stage is marked by characteristics which are not discoverable in the first. There is a moment in the evolution of a child, somewhere about the age of three, when the simple, almost animal-like consciousness is troubled by a new element, that is, the element of Self-consciousness. Likewise, in the evolution of the race, there may have been a period when upon men in general there dawned the conscious-

ness of themselves; of their own thoughts and actions. The old simple acceptance of sensations and experiences at their face-value gave place to what we now call reflection. How do these sensations affect *me?* What can *I* do to modify them? How can *I* get *pleasure,* and avoid *pain?* These were some of the questions that no doubt arose. The mind now revolved about a new center; around that center which we have tried to describe or define as the "I-in-itself." This "Self" or "I" began to spin like an eddy around its own axis. It studied itself first, and became concerned about its own pains and pleasures; and so lost touch, in the meanwhile, with the larger life of which it had been an intimate part. The old unity of the spirit; the old solidarity between Nature and the tribe was broken up. The "Magic Mirror of the Soul," reflecting Nature as a whole, in calm and simple grace, was suddenly cracked across. The new *Self-conscious man* became, in a measure, alienated from his tribe. He lapsed into strife with his fellows: Ambition, vanity, greed, the love of domination, the desire for property and possessions took hold of him. The influence of fellowship and solidarity grew feebler. He became alienated from his great "Mother." His instincts were less and less sure; and that in proportion as brain-activity and Self-regarding calculation took their place. Finally, the crisis came: Cain, as it were, slew his brother Abel, and became an outcast. The "Garden of Eden" and the "Golden Age" closed their gates behind him. He then entered upon a period of suffering; upon a period of "friction" with man and Nature, which only served to augment his Self-consciousness. A period of labor, toil, and sorrow began. And in this distressful state he continues today.

But can this be the best for which the race may hope? Will not the Seed of the woman yet bruise the serpent's head? Will the promise of the eternal "I-in-itself" not yet be fulfilled? In other words, will man not yet come into another stage of existence, in which he will find himself more at one with the

whole of the world? Will man forever remain an outcast or an exile? Millions of men and women are today shut in with all sorts of diseases, the chief cause of which is an over-self-consciousness.

So, one of two things will happen: The race will either continue in this way until, as Havelock Ellis would say, it destroys itself by its own inventions; by its own so-called civilization. Or, else, a new element will enter; a new birth of some kind will take place.

It is either hopeless destruction, like that which takes place when the "night-butterflies" scorch themselves to death in the flames of the arc-light; or, else, a moving into another stage of consciousness; into a stage of consciousness which will supersede the present one. In the latter case, the mind of man, as at present constituted, will have to undergo a transformation; that is, consciousness, as we now know it, will have to be purified and transmuted. Since the miseries of the world have dated from the fatal attempt to make the little personal Self the center of effort and activity; and since this effort has led to disunity and discord, both within the mind itself and within the body of society, there is nothing left but a return to a consciousness which will have *unity* as its fundamental principle. But this new stage of consciousness could not possibly be of the simple inchoate character of the first stage; for it will carry with it the enrichments of the ages; having been deepened and extended by the experience of the second stage. The treasures gained by reflection will not be lost; they will, as has been said, only be purified and transmuted.

Is there not even now, and has there not for a long time been, a tendency for life to seek its source? Is such a tendency not present in all religions and in all the rites and ceremonies of primitive peoples? In the "Grizzly" tribes of the North American Indians, if a man killed a bear otherwise than in the public hunt, he was forced to share it with the whole tribe in a

common sacrificial feast. In this, and in many other similar rites, one sees the *three phases of tribal psychology:* The *first,* is when the individual remains within the compass of the tribal mind; the *second,* in which the individual steps outside in order to gratify his personal Self; and the *third,* in which he submits to some sacrifice, and is received back into the unity of fellowship. Again, in religion, the Divine One which gives his life for his flock is no longer just an ordinary Bull or Lamb, but Adonis or Osiris or Dionysus or Jesus. He is betrayed, and suffers; but rises again, redeeming all with himself. And the corn, or the wine, or the flesh which was his body, and which he gave for the sustenance of mankind, is consumed in a holy supper of reconciliation. In other words, the ritual of salvation always has in it the idea of the return to unity or *at-one-ment.*

May it not be that all such ideas as those noted above mark the tendency toward the return to something like *one cosmic universal life?* As with the blossoming of self-consciousness in the human mind, came the dawn of a cycle of experience which is like the exile from Eden; so now the redemption, return, or restoration will have to come through another forward step in the same domain.

Therefore, abandoning the quest and the glorification of the separate isolated Self in the sense that Schopenhauer thinks of it, we may return to that oneness with Nature which will make unnecessary those concepts created as instruments in order to mend the cracks in "Nature's Broken Mirror." For, if the "Thing-in-itself" was not existent in the stage of "simple consciousness," may it not be that it will be absent in the period of "universal-consciousness?"

In this period man will enjoy a oneness with Nature which will make it impossible for him to posit existences over against himself; he will enjoy Reality immediately and within himself; and so will not look for it beyond.

This tendency and the possibility of its continuation may

be illustrated by the fact that God was once thought of as being *immanent,* the same period being followed by one in which men persisted in thinking of him as *transcendent.* But, peculiar to say, the period in which men thought of God in terms of the *transcendent,* was followed by another period in which they returned to the idea of God as *immanent;* in which period we now live. Then, Henri Bergson may be correct; and Reality may be that which is immediately known, or immediately knowable; *instinct, intuition,* or *sympathy,* being the means of knowing it.

The merging of reflective man with the rest of the world's life seems even more probable when we note the individual examples of such a tendency. William Brown, in *Psychology and the Sciences,* shows that primitive man was guided by both Intuition and Reason, but mainly by Intuition; while reflective man is now guided mainly by Reason. But men like William Wordsworth, Henry D. Thoreau, John Burroughs, and others are examples of how a high stage of reflection can become harmonized with life as a whole. These men's power of reflection led them not away from the whole of the world of life, but back to it. Henri Bergson admits that there is some Reason in all Intuition, and some Intuition in all Reason. May not the two finally be brought together by the common element in each? If there has been a time when Intuition ruled, and it is now true that Reason rules, may they each not soon learn by experience that it is "not good to dwell alone?"

If experience should teach all men such wisdom as has been suggested, then might not the race as a whole come into that *third* period of which we have spoken?

In reality, do not all thinking men at times, in their best moments, enjoy what we may call a "frictionless existence?" At times, just for a moment, one seems to drop into the very stream of Reality. But we have so trained ourselves in self-consciousness that the flash of "frictionless joy" lasts but for a moment. However, the fact that we ever have such moments

may be the promise of better things for the race as a whole, and a greater development of its inherent possibilities; when man will experience Reality without its having to be *chopped up, catalogued, and accounted for;* when no postulates or hypotheses, or any such things, will be necessary in order to deal with the world; the same being known and experienced directly, as seems to have been the case in very primitive times. For then men did not resort to spirits, and so forth, in order to explain the world; but, as E. W. Hopkins says, in the *Origin and Evolution of Religion,* and Allen Menzies, in his *History of Religion,* they worshipped only objects which were directly experienced. An experience like this, only on a higher plane, and carrying with it a deeper insight and appreciation would not be an undesirable one, but one that might save the race from many of the curses of modern civilization.

This does not mean, however, that the individual would not, in some sense, always ascribe meaning to the object, and that each individual object would not have its peculiar significance. Things would get their meaning in relation to selves as biological centers; but these centers, being in harmony with universal or metaphysical experience, would not divide reality into *actual* and *conceptual.* The significance of the object itself and the contribution made by the "I" would be known and enjoyed as one, there being no need to differentiate between data and the contribution made by the "I." The world would be no less full of meaning; but the individual would have no feeling that he must, as an individual, fill out, by his own efforts, a world that was incomplete. He would, of course, be always making a contribution, but he would not be doing so in the same sense that a scientist now makes use of a postulate in order to understand or to explain Nature. So-called *actual reality* and *conceptual reality* would be merged into one reality. In other words, there would be an "I-in-itself," but no "things-in-themselves"; for "things-in-themselves" are evolved out of the cosmic order, through

highly complex organic centers, for the purpose of enabling such centers of activity to again find a necessary and satisfactory harmony with the rest of Reality. That is, "things-in-themselves" are, in one sense, mere reflections cast upon, and magnified by, the "Mirror of Memory," and used as instruments of adjustment. But if the "I-in-itself" was in immediate touch with Reality, then no process of adjustment would be necessary. However, "things-in-themselves" might still continue to exist, only *not* as "instruments" in the sense that we must now use that term. They would exist as vital realities in the interaction between the data and the subject, in some such sense as beauty in art is now enjoyed; that is, immediately.

In other words, the grounds of "things-in-themselves" would continue to exist; for instance, the Time-Space continuum which makes possible the identity of personality, would still be a part of Reality; but it would not take the form of a postulation, as it now does. In short, "things-in-themselves" would still be aspects of Reality, but not separate existences. Having evolved out of the "cosmic process," "things-in-themselves" would again become merged, as it were, with the whole of Reality. They, together with other aspects of Reality, would be present as a part of the "content" of contemplation, but not as "objects" of contemplation.

Therefore, Spinoza may not be wrong when he thinks of Reality: (1) As Being; (2) As Known; (3) As Growing-into-Being; and (4) As Growing-into-Knowledge. For when Being is known, and men are merged, except the "I" as "I"; and the knowledge of the world has become more comprehensive and more profound, there will then be that unity of man with the rest of Reality which will not take away from him anything that contributes to his significance, but will rather add to him much that he now lacks in his attitude toward Reality as a whole.

We may, on the basis of the above observations, conclude

that there is some evidence for the argument that man may later bear a somewhat different relation to the whole of Reality. True, there are two tendencies: (1) The *centrifugal* or *self-consciousness-tendency* would fling man, as a specific, well-defined, and circumscribed entity, out into the trackless spaces; but (2) The *centripetal tendency* would attract him toward the center of light and life, and make him real in his proper relation to all the rest of Reality. But as to which of these forces is calculated to win, possibly no one knows. It may be that both will win: The *centripetal,* in terms of the present postulation in the form of "things-in-themselves," may become merged in the "I-in-itself," and through the same, into the rest of Reality. The *centrifugal* may also undergo a merger, in that man might always enjoy the consciousness of his own Ego. For, by implication, the "I-in-itself" is of a more substantial or "existential" character than are "things-in-themselves." The "I" is a "Thing-in-itself" chiefly in the sense of a cause, ground, or substratum of "things-in-themselves." It is true, as we have said elsewhere, that the "I-in-itself" has a cause or ground. But it, in turn, becomes a ground for "things-in-themselves." So, we may say that *the "I" is the heart of the cosmos;* or, that it is at least closer to the heart of the cosmos than are "things-in-themselves." *The "I-in-itself" is to "things-in-themselves," as real and constitutive beings are to nymphs and fairies.* The "I" involves both "stuff" and "function"; while "things-in-themselves" are abstractions, no less real, perhaps, but of a somewhat different nature than the functioning "I." This "I" of itself gives birth to "things-in-themselves"; but these "things-in-themselves" have no power to propagate themselves; that is, unlike the "I-in-itself," they have no "offspring." They become the rational controls and instruments of the "I" in its process of further begetting, or in its manipulation of the Phenomena or data with which it is being continuously confronted. Thus, the changes in "things-in-themselves" take

place not through any power inherent in the "things-in-themselves," but through the evolution of the "I." *The "things-in-themselves" are the flowers, not the roots of thought.*

But whether or not the *disappearance* of "things-in-themselves" is probable, it is certain that they have, in all their phases, undergone considerable *transformation;* which may be, in itself, an argument for the possibility of their final disappearance.

The transformation of "things-in-themselves" has followed three main lines; those which characterize the three phases of the concept: (1) The "Thing-in-itself" as a concrete reality; (2) The "Thing-in-itself" as conceptual; (3) The "Thing-in-itself" as spiritual.

1. *The Transformation of Things-in-themselves Considered as "Actual and Constitutive Realities"*: At first when the "Thing-in-itself" was conceived as a *constitutive something,* the concept thereof was very crude and materialistic. It was "earth," "air," "fire," or "water," or a combination of all of them.

But men like Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Plato, and Aristotle began to doubt the existence of any material "thing" as the ground of the world that was so *determinate* as these common elements. With them, it was at least *less determinate;* and less definable in materialistic terms than are the four elements. Even Empedocles felt the need of some more *immaterial principle;* something other than a combination of "earth," "air," "fire," and "water"; so he posited "Love" and "Discord"; "Love" being the God with which all things are shot through, and which is destined to triumph over "Discord."

The atomists stand almost midway between the "Thing-in-itself" as a *realistic something* and as a *mere concept.* Atoms are, it is true, thought of in realistic terms; but they

are, of course, mere *conceptual entities;* for no one ever saw an atom.

When we get to John Locke and to Immanuel Kant, there is a very evident confusion as to whether the "Thing-in-itself" is *realistic* or merely *conceptual* in nature.

But there has been at least this much transformation: Men can no longer say that the "Thing-in-itself" is a *common and visible element. Even though it may be thought of in realistic terms, it is, by implication, more conceptual.*

2. *In the Second Place, There Has Been a Transformation of Things-in-themselves as "Conceptual"*: Using again the idea of the atom, it was first thought of as an indivisible unit. All things were made up of a combination of atoms. There was no internal connection of any kind. Things were just a combination of atoms juxtaposed. But it is now thought that *the atom is not a unit with a prefixed measure and boundary;* on the contrary, it is conceived as a little universe of itself; a core of proton around which revolve electrons; a combination of small units negatively and positively charged.

Leibnitz thought the atomists were right when they postulated for the explanation of phenomenal bodies, simple, indivisible, eternal units. But they were wrong when they thought of these invisible, minute corpuscles as indivisible. For everything that is material, however small it may be, is divisible even to infinity. Therefore, if we are to think of true "indivisible units," we must confine ourselves to the realm of the "immaterial," and say that the smallest units of which things are composed are immaterial constituents. Physical points, like the atoms, are thought of as physical, and so not true points. Again, mathematical points are indivisible, but not real. But metaphysical or substantial points, the incorporeal, soul-like units alone combine in themselves indivisibility and reality. So, the monads, for Leibnitz, are the true Ideas and

the true atoms; the chief characteristics of which are indivisibility, individual perfection, and force.

Again, the concept or hypothesis* of cause has also undergone many changes: It has been defined as Energy, Power, Source, Life, Entelechy, Psychic Entity, and Evolution.

However, the concept of an "ether" is one of the best illustrations of how a conceptual hypothesis can become transformed in a few hundred years: Newton proposed the hypothesis of corpuscles. A century later this hypothesis was shown by Young to be unverifiable, he proposing the hypothesis of waves in an elastic ether. About three-quarters of a century later, this hypothesis also proved to be unverifiable, and was replaced by Maxwell's hypothesis of waves in an electromagnetic ether. But today many physicists say that there is no such thing as ether.

3. *The Most Remarkable Transformation of Things-in-themselves Has, However, Taken Place in That Phase of the Problem Which we Have, for Convenience, Termed "Spiritual"*: In the field of psychology proper, there have been significant reconstructions. The Self has been thought of as an entity within itself; as a psychic something that is preestablished to run parallel with physical activities; as a monitor which sits aloft in the pineal gland; as the stream of consciousness; and as a bundle of habits and impulses. Finally, for the radical behaviorist, there is no Self at all, in the sense that "Self" means "Soul." Mind, for Dr. Abbot, who writes in the *Psychological Review,* Volume XXIII, pp. 117 ff., (1916), is only a term for brain-functioning. As the function of the *lungs* is *respiration,* and the function of the *legs* is *ambulation,* so the function of the *brain* is *cogitation.* In other words, we have come all the way from thinking of the Soul as being a mysterious and metaphysical substance, to think-

* From this point forward the terms, "hypothesis," "value," and "Thing-in-itself," will be used interchangeably.

ing of it in very materialistic, or, even in logical terms, which is, of course, to do away with it as a separate existence.

As to *subconsciousness,* or the *unconscious,* which are postulates, there have been and are many theories: We may choose the "Cosmic Consciousness," the "Subliminal," the "Focus-Marginal," the "Dissociation," the "store-house," or the "Freudian" theory.

As to the "spirit" in the objective sense, it is possible that very primitive man worshipped only concrete, realistic objects. But succeeding this stage there was a long period when "animism" was the common belief: *All things have spiritual counterparts which support them and are their causes.*

Following this view was the belief in Gods, who, to some extent, took the place of the "little spirits." The Gods were assigned larger realms than had been assigned to the spirits. For instance, there was the Goddess of beauty; the God of thunder; the Goddess of grain and the harvest; and the Gods of the seasons.

Later, men came to feel that one God was more useful than many; and so the Orphics, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Hebrews, the Christians, and others adopted the belief in one God, instead of many local Gods.

Even in connection with this "one-God" idea, there have been many changes. We have only to glance at Greek philosophy and at Hebrew history in order to see the tremendous transformation that has taken place. For example, in Hebrew theology, as is well known, we have many succeeding contents of the God-concept.

But this is not all. The idea of God has undergone still further changes. For James Ward, in his *Realm of Ends,* God is finite, and not the cause of the world. Over against the idea of God as an efficient cause, stand Hocking, Josiah Royce, and others who contend that God should not be conceived primarily as "Cause," but as "Meaning."

Darwin, Paley, Pascal, Fontenelle, and Voltaire, however,

have tried to show that God is the "legal" or "efficient" cause of the world. They have all made use of that famous analogy of the *watch* and the *world*. God is the *super-human watch-maker,* who has put the world-machine together with surprising skill, and who intervenes miraculously, only on rare occasions, when he feels that the "works" are getting out of order.

Notwithstanding the general belief in this famous analogy, there may be some arguments against it, and in favor of men like Hocking and Royce.

Paley, together with others whom we have mentioned, assumes that a watch found in a desert, which presupposes a man as its *maker,* is analogous to the world, and God as its *creator*. But the following suggestions will show that there is no analogy between these two cases, and that these men do not prove what they intend to prove:

(1) (a) Knowing from past experience that men make *watches,* and having seen *watches* that were made by other men, we have a right to infer that some man made the *watch* found in the desert.

(b) But having had no experience of other Gods or the same God creating other *worlds,* we have no right to infer that a God created this one.

(2) (a) *The material for the watch having been already in existence, the man who made the watch could have been only the architect or artificer thereof.*

(b) Therefore, if we are to stick to the analogy, *we must suppose that the material out of which the world was made was in existence before God formed it into a world, making God,* not a *creator,* but a mere *architect,* like the Demiurge in Plato's *Timaeus*.

(3) (a) Man is the legal or efficient cause of *watches*.

(b) But it may be that God is only the *logical* or *metaphysical* cause of the world. He could certainly never be shown to be the *actual* cause, as St. Thomas Aquinas was sufficiently honest to admit.

(4) (a) Again, it may be acknowledged that the *watch* is a pure mechanism.

(b) But to make the *world* analogous, is, at least, to say that the world needs no God.

(5) (a) It is easy to show that the *watch* is the work of reason and reflection.

(b) But that the *world* as a whole is a self-consciously rational order has not yet been shown. So, to make God the creator of the world might not be to do him any honor.

(6) (a) In short, when we lose sight of God, Nature becomes our standard of Reality. If we have a God, we like to make his existence as sure as that of Nature. So, the most of the proofs for God have begun with Nature, and have tried to make his existence secure by showing him to be in some valid connection with this world, such as that of cause to the world as effect. Then, God, as the cause of the world, would be real even as the world is real.

(b) But this is not the way to find God or to prove his existence. If we should prove a first and conscious cause, we could only prove such a cause as equivalent to its effect. We could prove only such goodness as is equivalent to the mixture of goodness and evil that we find in the world; and this would possibly not be any credit to God. Such a Being would be a very limited Being. Who could worship or look up to a God who is logically no greater, no better, and no more real and immutable than the world! We might better just believe in the world as we find it; and proceed with the task of mastering it, without any reference to God.

In reality, such proofs as those to which men generally resort, are not true to the spirit of real religion; for it is well known that men have lifted their minds to God, rather because the world is unsatisfactory, than because it satisfies. We demand a God who is greater, better, and more real than the world; and our "demand" creates the "object" of our demand. Ideals of all kinds are creations of reflection under the stress of situations and conditions that are somewhat unsatisfactory, or that demand a universal by means of which they may be rationalized and set in order.

Thus, the idea of God may be a value-judgment, in the form of logical or metaphysical Non-Being. For instance, Space may be thought of as the logical cause of the worlds in space. For all that is not "worlds" is "space." The Space between the worlds and around the worlds is logically necessary to the shapes and sizes of the worlds. That is, in order to have "worlds," we must have "not-worlds."

Therefore, God as a cause is not *transcendent* in the sense that he is apart from; but *transcendent* only in a *logical* sense. That is, in fact, God is *in,* and *of,* the rest of Reality; but, for purposes of thought, he must logically *transcend* the rest of Reality. He is the Non-Being that makes possible Being; but he is *in* and *of* Being; "Being" not being able to exist without "Non-Being"; for if Being attempted to exist without Non-Being, it itself would become *indeterminate* and so lapse into Non-Being. *Logically* speaking, Being and Non-Being demand each other.

As "not-worlds" is necessary to "worlds," just so it may be that "not-space-worlds" is necessary to "space-worlds." That is, that all that is not Space and worlds must be thought of as God, whether he be in or out of the system of "space-worlds." This is to say that God is not the creator or legal cause of the world in the sense that Bishop Paley *et al.* suggested; but that God *is, and is necessary;* that he is a limiting concept; in

short, Non-Being. And so a judgment of value, as Immanuel Kant suggested. God's value for man is not His (God's) ability to have created the world, but the meaning which the very concept itself involves.

Consequently, these men prove, not that God is a "Creator," but that he is in some sense a "Maker":

> "None but a power omnipotent and wise
> Could frame this earth, or spread the boundless skies.
> He made the whole; at his omnific call
> From formless chaos rose this spacious ball,
> And one Almighty God is seen in all."

To this conclusion, the writer has no objections, provided that he may be permitted to define the process. God is, indeed, the "Maker" of the world, in some sense; just as men are the "makers" of watches, chairs, tables, houses, and other things. For man, being a logical and reflective creature, simply demands, on the basis of his own experience, that if the useful things with which he deals have had a "maker," and were made for a purpose; just so ought it to be in the case of the world. So, man posits a personality sufficiently powerful to perform the task which he, man, demands to be done. Therefore, God is the "Maker" of the world; but partly at least because reflection demands that he be such. In one sense, then, God may be thought of as making the world as men make things; but, in another sense, God is only the "Maker" in the logical sense; that is, his act is a logical demand. If he makes the world, as men make things, he does so only because intelligence demands that he do so.

In short, man reads his thoughts, feelings, characteristics, capacities, and abilities back into the world as a whole; or else builds them into personalities which behave much like himself; except that these logical and idealistic personalities may be more just, more holy, or more powerful than himself. Man magnifies the constructs of his own reflection; not, how-

ever, because he is "conscious" of his part in their construction, but because he is largely "unconscious" of the part which he plays in such a process. He imagines these beings to be largely independent of his own mind, because they are, as if they were the beings of dreams, so magnified that they seem to belong to another order than that to which man belongs.

It is by this process that God becomes a *cause*. However, not an "efficient cause," in the narrow sense of that term; but a "final cause." In short, God is not a *simple propelling force;* but a *dynamic* and *attractive force*. He moves the world as the beloved moves the lover, or as the "Good" moves him who wishes to be good. But God is a "final cause" both before and after being realized in reflection, if we think of him as active in the movements that constitute the series of cosmic changes that make possible his final realization in human reflection. But the "final cause," as used here, becomes one with the "efficient cause."

So, without qualification, we ought to object to the idea that man plays such an important part in the construction of the world. However, when we remember that the logical basis for God is immanent in the world; that reflection is simply the *determinate* aspect of the whole of Reality; and that man makes rational judgments because he is a part of a possibly rational world-order, then the part which man plays seems less objectionable. We are not contending that a man, out of his own individual powers of conception, as such, creates a world or an idea of God; but only that *God first fully realizes himself in the rational and logical thought of reflective beings; the end toward which the cosmic forces have forever moved*. But to say that man gives form to the universal and final cause of the cosmos is just to say that God, through man, demands his own existence; and this is to say, that, without man, God would not exist under the particular form that

he now possesses. Therefore, both God and man are factors in the world-process, when we look at it, *not theologically, but metaphysically;* and the final and proper form of God is not simply "God" in the "Platonic" and "medieval" sense, but "God-Man," a concept common to many or all of the great religions.

Again, if reflective man, the highest type of world-phenomena, is not instrumental in this process, then we must say that, either the lower orders of animals, or the blind and chaotic forces as a whole, have lifted God into existence; which hypothesis, it seems, would do him no special honor. But for God to be the *determinate* work of reflective man, and for the two to *evolve,* to *live,* and to *will* in mutual cooperation, as being inspired by each, and in some sense mutually dependent upon each, is to do honor to both God and man. This is to make Gods of men, in the profoundest sense of that term; and, at the same time, to make God no less a great, just, and holy God. For, as someone has said, the least creature of all mortals, acknowledged as a "willing subject," has more dignity and value than even an almighty God, if that God be thought of simply as a gigantic psychological mechanism; that is, as an object the reality of which demands the form of constitutive existence.

It is something like this that we wish to stress: As Spinoza said, God might have created things otherwise; but, seeing that man, too, is a part of created Nature, he would have been different in the universal change of all things, in "order that he might be able to understand them." Now, this is a significant statement, in that *it places the mind of man at the center of the situation,* and refuses to consider the possibility of the universe being other than such as the mind of man should comprehend. The emphasis is no longer, as in Descartes, on the *power of God,* but on the *mind of man.* Therefore, Spinoza goes on to say that the philosopher does not inquire into what God can effect with his supreme power; but judges concern-

ing the nature of things from the laws or tendencies which God has implanted in him.

So, man does not work alone in creating the logical cause of the world. For, as Spinoza would say, God is the cause of the world as the apple is the cause of its red color; and not as the father is the cause of the child, or as the sun is the cause of heat. The father is the external or efficient cause of the child; and heat has an existence apart from the sun. But God is not related to the world quite in this way. He is not its *transcendent* and *transient* cause, but its *immanent* or *indwelling* cause (*The Ethics,* Spinoza, pp. 62, 68). But if he is its *immanent* cause, then he is in some sense the cause of the "I" that knows him; for as we have said in the Introduction, God should be thought of as a Being within the series of changes that take place in the world. But being within the series, he is in some sense the "I" itself. So, the "I," in positing God, is only coming to know and to define *itself.* But in coming to know and to define itself, it is transmuting the *indeterminate* into the *determinate;* and creating a biological unit which is capable of evaluating, and so of building up or *determining* Reality.

Therefore, after all, man is a conscious agent and a chief factor in this process. *The different ideas of God could not be said to represent different constitutive Gods.* In fact, *these different concepts only represent the universal in a given system of facts.* The God in question at any one time is the universal under which a given set of facts is subsumed. For instance, the World-Soul of the Greeks, or the Holy Spirit of the Christians simply represents the universal under which certain facts are subsumed, or the hypothesis or "Thing-in-itself" by means of which certain facts may be explained. For example, the peculiar phenomena of Pentecost are explained by the presence of the Holy Spirit, an hypothesis generally made use of when it is logically impossible for the

Father or the Son to be present. In short, each set of facts may have its own universal, hypothesis, or "Thing-in-itself." For some, God is the sum-total of the social consciousness. The phenomena of the social group are noted; and the hypothesis of God is made use of to explain such phenomena. The thought-to-be unknown is made use of in order to explain that which is supposed to be known. For, logically, the known can never be explained by itself. The hypothesis of God is just as scientific and just as legitimate as any so-called scientific hypothesis; both being of the nature of postulates, on the basis of which data may be rationalized or set in order.

In conclusion, it is interesting to note, that though the early Greeks demanded many Gods and Goddesses, each one being assigned to his or her own specific jurisdiction; yet no one of these Beings, nor all of them together, were thought of as the efficient cause of the world. Neither were they generally personifications. In fact, though the Greeks did not realize it, these Divine Beings were the logical means of accounting for the different observed sets of Phenomena. That is, it was the Greeks' way of setting their world in order. The Gods did not create the world; but the Greeks conceived the Gods as logical supports for realistic situations; in other words, as "things-in-themselves." The Greeks concerned themselves very little as to the creation of the world, but created Gods to keep the existing world in running order; just as men today organize big businesses, divide the tasks, and create offices and appoint officers in order to keep the business going in a desirable way.

In short, the very idea of "cause" itself, in the ordinary sense, may be fallacious. Is it necessary to believe that all things must have efficient causes external to themselves? "There is no logical necessity of a cause for every event. No matter of fact can be demonstrated to exist, because the contrary of every such existence is entirely conceivable. The

universe may be self-organizing, like the animate beings with which we are familiar: It need not have a cause for this order, in some *Being* beyond *Nature* invested with the attributes of human nature" (*Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume,* Hendel, p. 403). Plotinus, Aristotle, and the Greeks generally, may, therefore, have been more correct than those who have championed the argument, that, in order to do honor to God, we must believe him to have been the legal, efficient, and realistic cause of the world. Kant, in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Book 2, Ch. 2, says, "It is vain to seek in the causal connection of Phenomena for an original act by which something may come to be that before was not." Our logical demands, properly understood, may be of tremendous assistance to us; but misunderstood, they may come to be hindrances to a real knowledge of life and the world. *Men ought to spend a great deal of their time in searching out the subtle conceits of their own mental activities.*

Thus, the transformation of "things-in-themselves" goes on; but man seems to keep his place in the midst of the stage, even though he appears to be always willing to grant that position to some other Intelligence. The evolving hypotheses remain relative to man's needs. New hypotheses have come into existence, and old ones have transformed themselves in keeping with the demands of human reflection. There is little under the sun so fixed that it will not shape itself to suit the need of man's logical demand. Those things which refuse to serve as means to purposed ends are generally dropped along the way, or else are so reconstructed and transformed as to satisfy the needs of man. A man's universal or hypothesis must suit itself to his universe of discourse. He may demand at one time, Woden; at another, Thor; and at still another, Yahveh. It all depends upon the age or epoch and his realm of discourse, as to what the particular "Thing-in-itself" may be.

Therefore, as we have tried to show throughout this sec-

tion, and as William James so well says in *The Will to Believe,* we have a right to believe any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will; but, as a rule, we have a tendency to disbelieve all facts, theories, or hypotheses for which we find no use. In other words, our ideas are hypotheses about Reality. As hypotheses, they are means of reconstructing Reality to suit our needs; or, they are instruments by means of which we conduct ourselves with reference to the "world-data." When our needs take on new phases, and when the world or knowledge-data is transformed in the process of evaluation, then our hypotheses must reshape or reconstruct themselves if they are to continue to have any fundamental meaning, value, or reality.

CONCLUSION

A BRIEF summation, together with some implications of the views which have been emphasized, will conclude the task of this work.

Due to the failure of some thinkers to discover the possible origin of the "Thing-in-itself," the historical development has been marked by great confusion, with a resulting unfruitfulness.

In general, there has been a conviction that the "Thing-in-itself" must be some "realistic" or "spiritual" something, existing independently and constitutively over against both man and natural Phenomena. But such cannot be the case. For, if "realistic," it would be subject to the laws or the definitions of Phenomena; and, if "spiritual," in the ordinary sense of that term, it could not possibly be a *real cause* of Phenomena. For a *cause,* in order to be a *real cause,* must be able to pass over into the *effect.* In the case of "spirit," this could not be true; for spirit is not *like,* but *unlike,* "matter" or "Phenomena." *Therefore, the "Thing-in-itself" can be neither realistic nor spiritual.* So, the "Thing-in-itself" may be a unique element contributed to the situation by the logical demand of man. In a word, the "Thing-in-itself" is neither a *realistic existent* nor a *spiritual existent;* but a *conceptual* or *subsistent existent.*

That is, the "Thing-in-itself" is the reflective "I-in-itself," so far as the knowledge-process is concerned; and all minor "things-in-themselves" are the legitimate "offspring" of this "I-in-itself."

A still clearer understanding of the nature of "things-in-themselves" is arrived at when we discover that they are

like values or hypotheses; and that the "knowledge-world" is made up of (1) *Data, which are progressively knowable and indefinitely analyzable;* (2) *"Things-in-themselves"*; and (3) *Purposes.* For any object is datum, plus purpose; the purpose always involving the hypothesis which makes possible the intelligent use or manipulation of the given datum. Rationalism begins with *universals;* and Empiricism with *particulars;* but Pragmatism or Instrumentalism starts with *both particulars and universals,* which grow up together, and which cannot get along without each other. As Hugo Münsterberg points out in his *Psychology and Life, Psychology is not at all an expression of Reality, but a complicated transformation of it, worked out for special logical purposes in the service of life.*

Therefore, "things-in-themselves" come to be *controls.* But being *controls,* they naturally objectify themselves; and so come to be an indivisible part of what we think to be the "given world." For, in reality, this "given world" is a very complex affair; being made up of data, reflective contributions, and the desires of the individual and the social group.

Still further, if "things-in-themselves" are controls, they are also instruments, in that the idea of control involves the idea of instrumentality. A rope, as a lasso, controls a wild horse, and is also the instrument by means of which he, the wild horse, is controlled. A concept in theology controls a man's activity, and is also the instrument by means of which he, the man, regulates his world.

But if "things-in-themselves" are controls and instruments; and if life is a scene of changing needs and desires, as we believe that every man will admit; then "things-in-themselves," as instruments or controls, must change in order to continue to be instruments and controls.

Then, if it is true that the "I-in-itself" is the origin of "things-in-themselves"; and that "things-in-themselves" are

a big part of the "world as known"; then the implication is, that values, hypotheses, or "things-in-themselves" have fundamental reality. Neither is this reality wholly dependent upon the form which "things-in-themselves" take. For, as was attempted to be shown in the last section, they are always parts of Reality, whether they take the form of instruments, or constitute a part of the content of the whole of Cosmic Reality.

However, as to the instrumental phase of "things-in-themselves," the recognition of the instrumental value of the hypothesis introduces us to something that is quite real. Therefore, to know the concept, its meaning and value, is certainly to come into touch with Reality. Leibnitz held that the *thought* of God was God. And Bishop Berkeley pointed out the fact, that if an experience furthers experience, then that experience which so functions is real. The ideas of Cause, World, Soul, God, Freedom, and Immortality are just as necessary to the imagination of man, as *food* and *air* are necessary to his physical existence. Neither does this necessarily depend wholly upon the consciousness of need; for food and air often function independently of the conscious need of the individual. In the present stage of thought-life, Soul, God, and so forth, function as conscious necessities; but it is not impossible to suppose that man might come into a stage of thought in which he would be unconscious of these existences, as such, and yet they, nevertheless, be actually functioning in his life.

Again, someone has said that, "we are determined to judge as well as to feel and to breathe." Then, if judging is only one aspect of a natural process, why are not the products of that judgment as real as any other phase of the process? H. F. Osborn, in *The Origin and Evolution of Life,* shows that human life and human thought is a higher aspect of an evolution which began in inorganic "stuff." Therefore, reflection, an aspect of life, is a higher form of the evolutionary

process. But life is natural; then reflection must in some sense be natural; the distinction between so-called *matter* and *reflection* being one not of *nature,* but of *function.* But if reflection is thus shown to be natural, then its products must also be natural. Then the "Thing-in-itself," whether thought of as an ideal, a value, or an hypothesis, is just another stage in this process of natural evolution. Someone has said, that "Self-discovery" is as much a part of the order of Nature as the discovery of a bird's nest; and that the evaluations which it renders possible and actual are as existential as the processes of building a house.

Therefore, we may conclude that "things-in-themselves" have no less reality than other existences. Shadworth Hodgson, an English philosopher of the Victorian Era, says that the "mirage" of absolute existence, wholly apart from knowledge, is a common-sense prejudice. The very term "existence," says he, implies relativity to some sort of consciousness. Our ethical judgments and our Moral Nature bring us into practical relation with the "Thing-in-itself," and so permits a positive knowledge of it.

F. H. Bradley, in his *Appearance and Reality,* repudiates the idea of the "Thing-in-itself"; yet goes on to say that Reality consists of "experience." But this may be saying what he did not mean to say about the "Thing-in-itself." For if experience is Reality, and the "Thing-in-itself" is in and of experience, then the "Thing-in-itself" must also be real.

Bishop Berkeley, in *Hylas,* says that, in *reflection,* we have *an immediate knowledge of Self as an active being;* and by inference therefrom of "other finite spirits and God." Remember that "other finite spirits and God" are "things-in-themselves" objectified, and we have the theory for which we have been contending.

According to Hegel, the "Thing-in-itself" is known immediately; because the "Thing-in-itself" is not *outside* of

thought; but, on the contrary, is a *product* of thought; a product of thought which has been pushed on to "abstraction." But if we use, not the word "abstraction," but the word "projection," we have the "Thing-in-itself" as a real constituent of the world that is known; that is, we have a real part of the whole of Reality; which part is necessary to the very unity of Reality as a whole.

So, the "Thing-in-itself," by regression, comes back to Phenomena; that is, to man, to the finite, to the external, as alone real and thinkable. And precisely as it is natural, finite, and becomes external, it, together with the other phases of our world, is fundamentally real.

But we must remember that the world which we have tried to describe as real, is not one the factors of which are merely juxtaposed. We have only tried to set down the factors involved in the making of the world, not to set their limits. In fact, however, we believe that it is the action, reaction, and internal interrelation of these factors that give the world its chief significance. That is, that make it to be a world of vital Reality. The world of knowledge is not a product of a mechanical laboratory. On the contrary, it is bone, and blood, and flesh. The world of knowledge lives and breathes, being shot through with the eternal purposes of man to live and to shape the world to his liking.

Here is the reconciliation of the "subject-object" problem. When we know that knowledge and Reality are not a system of external relations, but rather a system of relations, interrelations, and continuous interaction, then we have, not *two* worlds, but *one;* at the center of which is man, who produces the world which is known by making his reflective contributions to that which we may call a "world-data"; but of which he is, and still remains, a part, in the larger and more metaphysical sense of the term.

In short, this work is an attempt to escape from that spirit-

ual astigmatism, with which the mind is generally too much afflicted, and which has impelled it to bifurcate or bifocalize the world from every angle of observation: Physical and Psychical, Mechanical and Teleological, Appearance and Reality, Phenomena and Noumena, and many other nonsensical compartmentalizations; choosing here and there some cosmic "ansicht" as the measure of wisdom. A. N. Whitehead, and the Socratic Bergson, as Hartley Burr Alexander, author of *Nature and Human Nature,* has called him, together with others, have protested against this method. They remind us that discursive reason is at best but a preparation for a more thorough understanding; and that man's part is to know first of all his proper powers.

It is something like this that we have tried to do in this whole discussion: To discover the nature of the Self; to know the possible contribution which this Self makes to the world; and, finally, to escape from the evil results of the tricks which the mind continually plays upon itself; a task to which Lucretius, Peter Abelard, Francis Bacon, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and others, have especially devoted themselves.

But to know the Self, is to a large measure to know the world; for man, being of the world, is in some sense the *implicit* aspect of the world become *explicit.* Consciousness or reflection beholds the world, not as separate from, but as a part of, itself. Just as a flower, which is of a stem; which is, in turn, of a root, turns back and beholds the stem and the root, but only as the *implicit* become *explicit;* so, *consciousness, which is of the world, turns back and beholds and evaluates the world of which it is itself a part.* But this is not to say that the *flower* is not different in *function,* and that it has not its own peculiar reality and individuality. Neither do we mean to say that *consciousness* is not unique. It *is* unique, in that it is *that phase of Reality which is able to evaluate the whole of Reality, and to look back upon that out of which it*

came. Thus, mind or consciousness has a two-fold character: (1) By virtue of its contrast with Nature or the rest of Reality, it is one side of a relation; but (2) By virtue of its comprehension of Nature, it is a part of the whole within which the contrast occurs. In some sense, Nature is prior to the Self; but when the Self is once in action it has the power to retrace the steps by which it came into existence, and, in a measure, to comprehend the whole "cosmic order" out of which it arose. *There is something of all the plant in its flower; just so is there something of all the world in the mind. As the flower is the comprehension of all the plant; just so is mind or consciousness that which comprehends the world. In the flower and the seed are hidden all the seeds and flowers of the past of the species. Likewise, in consciousness is hidden some of the reality of each of all the realities that preceded its becoming determinate.* This does not mean that man is just a *microcosmic speck,* and that his mind is nothing more than the phosphorescent glow of a physiological process. No; just to the contrary, it means that he contains within himself the profoundest aspects of Reality; in that he can comprehend the whole of that which he is, biologically speaking, only a small part; but of which he is, metaphysically speaking, possibly the most significant part. The answer to the question, "What is man that thou art mindful of him?" is, "Thou hast put all things under his feet." He may be a Microcosm of the Macrocosm; but he, as a Microcosm, is as profound and in some sense as mighty as the Macrocosm.

But to say, as we have intimated, that the "I-in-itself" is an amplification of cosmic forces, is to suggest that its products are still further developments of the same process. That is, "things-in-themselves" will be amplifications of consciousness, just as consciousness or reflection is an amplification of the potentialities of the cosmic life; all of which is consistent with this discussion as a whole.

Again, if it be true that consciousness and reflection are the

implicit become *explicit* or *determinate,* then it may be that all the possibilities of conscious reflection are implicitly existent in the cosmos; and that "things-in-themselves" of all kinds are the rational and logical demands of man because they are implicit in the world of which he is a part. Therefore, to conceive of "things-in-themselves" is just to give shape to that which has been eternally *potential* and *indeterminate.* For instance, to conceive God is to prove his existence; which existence becomes, in turn, a demand of that consciousness which has, in the process, become *explicit* or *determinate.* In reality, this is what Descartes meant by his argument for the existence of God. He did not run into the error of St. Anselm and say that the idea of God proved God's *objective* and *constitutive* existence. *For Descartes, God does not exist because we conceive him; but, rather, we conceive him because he exists.* Being *rational,* we conceive that which is *rational.* Being a part of a rational order, the individual will make evaluations which are rational. We cannot well conceive of a rational being coming out of an inherently irrational order of Reality. Therefore, we may assume that both the individual and the world-order are rational; and that the individual is rational because he is a *product* of that which is rational. Again, as W. E. Hocking says, in *The Meaning of God in Human Experience,* in finding God as a necessary object of experience, we have sufficiently and decisively proved his existence. *What better proof could we have that any being exists than to find that being in our experience?* For man's power of recognizing existence is summed up in the word "experience."

The world is, then, an evolving process. But the *products* of the process never cease to be a part of the whole; never, in fact, come to be different from the whole, save in the uniqueness of their function. Therefore, the "I-in-itself," which is the source of conscious evaluation, has both a metaphysical and a logical right to read back into the world all that which it discovers in itself, regardless of occasional arguments to

the contrary; and, by projection, to reconstruct the world somewhat in keeping with its individual demand; this individual demand not being, however, out of relation to the rest of the race, or to the rest of Reality. In *Selections from Kant,* Watson, p. 141, Kant, in speaking of the Transcendental Ideas, says, "They are not mere fictions, but spring from the very nature of Reason itself, and, therefore, stand in a necessary relation to the whole use of Understanding." He should have regressed another step. For if we say that concepts are in a sense the necessary outcome of experience, then it is logical to take another step and to say that experience has a necessary relation to the world as a whole. If the Kantian Ideas or concepts in general are not "abstractions," neither is experience an "abstraction."

Yet, lest there still be room for misunderstanding, let us say another word as briefly as possible. The seventeenth century was obsessed with the idea of a *mechanistic universe.* But the eighteenth century followed, with its discovery of the *inner life,* Immanuel Kant of Königsberg leading the way; he being followed by Fichte; and Fichte, in turn, by the two Schlegels, Schelling, and Novalis.

However, it is not quite this tradition that we have attempted to perpetuate, howevermuch we may realize the importance of keeping in touch with the main stream of thought in any given field. The "I" which we have tried to define or to characterize is not the "I" of Kant, for no one quite knows what that was; even though, as we have seen, there are some very significant implications. It is not the "I" of Fichte, for that "I" had need to be bumped into existence by a world from in front. And it is not the "I" of the Romanticists, the Schlegels, and others, for this "I" was Fichte's "I" gone mad with its sense of freedom.

But the world of the "I" which we have in this work tried to set out is not like a child's playhouse, that may be set up, and torn down, and set up again, in keeping with every

whim of individual fancy. There is something stable about it, even though it be not "fixed." The "I" may reconstruct itself and its world, but it cannot do so simply by the power of its own individual whim. This "I" or "I-in-itself" is *conditioned* by the *unconditioned*. It is in some sense *determinate*. But it is *determined* by the *indeterminate,* of which it continually partakes. It is the *explicit* of the *implicit,* by which it has been shaped, and by which its possibilities have been, and are always being, more or less regulated. William James, in his *Human Immortality,* expresses the idea that consciousness comes to, and through, our bodies from a kind of *cosmic reservoir*. But while this "I" has been *determined* by the *indeterminate,* it itself, in turn, *determines*. It is not "that which is neither created nor creates." It is rather "that which is created and creates." The whole cosmos is its ground; but it is in turn the chief ground of all "knowing" processes, together with all the "things-in-themselves" involved therein. In the *Selections from Kant,* Watson, p. 50, Kant says, "Synthesis in general is due solely to the operation of imagination, a blind, but indispensable function of the Soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatever, but of which we are seldom even conscious. To bring this synthesis to conceptions is the function of Understanding. And it is only by this operation of Understanding that we obtain what can properly be called knowledge." And "Pure Synthesis viewed in its most general aspect, is the pure conception of Understanding." Again, p. 77, Kant says, "Imagination . . . pertains to Sensibility. At the same time its synthesis is the expression of spontaneous activity; for unlike sense, imagination is not simply capable of being *determined,* but it is itself *determining;* and hence it can *a priori determine* sense in its form, in accordance with the unity of apperception." (See also same work, pp. 79, 81, 87). This whole process represents the activity of the "I-in-itself."

True, this "I" is made by the *past*. But, by the use of its

imagination, it takes part in the making of both the *present* and the *future*. It may be somewhat passive in receiving the past; but it is active and at least partly free in its reconstruction, and in the projection of this past into the future. In the *Critique of Judgment,* p. 8, Kant says, "The will, regarded as the faculty of desire, is one of the many natural causes in the world, viz., that cause which acts in accordance with concepts." *Kant's "will," or the "I" stands in the center of the stage, not only in the sense that the world revolves about it but in the sense that it is the pivot upon which Reality turns.* It is the point at which *potentiality* becomes *actuality* or *actual Reality*. It is created by the past, in the evolutionary process. But having itself been *created,* it proceeds to *create.* And the world out of which it arose comes to be a different world, in that the new creations of the "I" mix and mingle with, and add meaning to, the world in which the "I" was once shut up. Having awakened, the "I" rises up, sets its house in order, sweeps out those things which are undesirable, and ornaments and decorates in keeping with its new-found needs. As Thomas Reid puts it, "The mind may be compared to an apothecary or chemist, whose materials indeed are furnished by Nature, but, for the purposes of his art, he mixes, compounds, dissolves, evaporates, and sublimes them, till they put on a quite different appearance."

But let us try to state the matter a little more clearly: Reality may be defined in two ways, that is, (1) *As purely metaphysical Reality;* and, (2) *As purely logical Reality.* The cosmic basis of experience is that metaphysical ground which precedes and underlies all purely biological experience, together with those demands which come to be a part of the experience of higher organisms. Now, as we have said in the preceding paragraph, *reflection is the pivot upon which Reality turns;* which, when amplified, means that purely *metaphysical Reality* is, in reflection, transformed into *logical Reality*. The "I" or "I-in-itself" becomes a "prism," which

receives into itself the *undifferentiated* and *indeterminate* "stuff." But by means of the "prism," the *undifferentiated* is *differentiated* and broken up until Reality appears to consist of "many," rather than of "one." Also, each *determinate* produced by the "prism" takes on its peculiar color; the "prism" or "I" apparently having the power to break up Reality into many differently colored parts, as, for instance, Cause, Time, Space, Matter, Mind, Soul, God, and an indefinite number of concepts, each of which has its cosmic ground. For we cannot think of *something* as coming out of *nothing*.

It is insisted by some authorities, Bertrand Russell, for instance, that man is subordinate to Nature in the realm of physical facts; but that he is independent of Nature in the realm of values. These writers say, at the same time, that man is a natural creature. But if man is a "natural product" of a "natural world-order," how can it be said that his process of evaluation is independent of Nature? As we have tried to show in our Introduction, value has a *psychological* basis; which may be interpreted to be a *naturalistic* basis. *Therefore, it is better to say that the world, including the world of values, is a continuous one. The colors of the spectrum are not new and independent creations; they are the original constituents of the light-ray which is subjected to the "prism."*

In brief, this is to say, that "conceptual Reality" is not to be wholly divorced from the rest of the "world-order." Kant himself, in the *Prolegomena,* Carus, p. 115, says: "Thus, we are able, in rational beings, or in beings generally, so far as their causality is determined in them as things-in-themselves, to imagine a faculty of beginning from itself a series of states, without falling into contradiction with the laws of nature." The "Thing-in-itself" as the "I-in-itself" is, therefore, not out of accord with, but in keeping with, Nature; in some sense a product of Nature, and, in a measure, the continuation of Nature; in that it has the power to amplify and project

the materials received by it. In the *Critique of Judgment,* p. 13, Kant holds that "There must be a ground of the unity of the Supersensible, which lies at the basis of nature, with that which the concept of freedom practically contains." In a word, Kant contends that "to explain the phenomena of organic life and the purposiveness of nature, we must hold that the world of sense is not disparate from, and opposed to, the world of thought; but that nature is the development of freedom." Therefore, the world of value should not be divorced from, but considered as a continuation of, the natural world-order.

To put it another way, ideals should not be thought of as being snatched out of an *empty void.* For, in reality, postulates, values, or "things-in-themselves" do not come to us in the form of mere "innate ideas." It is rather out of the stress of human experience, in relation to the rest of Reality, that the will adopts its aims and its deepest meanings. *Whatever is present in the ideal is first present in the rest of Reality.* In the order of existence, we are first *passive,* and then *active.* However, no analysis is able to separate our *passivity* from our *activity.* Things change only in form and function. As Aristotle believes, the world had no *beginning,* neither can it ever have an *ending.* But this does not mean that the world is not full of variety. For the *indeterminate* is always becoming *determinate,* and *vice versa.* Non-Being is always becoming Being. And Becoming itself is always full of new functions, in that it is always made of lesser or greater proportions of Being and Non-Being. In spite of the fact that the world was, is, and always will be, fundamentally the same in its metaphysical constituents, yet there may be always something "new under the sun." For that which functions today may not do so tomorrow; and that which *is not today, may exist, and function tomorrow,* as a vital instrument in the world's changing life.

That is, all of that which is experienced, and all of that

which may be experienced, is, in fact, real or potentially so. If I am not real, then nothing is real. Something in my conception of Reality starts from me; and my objects become real, as if infected with the contribution which I make. But it is still true, that unless the whole of Nature is real, nothing is real, not even myself. It was this fact which compelled Descartes, in spite of his rationalistic tendencies, to demand God as a "conserving cause." Something in my conception of Reality is borne in upon me from beyond. In part, I am real by virtue of what is not myself. That is, the Real must partake of the qualities of myself and of Nature as a whole. "Reality" is not *Nature or myself;* rather, it is *Nature and myself,* as we meet and exchange experiences with each other. In short, as we have tried to show, both the *indeterminate* and the *determinate* aspects of the world are changing and real. This is especially true when applied to man. As Leibnitz states, "The stags and the hares of our time do not become more full of shifts than those of former times; while, on the other hand, men become more skillful by finding always new contrivances." From which he draws the conclusion that the sources of necessary truth within us distinguish us from the lower animals. That is, we are not only *biological creatures,* but *metaphysical beings,* and bring with us into the world native capacities, born or formulated, by degrees, out of the indefinite past. *For Nature never goes by leaps.* Life is made up, not only of the big or *conscious* entities or perceptions, but of the *unconscious* entities or perceptions. The continuity of life has made possible the building-up of these little and progressive gains into a conscious individual. The little perceptions or psychical actualities have been gradually coordinated into one conscious and reflective personality, with its activities and its demands; just as the infinitesimal sounds produced by each wave unite and become, at last, the audible moaning of the sea. In other words, out of the *indeterminate,* by a series of concatenated processes, there have been evolved

Beings which have the power to reflect upon their experiences, and to create, amplify, and project conceptual stimuli *ad infinitum,* as a continuation of the cosmic process.

Finally, to synthesize and sum up, let us say that man, as an "I," "I-in-itself," or the chief "Thing-in-itself," *created,* by evolution, out of the primordial past, himself, at last, becomes a *creator.* Looking backward upon the world out of which he came, he refashions it in terms of the metaphysical and logical capacities of his "finished mind." And, looking forward, and aided by the powers of his "prismatic mind," he breaks up the "white light" of all Reality into many colors; and out of them builds a world, which, in appearance, is quite unlike the world which lies about him. That is, as a Microcosm of the Macrocosm, he gathers up out of the Macrocosm the *implicit metaphysical* Realities there; transmutes them into *logical* Realities; and, not quite knowing that he does so, quickly projects, hypostatizes, or reifies them, and builds them into an *objective or ideal world;* which is, as such, the work of his own creative genius.

But to further clarify the process of human thought, it should here be said that the whole movement is, consciously or unconsciously, *practical* and *purposive*; the "I," "I-in-itself," or chief "Thing-in-itself" being the hub of all the mental motions involved. In the *first* place, the "I-in-itself," as the essence, substance, or quintessence of Reality "mundanized" or "existentialized," proceeds to create those "subsistents" which seem most pertinent to the promotion and preservation of itself, that is, subsistents like God, the Soul, Freedom, and Immortality. In the *second* place, the "I" creates the proper or desirable "things-in-themselves" as explanations for the existence and behavior of the different realms of objective and visible Reality; which type of "things-in-themselves" includes subsistents like Fairies, the Mythological Gods, St. Nicholas, Santa Claus, and the several so-called Spiritual Gods of the great religions. And in the *third* place, and for

every-day practical purposes, the "I" whittles out useful subsistents, such as Patriotism, Loyalty, and Love. Of course if this "I" be of a scientific bent, it will think in terms of the "laws" of astronomy, the "principles" of biology, or the "concepts" by means of which the psychologist guides himself through the mazes of modern technical psychology.

However, it should be understood that this whole process of giving birth to concepts as a means of explaining the existence or activity of Phenomena is mainly an *unconscious,* or *subconscious,* one. As William McDougall, in *The Energies of Man,* would say, it is a kind of "crystal-vision" process. If a person will gaze at a sphere of glass or crystal, "or at any other small brilliant dark surface," he will most likely soon see a cloud of mist. In a little while this cloud will take on a sensible shape; when some scene will stand out before the subject. This "crystal vision" may even tell a story; which will seem to come to the subject ready-made from the outside; when, of course, in fact, he himself has produced it from within his own "subconscious" mind. *Man, being created, and created to create, instinctively, and, largely unconsciously, proceeds to create.* That is, man's role is to carry on the creative activities of the Forces, Powers, and Capacities which have preceded him.

In a word, God may be the logical ground of the world; and the Logos may be the creative Force therein. But, according to Origen of Alexandria, each man is another Logos, who continues to amplify the creations of the past in his own, and, to some extent, individual way. Not forgetting the Roots of the world as they exist in God; and not forgetting the Trunk as it functions in terms of the Logos (or Law, or Reason, or Intelligence) of all Nature and Life, man, largely unconsciously, goes on to construct a world which is a *colorful, artistic,* or *logical* climax to all of the Cosmic Creations preceding him.

We may not have a full knowledge of the "I-in-itself." But

we know that it *is;* that it is an Existential Reality; that it is full of mystery and not easy to fathom; and that out of its storehouse come unnumbered "things-in-themselves" or *Subsistent Realities,* like the *concepts, universals, hypotheses,* and *symbols* of Science, Philosophy, and Religion.

In accord with our previous discussion, it has been stated that man is the "flower of creation." If that is true, it may now be said, that the *subsistent* or *conceptual* world of which he is the builder, is the "flower" of all *creative activity.*

And so does man, in keeping with his *creative* or *constructive genius,* lay for the world of "stuff" a thought-foundation; and, at the same time, proceed to erect a *suitable superstructure* upon the world which he beholds with his natural eye. *He refashions and sets in order one world; and becomes the builder of another.*

If it is true that God instead of creating the world out of "nothing" created it out of his "Ideas," as St. Augustine is said to have suggested, with which suggestion Bishop Berkeley would very likely have agreed; then it might be perfectly natural for man to create a world out of *his* "ideas." At least, whether with or without the case of God as a precedent, that is precisely what he does: A Noumenal World, an Intelligible World, a Supernatural World: A World of Thoughts, a World of Logic, a World of Dreams.

Therefore, the whole matter of the nature of man may be summed up by saying, that man is not, primarily, a *Reasoner,* but a *Believer* and a *Dreamer.* At the expense of Reason, or in spite of Reason, man *wills* his own "Thought-World," and furnishes it with the places, things, and beings which are born out of his own "Creative Mind."

"Virtus rerum in medio consistit."

ADDENDUM

THE "UNKNOWABLENESS" which we generally think of as belonging to, or as being inherent in, any given object, is, in reality, only the projection of our own idea of "unknowableness."

Therefore, if one will only exercise himself in the way of cognizing Reality from within, he will soon be convinced that all cognition is ultimately subjective or transcendental; that there are no "things-in-themselves" hidden away in the midst of things phenomenal; and that his own mind is the source and the secret of the whole process.

Bodily objects are, and are progressively *knowable*; for the ultimate "Thing-in-itself" is "psychic," and so capable of ultimately comprehending the so-called phenomenal *unknowable*.

In other words, the ultimate "Thing-in-itself" is the cognizing mind of the individual, as he creates the "known" world out of the "raw stuff" of something which is in some sense, at first, relatively objective; but which is finally absorbed and assimilated by the mind; and then by it projected beyond as that world which is now more satisfactory to its "creator" than any "raw-stuff" world could possibly be.

And so does man, by the power of his own inherent creative capacity, become the builder of the world in the midst of which he lives. *A* world was here when or before he began to think; but *his* world was not here until he created it out of the stuff of his own being.

In the study of the Psychology of the primitive man, it is now well understood that the *spirit* or "Thing-in-itself" in the tree or the river or the sun was the "psychic state" of the individual projected into the object, and then thought of as be-

longing to the object in its own right. Here the mind of the primitive man is identical with the mind of the modern civilized man. In each case the thought-process is the same.

It is this capacity or logical necessity of positing conceptual causes that makes man, as the *thought* of a *Cosmic Thought,* to be the ultimate "Thing-in-itself." That is, he, man, is ultimate for the reason that he is the amplification of that larger *Thought* out of which all *thoughts* and all *things* proceed. But, being of the nature of the larger *Thought,* he is naturally capacitated to read himself into all of Nature; just as the larger *Thought* expresses itself in and through all of the objects of the world.

That is, all of Reality is Mind-Reality. The whole of the Natural World is what it is because of the presence and the activity within it of a Cosmic Mind. And the human or cognitive mind of man is shot through with that particular kind of mind which characterizes the Cosmos.

And that particular kind of mind with which the world of man is shot through we call "things-in-themselves." For they are the ways or means by which he creates his world and gives it meaning. He, as the chief "Thing-in-itself," in terms of that which thinks, must create or think or cognize in terms of his basic nature. That is, these little "things-in-themselves" are but the projections of himself into all those things which constitute the raw stuff of his world.

But even all of this so-called "raw stuff" of the phenomenal realm may be nothing more than the Thought of the Cosmos "mundanized" and made to look unlike the stuff of Thought, when, in reality, it, too, is, in essence, nothing but Thought.

For, just as man naturally makes *things* of his *thoughts* by reifying certain concepts, perhaps the Thought of the Cosmos has made *things* of his *Thoughts,* as, for example, suns, planets, rivers, birds, and flowers.

Another way of stating the matter is to say that man

thinks as he does because of a kind of *inner compulsion*. Being one aspect of the Cosmic Mind, he must needs think somewhat in keeping with that Mind.

And that is to say that he does not "think God's Thoughts after him," but, rather, that he "thinks God's Thoughts along with him."

And all of this is to say that both the *Thought-World* of God and the *Thought-World* of man are of the nature of Reason. And if that is true, then the nature of all Reality is that of Intelligence, Logic, Ideas, Concepts, and Transcendental Realities of all kinds.

Therefore, to sum up, one might say that it is the nature of both God and man to think in the ways which have been suggested. That is, that the "World-of-God" is what it is because it is the nature of God to think as he does; and that the "World-of-man" is what it is because it is the nature of man to think as he does. And that both Worlds are what they are because of a kind of *necessity* or *inner compulsion*. Which may be just another way of saying that the true nature of Reality is stateable in terms of the Thoughts of God and the thoughts of man, which thoughts *must* be thought as they now are. And that these thoughts, and not Matter, or Force, or Energy constitute the ultimate "stuff" of Reality, both *visible* and *invisible*.

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